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Summary
The main  purpose  of  this  thesis  is  to  provide  an  understanding of  the  EU’s  approach to
peacebuilding in its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations.
The thesis explores why EU missions carry out mainly post-conflict peacebuilding tasks and
whether  the  shift  towards  peacebuilding  is  about  a  substantial  change of  EU norms.  The
research analyses how peacebuilding in CSDP actions is framed, designed and operationalised
through the complex decision- and policy-making processes within the CSDP.  In particular,
the thesis assesses how the EU’s approach to peacebuilding in the CSDP was influenced by
the  UN’s  conceptualisation  of  peacebuilding  and  how  the  EU  has  developed  its  own
distinctive approach to peacebuilding. While looking at the examples of civilian missions and
military operations in Mali and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the thesis provides insights into
the operational dynamics of peacebuilding under the CSDP.
The thesis argues that CSDP missions and operations reflect a normative and practical
commitment of the EU to international peacebuilding. CSDP actions deployed in post-conflict
scenarios follow the logic of liberal peacebuilding strategies while aiming at the stabilisation,
reconstruction and building of the institutions of a functioning state, in particular the military,
police and justice sectors. The EU pursues its peacebuilding activities under the CSDP in a
comprehensive, case-specific and geopolitically strategic way as demonstrated by case studies
of Mali and Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, the research reveals that, although the
shift towards peacebuilding in CSDP actions has been underpinned by a change of normative
approaches, driven by the reform process of the UN peacekeeping, it also reflects the EU’s
preferences, pragmatic limits and capability-expectation gaps in crisis management. 
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1  Introduction
Outline of the theme 
Since the end of the Cold War, multiple security challenges have led to the development of
new ways of dealing with conflicts. The surge of intrastate conflicts and the recurrence of
violence  have  emphasised  that  neither  military  intervention  nor  peacekeeping  alone  can
prevent a country from sliding into a war. Traditional peacekeeping utterly failed in Rwanda
and Srebrenica. The rise of transnational terrorism further underlined the importance of new
approaches to post-conflict states which can easily become breeding grounds of terrorism.
Besides, the US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq cast a shadow of doubt over the
ability of military actions to achieve lasting peace.
In this  environment,  peacebuilding has emerged as  a  new practice of  international
assistance  to  states  recovering  from  conflicts  in  their  quest  for  sustainable  peace.
Peacebuilding is a form of post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction aimed at preventing
the  relapse  of  a  post-conflict  society  back  into  conflict.  It  addresses  both  the  immediate
consequences and root causes of conflicts. Peacebuilding that focuses on the stabilisation,
reform and building of state institutions has become the dominant approach of state actors and
intergovernmental organisations (Richmond 2011; Richmond and Mitchell 2012). This form
of  peacebuilding  addresses  structural  causes  of  conflict  while  building  social,  political,
judicial, economic and security state sectors (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; 2006). 
While peacebuilding has been mainly associated with the United Nations (UN), the
European Union (EU)1 also identified it as one of the priorities of its foreign policy (Council
of the EU 2008). The EU contributes financially and with civilian and military expertise to the
peacebuilding activities of the UN and other organisations. The EU also undertakes its own
peacebuilding policies and programmes. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)2
has  become the  EU’s  most  significant  contribution  to  international  peacebuilding  efforts.
Launched as an instrument for managing conflicts outside the EU’s borders, the CSDP stands
primarily for civilian and military missions in third countries. It covers the full range of crisis
management  tasks,  also  known  as  Petersberg  Tasks:  “joint  disarmament  operations,
humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and
1 The  EU  is  used  in  this  work  to  also  denote  its  predecessor,  the  European  Community,  unless  it  is
indispensable to refer to previous terms.
2 CSDP was  initially  framed  as  Common  European  Security  and  Defence  Policy  and,  shortly  after,  as
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The Lisbon Treaty renamed ESDP to CSDP (Howorth 2014,
19). CSDP is used in this work to refer to all the three unless it is necessary to refer to previous names.
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peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and
post-conflict stabilisation” (TEU Art. 23(1)).3 
Initiated by the Franco-British agreement at Saint-Malo, the CSDP was envisioned as
a tool for strengthening all aspects of the security of the Union, including the EU’s capacity
for autonomous military actions in international crises (Joint Declaration 1998). The original
Petersberg Tasks were designed for military crisis  management:  “humanitarian and rescue
tasks,  peacekeeping  tasks  and  tasks  of  combat  forces  in  crisis  management,  including
peacemaking” (Treaty of Nice Art. 1(2.2)). The CSDP was supposed to empower the EU as a
military actor  and strengthen the EU’s  military capabilities  (Salmon and Shepherd 2003).
Despite  this  vision,  and  despite  the  fact  that  the  CSDP includes  the  full  range  of  crisis
management tasks, EU missions and operations are mainly utilised in post-conflict scenarios
rather than open conflicts. CSDP actions have, for the most part, been deployed to promote
post-conflict  stabilisation,  reforms  and  the  rebuilding  of  state  structures.  They  comprise
activities in the areas of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); security sector
reform (SSR), which includes the reform and capacity-building of military and police sectors;
and the reform of the rule of law. These activities fall within the scope of peacebuilding.
Since 2003, the EU has deployed several missions and operations to stabilise and build
peace in third countries. Through these deployments, the EU established itself as an actor in
international peacebuilding (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006; Stewart 2011). As Biscop and
Whitman noted, the emergence of the CSDP, in particular its military component, was the key
aspect in the gradual development of the EU “as an autonomous actor in the field of security,
aiming to safeguard European security by improving global security” (Biscop and Withman
2013a,  1).  Tardy  noted  that  CSDP  missions  and  operations  “are  the  most  visible
manifestations of EU activity in fragile states and the most tangible expression of the EU’s
contribution to international peace” (Tardy 2015a, 7). It could be argued that CSDP actions
reflect a normative and practical commitment of the EU to international peacebuilding.
EU missions  and operations  are  part  of  a  broader  spectrum of  international  peace
missions carried out by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the African Union
(AU) and the UN (Missiroli 2015). Peace support operations have become a central activity of
3 These tasks may be utilised in the fight against terrorism and in the support of third countries in combating
terrorism in their territories as outlined in Art. 43(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The CSDP also
includes provisions for the progressive framing of a common EU defence policy, actions of solidarity and
mutual assistance if an EU state is the object of an armed aggression, and  the  framework for Permanent
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) (TEU Art. 42). Sanctions, mediation and conflict prevention support, and
the early warning mechanism  are institutionally  under the authority of the Deputy Secretary-General  for
CSDP and Crisis Response (DSG-CSDPCR). However, they do not fall under the CSDP decision-making
based on Art. 42 and 43 of the TEU. Sanctions are regulated by Art. 30 and 31 of the TEU. 
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international organisations since the 1990s. While the UN has been the main actor in conflict
management since the end of WWII, regional organisations assumed a similar role only after
the  end  of  the  Cold  War.4 Short-term  military  peace-enforcement  operations  have  been
NATO’s main activities. In contrast, the UN has been at the forefront of peacekeeping. Since
the end of the 1990s, the UN has expanded its peacekeeping operations, the task of which was
to  merely  observe  peace  agreements  and  keep  peace,  into  comprehensive  missions  with
peacebuilding components and pioneered peacebuilding missions. 
The role of the EU in peacebuilding has been mainly shaped by the UN.  The UN
provided a source of legitimacy for the EU’s CSDP (Kurowska and Seitz 2011). At the same
time,  the  EU  was  the  main  supporter  of  the  shift  towards  peacebuilding  at  the  UN
(Blockmans, Wouters and Ruys 2010, 2). The EU’s peacebuilding activities under the CSDP
resemble those of the UN as they aim at the stabilisation and rebuilding of state institutions.
Howorth  has  argued  that,  in  their  scope  and  range,  CSDP missions  and  operations  are
comparable  only  “to  the  United  Nations  as  a  peacekeeping  body”  (Howorth  2014,  13).
Nevertheless,  in  contrast  to  robust  and multidimensional  UN missions,  CSDP actions  are
modest,  small  in  size  and  usually  focused  on  one  aspect  of  peacebuilding.  One  of  the
questions explored therefore is how peacebuilding within the CSDP fits the UN framework
and norm of peacebuilding. A second question is how the shift towards peacebuilding at the
UN has impacted on the identity of the EU as a peacebuilding rather than military actor.
At the same time, the CSDP is an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP). In this  sense,  EU peacebuilding is an outcome of EU foreign policy.  The
unique nature of EU foreign policy-making, which combines both the member states and the
EU  institutions,  has  inevitably  influenced  the  character  of  EU  peacebuilding.  So,  to
understand the EU’s approach to peacebuilding under the CSDP, it is important to examine
how peacebuilding is orchestrated as EU foreign policy. This can help to explain the extent to
which  the  EU’s  approach  to  peacebuilding  is  influenced  by  self-centred  preferences  of
member states or their normative commitment.  
Despite primarily involving post-conflict activities, the CSDP has not been analysed
from a peacebuilding perspective. The peacebuilding literature focuses on the UN and NGOs
as  main  international  peacebuilding  actors  (Newman 2013).  The  conceptualisation  of  EU
peacebuilding is widely absent in peace studies.  Before the launch of the CSDP, scholars
highlighted the EU’s potential in conflict prevention and in tackling root causes of conflicts
(Cottey 1998; Bonnen 2003; Debiel and Fisher 2000; Hill 1992; 2001; Rummel 1996). While
4 For example, Ojanen has argued that NATO, the Western European Union (WEU) and later the EU had to
find new activities after their traditional defence function ceased after the end of the Cold War (2006b, 68).
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analysing  the  international  role  of  the  European  Community,  Christopher  Hill  (1993)
identified a ‘capability-expectations  gap’ between what the Community aspired to do and
what it was actually able to deliver. He determined three components of this gap: the ability to
agree, resource availability, and the instruments at the Community’s disposal, all of which
were lacking at that time. The CSDP was seen as a crucial step towards the narrowing of this
gap (Cameron 2002; Freire 2008; Toje 2008). 
Initially,  the  debate  centred  on  whether  the  EU needed  a  CSDP and whether  this
instrument could ever be good for the EU. While some criticised the establishment of the
CSDP,  in  particular  its  military  component,  as  the  wrong  policy  for  the  EU  (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni 2003;  Menon 2003), others defended it (Howorth 2003).  Lindley-French was
pessimistic about the prospects for a more united and active use of the CSDP (Lindley-French
2002). Eilstrup-Sangiovanni  (2003) argued that  the  EU should  focus  on  strengthening its
capacity  for  what  it  does  best,  namely  non‐military  crisis‐management  and  post‐war
reconstruction, instead of attempting to build an autonomous military capacity since EU states
fundamentally disagree about where and when to deploy troops. In contrast, others saw the
CSDP as a quest by EU countries for autonomy in security and defence. This pursuit led to
fears about the competing ambitions, contrasting visions and trans-Atlantic tensions between
the CSDP and NATO. Scholars debated whether the CSDP would strengthen or undermine the
Alliance and how it would affect the relationship between the two (Cimbalo 2004; De Wijk
2004; Howorth and Keeler 2003; Ojanen 2006b). 
Scholarship on the CSDP has, however, grown exponentially, focusing predominantly
on the  evolution,  procedures,  structures  and roles  of  the  CSDP from the  perspectives  of
security, actorness or integration (Bonnén 2003; Cameron 2012; Gnesotto 2004; Grevi, Helly
and Keohane 2009; Howorth 2014; Kurowska and Breuer 2012; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite
2006; 2008; Meyer 2006; Pohl 2014; M.E. Smith 2017; Tardy 2015a). While some scholars
argued that the CSDP was created to balance the US (Pape 2005; Posen 2004, 2006; Jones
2007), others questioned this assumption (Howorth 2014; Howorth and Menon 2009). Some
have emphasised the  importance of  a  strategic  vision for  the  CSDP (Biscop 2002;  2009;
2015b;  Biscop and  Coelmont  2010;  2011a;  2011b;  Biscop and Norheim-Martinsen  2012;
Biscop et al. 2015; Howorth 2004; 2009); others have criticised the CSDP for its political and
institutional gaps (Menon 2009; 2011; Salmon 2005; Shepherd 2012). 
The CSDP has been situated within the frameworks of conflict prevention and/or crisis
management (e.g. Blockmans 2008b;  Galantino and Freire 2015; Gross and Juncos 2011b;
Pohl 2014). Some studies have focused exclusively on the military component of the CSDP
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(Engberg 2014), with some hopes being evoked for an increased EU military involvement and
a common European defence (Andersson et al. 2016; Cooper 2003; Kagan 2003; Treacher
2004; Salmon 2005). Other works have been dedicated to civilian missions (Nowak 2006a;
Tocci  2007).  Some  scholars  have  seen  civilian  conflict  prevention  in  danger  due  to  an
increased militarisation of crisis management (Debiel and Fischer 2000; Stewart 2006; 2008;
2011;  K.E.  Smith  2008).  The  Routledge  Handbook  of  European  Security  (Biscop  and
Whitman 2013b) and Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations (Rehrl and Glume 2015)
provide  a  comprehensive  overview  of  different  aspects  of  the  CSDP,  including  actors,
structures, decision- and policy-making processes, and missions and operations. 
Respective CSDP missions and operations have been analysed extensively (Asseburg
and Kempin 2009;  Celador  2005; Emerson and Gross 2007a;  Galantino and Freire  2015;
Grevi,  Helly and Keohane 2009;  Gross  2009;  Merlingen and Ostrauskaite  2005a,  2005b,
2008; Martinelli 2008; Osland 2004;  Seibert  2010; Whitman and Woff 2010). These works
mostly focus  on  particular aspects  of  CSDP actions.  Some authors  use  the  term conflict
prevention for civilian missions and crisis management for military operations, while others
refer  to  both elements  of  the  CSDP as  to  crisis  management.  However,  as  Ginsberg and
Penska (2012) and Freire and Galantino (2015) argue, most works on CSDP missions and
operations lack a comparison with other cases and a link to an overall framework or theory. 
When EU peacebuilding has been studied, it has usually concerned the development
activities of the Commission (Castaneda 2014, Newman 2013; Spernbauer 2014). Only a few
scholars have looked at peacebuilding within the CSDP, even then only from specific points
of view. The Routledge Handbook mentioned above does not refer to peacebuilding, while the
Handbook by Rehrl and Glume contains brief references to it. In the Routledge Handbook,
Gourlay (2013) discusses the potential and limitations of civilian CSDP as a tool for state-
building in countries recovering from war. Merlingen and Ostrauskaite (2005a; 2005b; 2006),
for example, study the policing component of the CSDP within a peacebuilding framework.
While concentrating on one aspect of the CSDP only and on two particular missions in Bosnia
and Herzegovina (BiH), and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), they link
EU peacebuilding to the international construction of liberal peace. They conclude that CSDP
missions  “are  designed  for  short-term  crisis  management,  rather  than  long-term
peacebuilding” (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2005a, 233), despite the fact that the missions in
the Balkans carried out long-term post-conflict peacebuilding tasks.
Richmond,  Björkdahl  and  Kappler  (2011)  have  looked  at  the  evolution  of  the
emerging peacebuilding framework of the EU. They mainly focus on the normative level and
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lack a reference to the CSDP mechanism. Whitman and Wolff’s edited book (2012) analyses
the EU’s role as a global actor in conflict management. Although the work does not build on
the framework of peacebuilding, it refers specifically to those EU activities which fall under
the category of peacebuilding. The work by Aggestam and Björkdahl (2013) which discusses
the  EU’s  peacebuilding  practices  in  the  Middle  East  and  the  Western  Balkans  links
peacebuilding with justice theories. While the contributors argue that the EU peacebuilding
framework is based on liberal peacebuilding, they observe that the EU is moving towards a
less  state-centric  approach.  While  these  scholars  criticise  the  liberal  nature  of  EU
peacebuilding,  others argue that peacebuilding in the CSDP is not liberal  enough (Osland
2004; Dobbins et al. 2008). 
The European Union and Peacebuilding by  Blockmans,  Wouters  and Ruys (2010)
provides  a  comprehensive  overview  of  the  whole  spectrum  of  the  EU’s  different
peacebuilding activities. This volume perhaps best analyses the EU’s peacebuilding policies
and activities. CSDP missions and operations are depicted as a short-term dimension of the
EU’s peacebuilding activities.  They are  discussed only as  part  of  other  activities  such as
development and human rights promotion. Respective chapters outline the CSDP structures
and  procedures  but  lack  an  analysis  of  the  dynamics  behind  peacebuilding  policies.
Contributors  discuss  different  CSDP  missions  and  operations  in  connection  to  other
peacebuilding activities under broader frameworks such as good governance and economic
development. However, due to its focus on a wide range of the EU’s peacebuilding activities,
CSDP actions are not given very much attention.5 
Despite the contribution of these studies, the nexus of the peacebuilding framework
and the CSDP practice has  not  been addressed profoundly to  date.  The studies  discussed
above have focused on specific aspects of peacebuilding or CSDP tasks, such as policing or
justice sector separately, or discussed the role of the CSDP as part of other frameworks. The
literature has not examined the relationship between the CSDP peacebuilding practice and the
international  peacebuilding  model,  in  particular  the  UN  framework  of  peacebuilding.
Scholarship has not analysed why CSDP actions carry out primarily peacebuilding tasks and
how these tasks are negotiated, designed and formulated through decision- and policy-making
processes at  the EU level.  Lastly,  comparisons  of different  case studies  on peacebuilding
practices through the CSDP have been absent in the academic literature.
5 The collection is the last part of a trilogy on the EU’s approaches to conflicts. The first volume looks at the
EU and conflict prevention (Kronenberger and Wouters 2004), and the second analyses the EU and crisis
management (Blockmans 2008b). The CSDP is discussed in the second book within the framework of crisis
management, whereas the last book analyses the CSDP from the perspective of peacebuilding. 
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Research aims and questions
Given this relative lack of attention to EU peacebuilding, this dissertation analyses the EU’s
approach  to  peacebuilding  through  the  CSDP  by  investigating  how  the  CSDP  fits  the
peacebuilding framework. The questions of how the peacebuilding paradigm shift is reflected
within the CSDP and the extent to which the EU adopted the international peacebuilding
framework have not been explored. Contemporary scholarship has not investigated why the
CSDP mainly involves peacebuilding and what the main characteristics of EU peacebuilding
are. This thesis aims to help fill this gap by exploring why and how the EU has adopted and
institutionalised the norm of peacebuilding. The research analyses how peacebuilding under
the  CSDP is  conceptualised,  designed,  governed  and  implemented.  The  central  research
question examines the extent to which CSDP missions and operations reflect a normative and
practical commitment of the EU to international peacebuilding – that is to say, the extent to
which CSDP missions and operations have been shaped by international peacebuilding norms
and/or by EU foreign policy-making.  The analysis of these two dimensions of the research
question  as  well  as  the  extent  to  which  they influence  each other  is  undertaken  through
competing perspectives from three interrelated angles:
 The relationship of the CSDP to the international peacebuilding paradigm shift: To
what extent have international peacebuilding norms, as articulated through the UN,
influenced the EU’s CSDP? To what extent is the EU’s understanding of peacebuilding
compatible  with  that  of  the  UN? How did  the  two entities  influence  each other’s
conceptualisations of peacebuilding? 
 The conceptualisation and governance of EU peacebuilding within the CSDP: To what
extent is the EU’s approach to peacebuilding in the CSDP shaped by member states
and EU institutions? What interests, preferences and considerations do these actors
pursue in the design of CSDP peacebuilding? 
 The operational dynamics of peacebuilding under the CSDP: What can actual missions
and operations tell us about the EU’s approach to peacebuilding? To what extent is the
implementation of peacebuilding in CSDP actions conditioned by the EU’s political
and practical capabilities and/or constraints? 
These research questions and perspectives can generate meaningful conclusions for the
role of the EU in international peacebuilding. The analysis of peacebuilding within the CSDP
helps to determine what kind of international peacebuilding actor the EU is. The analysis of
these aspects requires asking further questions: What does the focus on peacebuilding in the
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CSDP tell us about the EU’s capability-expectations gap? Has the shift towards peacebuilding
in  the  CSDP led  to  a  renewed  broadening  or  further  narrowing  of  this  gap?  Does  this
extensive  focus  on  post-conflict  stabilisation  and  peacebuilding  prove  right  Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni’s (2003) argument that the EU should focus on strengthening its capacity for
what  it  does  best,  namely  non‐military  crisis‐management  and  post‐war  reconstruction,
instead of attempting to build an autonomous military capacity? 
This thesis also asks how the shift towards peacebuilding in the CSDP corresponds
with arguments by those who call for an enhanced EU’s involvement in the full range of crisis
management tasks. Sven Biscop noted that, due to close proximity and the interests at stake, it
is not an option but that it is “Europe’s responsibility to take the lead in maintaining peace and
security” in its close and broader neighbourhood (Biscop 2013a, 4). He has argued that the
EU has three responsibilities as a security provider outside its territory: 
“In (1) crisis management, Europeans must be able to act across the full spectrum
of expeditionary operations, from evacuation, support to humanitarian relief, and
assistance and training, to peacekeeping, peace enforcement and indeed war. But a
military  strategy  also  encompasses  (2)  prevention,  by  way  of  maintaining  a
permanent forward presence in priority areas, and (3) deterrence, by maintaining a
credible power projection capacity at all times” (Ibid., 2).
Post-conflict stabilisation and peacebuilding are indeed the indisputable component of this
responsibility. According to Biscop, “[w]hether it intervened or not, Europe definitely has a
responsibility  to  stabilize  any  post-conflict  situation,  including  through  peacekeeping,
SSR/DDR, and training and assisting local armed forces (as well as the security and justice
apparatus)” (Ibid., 3). However, he argued that some situations may require the use of other
instruments, such as combat operations.  The EU should therefore be more ambitious,  and
develop its capabilities further (Ibid., 5). This level of ambition is also important, if the EU
wants to prove its credibility as an actor in international conflict management. As Biscop and
Whitman have argued, the capacity to be an effective global actor does not translate only in
terms of normative influence as a model.  Instead,  “the EU must be a  power,  an effective
strategic actor. […] Attractiveness alone does not generate soft power – the EU must be seen
to  act  upon  its  strategy.  [...]  its  agenda  entails  a  commitment  to  proactively  shape  the
environment” (Biscop and Whitman 2013a, 1).
Through my own participation in peacebuilding activities in the Western Balkans, I
experienced how particular strategic frameworks shape peacebuilding on the ground. While
working  later  at  the  DPKO  and  UNMAS  at  the  UN  HQ,  I  observed  how  international
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peacebuilding efforts were influenced by multilateral processes. I noticed that one actor stood
out of the crowd – the EU. In my every-day work, the EU was regarded not only as the most
significant donor to UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding but also as the key promoter of UN
norms  and  the  most  significant  partner  in  international  conflict  management.  I  became
intrigued by the role of the EU in peacebuilding. Hence this thesis.
Research design
To  answer  the  research  questions,  this  work  looks  at  the  conceptual  understandings,
governance (decision- and policy-making) and implementation of peacebuilding within the
CSDP framework.  The conceptual level of the CSDP is explored through an analysis of the
link  between peacebuilding  and the  CSDP. The procedural  level  of  decision-  and policy-
making  analyses  the  role  of  member  states  and  EU institutions  in  the  conceptualisation,
design and governance of peacebuilding under the CSDP. The analysis of the implementation
phase  is  undertaken  through  an  examination  of  particular  operations  and  missions  with
peacebuilding scopes in Mali  and BiH. This analytical framework takes into account  two
dimensions of analysis: the dimension of international norms and that of foreign policy. These
dimensions are key to the understanding of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding in the CSDP.
On the one hand,  the CSDP peacebuilding practice resembles the international  normative
framework of peacebuilding. On the other hand, peacebuilding activities carried out within
the CSDP are outcomes of EU foreign policy. 
The normative dimension
The CSDP can be seen as a demonstration of the EU’s role in the world and the expectations
that arise  from  this  role.  It  represents  a  norm-driven  set  of  actions  that  contribute  to
international  peace  and  security.  The  aim  of  CSDP peacebuilding  actions  is  to  rebuild
institutions of a functioning state. According to Hill, ‘a well-functioning state’ comprises a set
of institutions representing res publica. These institutions “include the machinery of justice,
the police and armed forces, public administration and the institutions of political life. Their
purpose is to ensure continuity, order and common purpose” (Hill 2003, 33). By building state
institutions, CSDP actions seek to contribute to a more stable international order. According to
Hill, working towards a more stable international order is one of the main expectations of
foreign policy (Ibid., 45). CSDP peacebuilding activities pursue a particular set of norms; they
transfer a European vision of a well-functioning state. 
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Norms  are  central  to  the  understanding  of  EU  foreign  policy  (Tonra  2001,  16).
European  studies  have  focused  on  the  extent  to  which  European  norms  shape  the  EU’s
international behaviour. The EU has been described as a ‘civilian power’ (Duchene 1972), a
‘superpower’ (Galtung 1973; Leonard 2005; McCornik 2006; Reid 2005; Whitman 1998), a
‘normative  power’ (Manners  2002),  an  ‘ethical  power’ (Aggestam 2008)  and  a  ‘positive
power’ (Biscop  2005a).  Manners’ notion  of  normative  power  Europe  provided  the  most
popular conceptualisation of the EU as a foreign policy actor. Manners argued that the CSDP
is one of three main areas – in addition to the EU membership and cooperation - through
which the EU promotes peace. With their focus on “peacekeeping, conflict prevention and
strengthening international security”, CSDP actions contribute to sustainable peace (Manners
2008,  49).  The EU norm of  sustainable  peace that  addresses  the  root  causes  of  conflicts
mirrors the European experience of ensuring that war “becomes not merely unthinkable, but
materially impossible” (Ibid.,  48).  This normative approach is embedded in peacebuilding
efforts pursued through CSDP actions that seek to build sustainable peace by reforming and
building institution as to make the return of violence impossible.
While  the  normative  role  of  the  EU  in  international  affairs  has  been  studied
extensively,  the  impact  of  international  norms  on  EU  policies  is  underdeveloped  in  the
literature. De Franco, Meyer and K.E. Smith (2015) have investigated how the EU accepts
and internalises international norms, in particular the responsibility to protect (R2P) norm.
Similarly,  peacebuilding  within  the  CSDP could  be  seen  in  relation  to  the  international
peacebuilding norm.  While states are  not  required to  adopt  international  norms,  they still
respond to them and consider choices that result from them (Tonra 2001, 50).  Norms  that
guide international regimes are doctrines that evolve and are accepted as a result of political
processes. They provide frameworks within which political actors act (Björkdahl 2002, 22).
The realist and rationalist traditions understand norms as instruments that purely serve
state interests. International norms remain “a reflection of the self-interested calculation of
great powers and they have no independent effect on state behaviour” (Mearsheimer 1994-5,
7). From a neoliberal perspective, norms influence state behaviour – their preferences and the
way they  link  their  preferences  to  policy  choices (Keohane  2002,  2012).  Constructivists
define norms as shared expectations about appropriate behaviour of actors in international
relations (Katzenstein 1996a; 1996b; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Norms become standards
when  they  consistently  impact  on  state  behaviour,  are  historically  conditioned,
institutionalised, and taken for granted (Katzenstein 1996b, 18-19). 
International  institutions  provide  a  platform for  the  reconciliation  of  national  and
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international norms (Keohane 2012). They are major promoters of norms in world politics;
they  advocate  and  formulate  regulatory  norms  (Barnett  and  Finnemore  2004,  33).  This
research uses these frameworks to explore how the international norm of peacebuilding has
shaped the conceptualisation of peacebuilding in the CSDP. Studying EU peacebuilding from
a  normative  perspective  requires  analysing  the  extent  to  which  the  EU’s  approach  to
peacebuilding was influenced by the UN’s understanding of peacebuilding. Since the EU is
the key actor in the UN, we also need to understand the extent to which the EU influenced the
UN’s understanding of peacebuilding. 
At the same time, states also behave according to their own norms that reflect state
interests;  they  provide  justifications  for  preferences  and  strategies  for  pursuing  these
preferences  (Finnemore  1996).  They  motivate  foreign  policy  development  and
implementation as they help to define goals and offer a vision and direction for foreign policy
actions  (Björkdahl 2002, 20). They shape instruments of foreign policy (Kowert and Legro
1996, 463). In this sense, EU foreign policy is an intersection of member state preferences and
pre-existing EU commitments and norms (Thomas 2011a, 10). EU member states pursue their
foreign policy preferences within an institutionalised setting that is demarcated by EU norms.
Thomas argues that once member states have committed themselves to particular norms, they
are unlikely to take actions that do not reflect their original intention (Thomas 2011c, 6). 
As a result,  EU missions and operations transfer not only the international normative
standards but a European vision of a functioning state. While the promotion of EU-centred
norms through the CSDP seeks the establishment of stable and functioning states, it also runs
risks of undermining national ownership in countries of deployment. Tocci has observed that
EU foreign policy has been realist, imperialistic and status quo-oriented in many cases (Tocci
2007). In the pursuit of its own interests, the EU has often behaved as a post-modern imperial
power  when  imposing  ready-made  Western  models  of  state  institutions  in  post-conflict
societies through CSDP activities (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006). 
Studying the normative side of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding requires exploring
the extent to which the international norm of peacebuilding is embraced by EU states which
subsequently negotiate this norm with their own preferences, interests and concerns at the EU
level. It is important to understand how the EU’s approach to peacebuilding is constructed as
a norm that is shared by member states. When states coordinate their foreign policies, such as
in the case of the EU,  norms may collide. In the EU,  institutions have been established to
pursue a harmonisation of different norms. The institutional framework of the CSDP provides
a platform where national and international norms can be reconciled. 
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To  understand  how  this  institutional  framework  allows  for  a  synergy  of  different
norms in the CSDP, this thesis also reflects on the convergence of strategic cultures of EU
states with regard to peacebuilding.6 Meyer observed that, although still distinct, the national
strategic cultures of EU states in the area of defence and security have converged substantially
since the end of the Cold War. This convergence has led to the emergence of a European
strategic culture (Meyer 2006).  Cornish and Edwards defined European strategic culture “as
the institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the
accepted  range  of  legitimate  and  effective  policy  instruments,  together  with  general
recognition  of  the  EU’s  legitimacy  as  an  international  actor  with  military  capabilities”
(Cornish and Edwards 2001, 587). This thesis analyses how member states’ norms with regard
to peacebuilding converge to make a coherent EU policy on peacebuilding within the CSDP. 
The foreign policy dimension
The second dimension of the analysis assesses the EU’s approach to peacebuilding in the
CSDP from the perspective of foreign policy-making. Traditional understandings of foreign
policy centralise on the state as an actor of foreign policy. Allen defines foreign policy as “an
attempt  to  design,  manage and control  the external  activities  of  a  state  as  to  protect  and
advance  agreed and reconciled  objectives” (1998,  43-44;  see also Manners  and Whitman
2000, 2). Foreign policy analysis has primarily built on the discourses about the relationship
between agency and structure (Hill 2003, 25-26; Tonra 2001, 8-10). According to Hill, agents
are  actors  “capable  of  decisions  and actions”  –  “of  the  exercise  of  independent  will  and
decision-making” (Hill 2003, 27). Structures constitute environments in which agents operate
and which shape actors’ choices (Hill 2001, 26). Structures refer to institutions defined either
as bureaucracies or as formal rules and procedures (Gross and Juncos 2011c, 10). 
Hill prefers the term actor to that of agent when referring to foreign policy. Foreign
policy actors are decision-makers, such as the head of government, foreign minister and the
cabinet,  who  execute  foreign  policy.  Hill  substitutes  structures  with  agents  -  staff  and
bureaucratic  entities,  in  particular  foreign ministry,  working under the control  of political
actors  (Hill  2003).  While  agents  (actors)  and  structures  (agents)  tended  to  be  seen  as
irreconcilable  (see Tonra  2001,  6-10),  Anthony Giddens suggested  that  they are mutually
constitutive  (Giddens  1984). States  are  not  only  actors;  they  also  comprise  bureaucratic
structures. Similarly,  institutions possess actor-like qualities (Barnett and Finnemore 2004;
Hill 2001, 28).  Taking into account the interrelationships between agents and structure,  Hill
6 Strategic culture refers to norms, ideas and patterns of behaviour that are shared among actors in a given
political community (Meyer 2006, 20).
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specifies foreign policy-making as “a complex process of interaction between many actors,
differentially embedded in a wide range of different structures” (Hill 2003, 28). 
Hill’s definition reflects the nature of EU foreign policy-making which  includes the
coordination of the economic, political and military tools of foreign policies of member states
through common institutions (Exadaktylos 2012, 196; Tonra 2001;  White 2001; 2004). Hill
perceives the EU as “an independent actor” similar to a sovereign state, capable of making
decisions  on foreign  issues,  and possessing  structures  to  deliver  its  external  actions  (Hill
2003, 3).  The boundaries between structure and agency are blurred in EU foreign policy-
making due to the institutional context in which this policy is produced (Aggestam 2006, 24). 
In this sense, peacebuilding in the CSDP is shaped by the EU’s multilevel process of
governance. On the one hand, the CSDP is intergovernmental; it is controlled by the member
states which authorise and oversee CSDP actions. On the other hand, the intergovernmental
decision- and policy-making takes place through common institutions – the Foreign Affairs
Council (FAC) and its preparatory bodies, in particular the Political and Security Committee
(PSC), European Union Military Committee (EUMC), the Committee for Civilian Aspects of
Crisis  Management  (CivCom)  and  the  Politico-Military  Group  (PMG).  In  addition,  the
European External Action Service (EEAS), under the  High Representative of the Union for
Foreign  Affairs  and  Security  Policy  who  is  also  the  Vice-President  of  the  European
Commission  (HR/VP),  is  involved  in  the  design  and  coordination  of  the  CSDP.  EEAS
officials  mediate between the states, draft  documents,  advise and coordinate planning and
operations.  Howorth’s  notion  of  ‘supranational  intergovernmentalism’  describes  most
appropriately  this  complex  process  of  decision-  and  policy-making  in  the  CSDP.  In  this
process, the lines between supranational EU institutions and intergovenmental negotiations
among the member states become blurred (Howorth 2014, 69). 
Decision- and policy-making in the CFSP is generally characterised by cooperation.
As argued by Tonra, cooperation in foreign and security affairs is, indeed, nothing unusual;
the UN and NATO provide striking examples. What makes the cooperation of EU states in
foreign  and security  policy unique  is  the  fact  that  this  process  supports  “the  progressive
integration of the foreign, security and defence policies of the member states” (Tonra 2001,
3).  EU  foreign  policy  influences  national  foreign  policies,  resulting  in  adjustments  and
changes of national preferences (Bulmer and Radaelli 2013; Exadaktylos 2012; Meyer 2006;
Tonra 2000; 2001). 
Indeed, cases such as Libya, Darfur and Iraq remind us that the CSDP is not always
characterised by cooperation. Some scholars refer to these cases to point to the incoherence
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and ‘consensus-expectations gap’ in the CSDP (Menon 2009; 2011; Toje 2008). Nevertheless,
other scholars observe that CSDP decision- and policy-making is generally coordination and
consensus-oriented  (Cross  2010;  Juncos  and Pomorska  2006; Juncos  and Reynolds  2007;
Howorth 2010; 2014; Meyer 2006). This consensus-driven approach has  contributed to the
emergence of a trans-European strategic culture on EU foreign policy (Howorth 2010; 2014).
One of the tasks of this research is therefore to analyse the extent to which EU peacebuilding
is affected by consensus and/or disagreement and how disarmaments are overcome. 
The analysis  of  peacebuilding within the CSDP considers  these various  aspects of
policy-making through which CSDP peacebuilding is constructed. In particular,  this thesis
investigates the role of actors and structures  in the formulation and governance of CSDP
peacebuilding. Applying the actor-structure perspective can help to reveal the interrelationship
between the member states and the EU institutions. With the help of this framework, it is
possible to analyse the extent to which the CSDP reflects the EU’s normative commitment to
peacebuilding and the extent to which it reflects the EU’s self-centred interests.
Components of the analysis 
To analyse the EU’s peacebuilding approach within the CSDP through these two dimensions,
I resort to a framework proposed by Exadaktylos who defined four interrelated variables of
foreign  policy  analysis:  beliefs,  actors,  decision-making  procedures  and  instruments
(Exadaktylos 2012).7 In this research, beliefs refer to international norms that underpin the
international peacebuilding practice and norms that underpin the CSDP, i.e. beliefs agreed at
the EU level that reflect a convergence of national preferences. These two sets of norms help
to define the normative foundation of the EU’s peacebuilding approach. On the one hand, the
research observes how the UN normative framework has impacted on EU peacebuilding in
the CSDP. On the other hand, the research investigates how EU member states’ preferences
are orchestrated together to form a common normative framework for peacebuilding in the
CSDP. The thesis analyses how the norm of peacebuilding is used in making decisions and
policies on particular EU missions and operations. 
The second component of the research design refers to the EU as an actor capable of
deploying CSDP peacebuilding actions. In the CSDP, the EU as an actor is comprised of the
member  states  and  the  EU institutions.  The  intergovernmental  nature  of  CSDP decision-
making postulates the member states as the key actors in the CSDP as they have powers to
decide on CSDP actions. But, the extent to which an EU state becomes a stakeholder in a
7 Exadaktylos’ model is similar to those by Hill and Tonra, which identify actors, agents/ structures, resources
and instruments as variables of foreign policy analysis.
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peacebuilding process and has leverage over it depends on stakeholders’ sources of power,
such as the influence in the country or within the EU; the control of resources; the possession
of relevant knowledge, experience and negotiating skills; and status and representation. For
instance, due to historical, economic, cultural and political ties, France has been a key actor in
peacebuilding in Mali. Nevertheless, other states without historical or economic ties may also
become stakeholders. For example, Germany has gradually become a crucial player in Mali.
Procedures,  the  third variable,  refer  to  institutional  frameworks and structures  that
accommodate decision- and policy-making processes in the design, management (strategic
and  operational),  oversight  and  implementation  of  CSDP  peacebuilding.  The  European
Council and the Council of the EU, in particular the FAC, are the highest decision-making
bodies responsible for the CSDP. Nevertheless, the decisions are mainly shaped through the
four preparatory bodies of the Council: the PSC, the EUMC, CivCom and the PMG (Howorth
2014). In addition, the CSDP directorates and divisions within the EEAS are involved in the
design,  coordination  and  implementation  of  the  missions  and  operations.  To  trace  how
peacebuilding evolves  and is  governed,  the  research  analyses  policy assumptions  and the
mind-maps  of  policymakers  in  these  bodies.  The  study  investigates  whether  there  is  a
convergence  in  terms  of  policy  formulation  with  regard  to  peacebuilding,  which  would
indicate the presence of a strategic framework at the systemic level of the CSDP or whether
peacebuilding is pursued in an ad hoc manner. 
In CSDP policy-making, the lines between actors and structures have become blurred.
Not only are member states actors in  the CSDP, the intergovernmental structures and the
EEAS represent both actors and structures on behalf of which they act. The CSDP is therefore
examined here through the prism of the interrelationship between structures and actors. The
focus on actors investigates intentions, meaning and choice of policymakers in developing
peacebuilding policies. The focus on structures analyses peacebuilding as a part of the policy-
making procedures and processes located in established EU structures. 
The  final  variable  of  the  analytical  framework  represents  resources,  tools  and
capabilities which are studied in this thesis to explore how peacebuilding within the CSDP is
implemented in practice. Capabilities and tools include instruments of foreign policy which
may be financial, informational and organisational (Exadaktylos 2012; Salamon 2002). The
nature and amount of resources in the CSDP depend on the capabilities and willingness of
national political actors. The ability of the EU institutions to grasp the existing opportunities
and  develop  best  practices  is  also  important,  though  it  often  depends  on  resources  and
instruments. This research does not evaluate the effectiveness of the CSDP as such. Instead, it
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seeks to understand how the decisions and preferences on capabilities and tools made by the
EU shape the nature of the CSDP and the EU’s approach to peacebuilding. 
To understand how these components interact to make a coherent policy,  I employ
Hill’s framework of foreign policy-making, and Tonra’s adaptation of Hill’s framework of the
EU’s capabilities: “its ability to agree, its resources, and the instruments at its disposal” (Hill
1993,  315).8 According  to  Tonra,  an  application  of  this  framework  to  the  CFSP means
considering 1) the extent of cohesion in the decision- and policy-making in the CFSP, 2) the
instruments deployed in its support, and 3) resources that states provide for actions (Tonra
2001, 44). The EU’s ability to agree on its CFSP depends upon the extent to which agreement
can  be  reached  between  the  member  states;  the  ability  to  ensure  the  coherence  of  the
established common position; and the sustainability of the common position. The ability to act
represents the instruments employed in support of positions agreed in the CFSP. This requires
considering  what  tools  are  negotiated  and  what  institutional  mechanisms  can  ensure  co-
ordination.  The  resources  needed  to  achieve  agreed  goals  include  financial,  diplomatic,
political and military capabilities of the member states, the institutional capacity of the CFSP
itself, the EU policy competences and the level of political will (Tonra 2001, 44-45). 
In this thesis, I apply this model to the study of peacebuilding under the CSDP at the
levels of decision-making, coordination and implementation:
 In  terms  of  the  EU’s  ability  to  agree,  the  research  investigates  how a  normative
convergence of EU member states’ peacebuilding approaches is achieved in the CSDP.
I look at the relevant Council preparatory bodies involved in CSDP policy-making.
This analysis is guided by these questions: Do member states and EU institutions have
the same understanding of peacebuilding? How do they overcome a disagreement and
reach a common position? Is the common position maintained over the time? Instead
of looking at individual states, this thesis analyses the interaction among states. 
 In terms of instruments, the dissertation looks at different elements of operations, such
as training of police and military forces, legal advice, and diplomatic relations. I ask
what instruments are employed for particular missions and why these instruments are
considered to be the most appropriate.
 Finally,  the  research  asks  what  resources  member  states  provide  for  particular
missions. The dissertation seeks to understand how member states decide on particular
tools and the extent to which this decision impacts on the nature of missions. 
This research focuses on the EU structures at the expenses of the impacts of domestic and
8 Hill pointed to the European Community’s lack of these capabilities. Although the establishment of the CSDP
was seen as a step towards closing this gap, this model remains useful for studying CSDP policy-making.
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global developments. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse the impacts of
domestic politics and global affairs on the EU’s approach to peacebuilding, these influences
are reflected in respective decisions and, when relevant, discussed in the thesis. 
Methodology 
Methods and rationale for choice
To address the research questions, the dissertation takes an eclectic approach that combines
relevant methods and theories. Analytic eclecticism integrates different stories and addresses
the problem in its complexity. Methodological pluralism allows for a triangulation in data and
analysis, leading to compelling arguments (Della Porta and Keating 2008;  Exadaktylos and
Radaelli  2012;  Sil  and  Katzenstein  2010).  Since  peacebuilding  in  the  CSDP is  a  policy
produced through a multilevel process, an eclectic approach can provide a comprehensive
understanding of its complexities. It can help to interpret the relation of this policy to the
international normative framework. 
This research is situated at the nexus of the theories of foreign policy analysis, neo-
institutionalism and peacebuilding. These theories aid the understanding of the norms, actors,
structures  and  processes  that  shape  EU peacebuilding  and  shed  light  on  the  relationship
among them. This research adopts qualitative interpretive approach that combines document
analysis, expert interviews and observations. These methods can be applied in researching
organisations, bureaucracies, and policy- and decision-making (Brians et al. 2016; Della Porta
and Keating 2008;  Bryman 1988;  Neyland 2008).  They  allow for an in-depth analysis  of
actors,  structures  and  procedures  in  the  CSDP. This  combined  methodological  approach
influenced  my  sources,  which  are  manifold.  Primary  sources  comprise:  a)  documents,
including EU legal documents, such as treaties, conclusions, decisions and communications;
UN documents; and other policy reports; b)  interviews with officials in EU institutions and
missions; and c) personal observations of operational and policy-making settings. The thesis
also draws from secondary sources, such as academic literature, and media and policy reports.
Interpretive  document  analysis  was  used  to  analyse  the  conceptualisation  of
peacebuilding  in  relevant  EU  and  UN  documents.  Document  analysis  traces  discursive
categories (Bowen 2009).9 Discourse analysis has been widely used in European studies with
the aim of uncovering ideas,  concepts,  norms and policy frames that  may suggest causal
9 Discourse is a set of “ideas, concepts, and categorizations [...] through which meaning is given to physical
and social realities” (Hajer 1997, 44). Discourse helps decision- and policymakers to combine preferences to
produce, enable or constrain a specific policy and choice (Lynggaard 2012).
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relationships (Diez 2001; Lynggaard 2012). It is useful in mapping how peacebuilding has
evolved in a discourse of concepts. When analysing documents, I trace peacebuilding as an
idea that  translates  into a  policy produced by an interplay of the EU institutions  and the
member states. I look for relevant information which points to ideas, norms, preferences and
interests of the EU with regard to peacebuilding. I explore who proposes these ideas - whether
member states or EU institutions - and the reasons for their preferences. 
Expert (elite) interviews and observations were employed to analyse processes within
CSDP structures. Interviews and observations help to interpret phenomena from a perspective
inside the organisation and that of policy makers (Della Porta and Keating 2008). They shed
light into the dynamics of decision- and policy-making, which would be hard to detect in
official documents. They reveal hidden meanings behind actors’ behaviour  (LeCompte and
Schensul  2010,  12–14;  Neyland  2008,  2).  Interviews  are  vital  in  researching  the  CSDP
because the decision-making processes in the Council are not public. Official documents do
not necessarily spell out the reasons behind the policies. 
For the purpose of this research, I carried out semi-structured interviews with member
states’ representatives  in  relevant  Council  preparatory bodies,  with  officials  of  the  CSDP
directorates of the EEAS and with officials in the missions in Mali and BiH. 
Fieldwork procedure
Fieldwork was carried out at different intervals and in different places from October 2013 to
June 2016.10 The selection of the research sites was guided by a combination of pragmatic
reasons  and  purpose-oriented  criteria,  such  as  accessibility,  permissibility,  location  and
familiarity (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, 37-60; LeCompte and Schensul 2010, 154-156).
The preliminary informal interviews with officials from foreign ministries in London, Paris
and  Berlin  revealed  that  decision-  and  policy-making  on  CSDP takes  place  primarily  in
Brussels. Juncos and Reynolds already observed that national preferences of EU states are not
defined in isolation in capitals but in an institutional context in Brussels (2007). The core
fieldwork then focused on Brussels-based structures and case studies. The PSC, CivCom, the
EUMC, the PMG, and the EEAS are the key policy-making structures with regard to CSDP
matters.  Officials  in  Brussels  were  easily approachable  and generally open to  interviews.
Carrying  out  interviews  in  Brussels  was  unproblematic,  whereas  security  aspects  and
distances were considered when conducting research in case studies. In total, I carried out 52
formal (elite) semi-structured interviews: 24 interviews with member states’ representatives,
10 Nevertheless, I continued in following new developments during the writing phase as well as in meeting with
EEAS officials, which was also encouraged through the fact that I have lived in Brussels.
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21 interviews with EEAS officials and seven interviews in Mali (See Annex). 
In addition, I conducted informal interviews with more than 50 officials in Brussels,
Mali, BiH and other EU capitals. Informal conversations were key to gaining most relevant
insights  into  CSDP policy-making.  They often  provided  more  valuable  data  than  official
interviews. Such interviews have become common in interviewing groups and individuals,
including public officials, who fear that their identity could be revealed through recording
(Bendixen  2013;  Dexter  2006).  While  I  was  socialised  within  the  diplomatic  circles  in
Brussels, I did not seek to misuse my position: officials were aware that I was undertaking
research.  Informal interviews were used to shed light on particular themes.  Conversations
with  former  practitioners  and  scholars  further  expanded  my  perspectives.  The  access  to
officials  in  the  EEAS  and  Council  committees  was  facilitated  through  official  channels,
existing contacts and informal conversations.  For the selection of interviewees, I adopted a
combined criterion-based and snowball (convenience) sampling (For details, see LeCompte
and Schensul 2010, 154–172; Schensul and LeCompte 2013, 280–318).11 
To gain member states’ perspectives, I focused on representatives in the PSC, CivCom,
the PMG and the EUMC. I also interviewed a representative of Athena.12 I organised member
states into four categories, namely 1) the three large states: France, Germany and the UK; 2)
other Western European states: Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain; 3) non-
NATO  members  of  the  EU:  Ireland,  Finland  and  Austria;  and  4)  Eastern  European  EU
members:  the  Czech  Republic,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Romania  and  Slovakia.  Before
commencing  my  fieldwork,  I  already  knew  representatives  from three  member  states.  I
obtained contact  details  of  other  representatives  from the  websites  of  the  member  states’
delegations to the EU or upon a suggestion from another country’s representative. 
Previous research followed the tradition, prevalent in the studies of European foreign
policy, of focusing on most powerful EU states (e.g. Pohl 2014) or on a group of similar states
(e.g. Tonra 2001). The categorisation used in this research generates a more inclusive analysis
of member states’ preferences. It includes countries which are mostly involved and influential
in the CSDP while paying attention to geographical balance. It includes both powerful states
and smaller countries. France, Germany and the UK are regarded as the key actors in the
11 Most interviewees were approached via email. I received responses from all the contacted persons. In two
cases,  interviewees  declined  my  request  as  they  were  made  aware  by  their  colleagues  that  I  already
interviewed  people  in  their  division.  One interview was  cancelled  due  to  interviewee’s  unavailability.  I
maintained effective relationships with interviewees as this is important for gaining in-depth views on the
subject  (Duke  2002;  Neyland  2008,  15).  Preserving  rapport  increases  the  credibility  of  the  researcher
(Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, 80–83),  and eases  the access to information (Schensul and LeCompte
2013, 9–13). To build rapport and trust with interviewees, I used informal conversations and networking.
12 Athena is a mechanism for the financing of common costs relating to military operations under the CSDP.
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CSDP in terms of defence spending, contributions and political influence. However, although
the input of smaller states may be marginal, their vote and contribution is often essential for
enabling a particular action.13 This selection acknowledges that the CSDP is a policy which is
decided not only by the powerful states, but which involves all the member states. Since the
aim of the research is to analyse the EU’s approach and not the member states’ approaches, it
was not necessary to interview the representatives of all the member states. 
In determining potential interviewees from the EEAS, I followed the organisational
chart of the EEAS. With the use of criterion-based sampling, I aimed at interviewing at least
one official from each division of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD),
Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability Directorate (CPCC) and the six directorates of the
European Union Military Staff (EUMS). I also conducted interviews with officials responsible
for the coordination of missions and operations in BiH and Mali. In addition, I interviewed
officials from the Security Policy and Conflict Prevention Directorate (SECPOL) and from
geographical desks, one European Union Special Representative (EUSR) and one high-level
official.  I  approached approximately one third of  interviewees through informal  channels.
Through these connections, I obtained contact details on other potential interviewees from the
EEAS. Sometimes, I was recommended to interview a particular official (snowball sampling).
Carrying out interviews with officials in missions was difficult due to the restricted
access to sites and strict rules which officers in the missions must follow. Military personnel
referred me to public relations officers. As a result, I mostly gathered information through
informal conversations with officials in missions, officials in Brussels and representatives of
embassies of EU states in Mali and BiH. During my two stays in Mali in 2013 and 2014, I
conducted  formal  interviews with seven officials  from the  military operation  and the  EU
delegation. Since the civilian mission was still in planning during my fieldwork, I relied on
information from conversations with planners and EEAS officials. In BiH, I was not able to
conduct  recorded  interviews.  Nevertheless,  informal  conversations  provided  sufficient
insights in the dynamics of the operation in BiH. For information on the completed civilian
mission in BiH, I interviewed officials in Brussels. I also engaged in informal conversations
with two former army officers who served in BiH. 
13 While researching how the EU member states overcome their divergent preferences to reach agreement on
issues in the CSDP, Thomas argued that not only the agreement of the most powerful states is critical for the
EU to achieve consensus. Most conservative (seeking the smallest departure from the status quo), ambitious
(seeking a great  departure from the  status quo and unwilling to  accept  less),  committed (with the most
intensive commitment to its preference) and interested states (with the most at stake in this policy area) are
also likely to play a veto card (Thomas 2011a, 13).  Smaller states are often more active in the CSDP than
larger and wealthier states. For instance, in 2011, Romania had the largest number of  civilian experts in
civilian missions out of all EU states (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 
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The interviews were semi-structured and followed a context-appropriate topic guide
with preselected questions focusing on different elements of the research and reflecting the
interviewees’ area of  policy.  Since most  interviewees refused to  sign a  written consent,  I
mainly  used  verbal  consent,  supported  by  the  email  communication  with  respondents’
agreement to be interviewed. Some interviews were recorded. However, I was not always
allowed to take a recorder to the premises of the EEAS/ CSDP. In particular, the use of a
recorder in the EEAS buildings on the Avenue de Kortenberg was prohibited. In such cases
and when participants refused to be recorded, I took notes.14 
Participant observations formed an important part of my fieldwork, especially in Mali
and BiH. While I was not allowed to participate in the meetings of the Council committees
and the EEAS, I used informal interactions to explore the dynamics of such meetings. In the
missions, I was not granted access to the everyday work either. However, I participated in
training sessions and demonstrations for representatives from contributing countries. I was
given guided tours through the facilities. Informal interactions allowed me to get a perspective
into  the  everyday  work  of  the  missions.  The  analysis  of  interviews  and  fieldnotes  was
undertaken with the use of an inductive coding approach. I  followed a  coding scheme of
different  items  sorted  into  units  of  concepts  and  ideas  such  as  peacebuilding,  interests,
preferences and actions. I considered which codes are shared among actors and which differ. 
Case studies
The conceptual and procedural map of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding in the CSDP is
applied to the analysis of particular missions and operations in BiH and Mali. These have
been selected out of 34 CSDP missions and operations (see table 2, p. 67) that the EU has
deployed so far. This selection was guided by the following criteria: 1) missions/ operations
with  peacebuilding  tasks;  2)  ongoing missions/  operations;  3)  countries  with  civilian  and
military  instruments;  4)  geographical  balance;  5)  the  duration  of  deployments;  6)  the
14 Interviewees were informed about the confidentiality of their identity, the aims of the project and the purpose
of the interview. I asked my respondents for their approval to record the interview (or take notes), and to use
their responses for  academic purposes.  At the start  of my research, I  attempted to use written informed
consent. However, this did not work since many interviewees hesitated to sign any form and I had to use
verbal  consent.  Written signed form  consent is  usually not required  in sensitive cases where there is  an
atmosphere of fear of the misuse of the data, such as in the research with individuals who distrust signed
forms (Bendixsen 2013) and in elite interviewing (Dexter 2006; Duke 2002; Powner 2015).  To ensure  the
anonymity of interviewees, I replaced names by numbers for the formal interviews and by letters in the case
of informal interviews. The analysis does not refer to particular member states or officials from particular
divisions. I refer to the above mentioned groups of states, except of cases when a reference to a specific
country is  unavoidable or  where respondents agreed with a reference to their  country.  Interviewing was
concluded once I collected sufficient number of interviews which provided a confident level of understanding
of the subject. When analysing the collected data, I often contacted my interviewees for further clarification.
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similarities and differences of the conflict situations; and 6) the accessibility of research sites. 
Selecting missions and operations with peacebuilding tasks was crucial as to explore
the  operational  dynamics  of  the  EU’s  peacebuilding  approach.  To  reveal  how  CSDP
peacebuilding policies work in practice, it is essential to study missions with peacebuilding
mandates.  As  a  result,  peacekeeping  and  peace-enforcement  operations,  such  as  current
Atalanta and Sophia operations or border monitoring missions in the Palestinian Territories
and Georgia, were excluded as they would not have provided required information on the
dynamics of peacebuilding in the CSDP. 
Studying all types of missions could help to better explain why the EU chooses to
intervene in some countries with peacekeeping, while in others with peacebuilding. However,
including peacekeeping and combat operations in my selection would go beyond the scope
and timescale of one piece of research, particularly one that explores the EU’s peacebuilding
approach in the CSDP and not the EU’s approach to the entire spectrum of crisis management
instruments. A comparison of all types of EU missions would require redirecting the research
question to the study of differences between the EU’s different types of missions. Besides, the
analysis in chapter four explores the reasons behind the EU’s decisions for particular types of
missions, revealing the rationale of the EU’s preference for peacebuilding over other types.
Including case studies with ongoing CSDP actions was key for generating empirical
evidence  with  first-hand  data  that  would  be  impossible  to  gain  through  an  analysis  of
completed  cases.  While  completed  missions,  such  as  those  in  FYROM,  the  Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) or Guinea Bissau, could provide important insights into the early
stages of EU peacebuilding efforts, conducting research on such cases would be limited to an
analysis of archival sources and existing literature. In this thesis, the case study of BiH, with
the first EU mission and the longest ongoing operation, provides for such insights.
Indeed,  completed  peacebuilding  missions  in  countries  that  have  not  reached  full
stability and where violence often reoccurs, for instance in Afghanistan, Iraq, South Sudan
and the DRC, are important reminders of the limits of the CSDP. They raise questions about
the EU’s sustained commitment and the appropriateness of the EU instruments at that stage of
the conflict. Especially the DRC is an appealing example where the EU has deployed four
missions to stabilise the situation, protect civilians and carry out SSR of the military and
police sectors. This case highlights that EU peacebuilding missions were not able to achieve
sustainable peace; violence has often re-emerged, requiring a return of the UN and the EU.
However, due to high security risks, it would have been problematic to undertake fieldwork in
these  countries.  Most  importantly,  while  my  research  did  not  look  at  such  countries,  it
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discussed these aspects in the analysis of the two selected cases. One of the reasons of the
continuation of the operation in BiH is the fear of some member states that the departure of
the EU would lead to a recurrence of violence. The Mali case provides further insights into
the aspects of appropriateness and effectiveness as the north of the country is still exposed to
the threat of terrorism.
In terms of ongoing peacebuilding missions, Kosovo, Ukraine, Libya, Niger, CAR and
Palestine could be considered. During my fieldwork, these countries were examples with one
type of missions - either military or civilian. Cases such as Ukraine and Palestine could point
to the limits of the EU’s commitment which is also dependent on international politics and
major players. However, selecting cases with one type of missions would limit the focus of
my research that seeks to provide a comprehensive view on both elements of the CSDP. I
looked for case studies with both civilian and military instruments with a view of ensuring a
comprehensive  analysis  of  both elements  in  relation  to  the  EU’s  peacebuilding  approach.
Studying  both  types  of  missions  can  expose  the  advantages  and  limits  of  such  actions,
whether both elements reflect the EU’s commitment to peacebuilding, and how they interact
with each another in a particular country as they seek to contribute to sustainable peace. 
In this sense, Central African Republic (CAR),  Somalia and Libya in which the EU
has deployed the whole spectrum of CSDP instruments could fit this criterion. However, at
the  start  of  my research,  CAR was still  in  the peacekeeping stage.  The EU deployed an
operation with peacebuilding elements to CAR only in 2015 upon the approval of the UNSC.
Somalia  is  a  particularly  gripping  case  with  military  and  civilian,  as  well  as  peace-
enforcement  and peacebuilding instruments  deployed simultaneously.  Libya  has become a
more complex case with the EU extending its CSDP activities and taking a proactive role in
peace efforts in this country only since 2015. However, practical considerations, namely the
accessibility and security of the research sites, were crucial factors which led me to exclude
cases such as Somalia and Libya. 
Geographical distance in the selection is an important factor that can reveal the level
of the EU’s commitment and ambition on the one hand and geostrategic preferences on the
other hand. It would be expected that the EU’s commitment to peacebuilding is strongest in
countries in Europe, whereas deployments outside Europe may be driven by factors other than
those found in missions in the EU’s close neighbourhood. A comparison of the oldest and
most recent CSDP engagements is another criterion that helps to trace key dynamics in the
development  of  the  EU’s  approach to  peacebuilding.  Taking into  account  differences  and
similarities of conflicts is useful as to understand how CSDP peacebuilding policies work in
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different  countries  or  similar  situations.  In  addition,  access  to  research  sites,  including
technical and travel arrangements, security considerations and familiarity with countries were
taken into account in the case selection. For instance, fieldwork in countries such as Libya or
Somalia would have not been allowed by the University for security and safety reasons.
This research focuses on missions and operations that have taken place. It excludes
actions  that  have  been  considered  but  never  launched,  such  as  a  military  operation  with
peacekeeping tasks in Libya in 2011. The research could have gone further as to study the
entire universe of conflicts, including those where the EU has not deployed any CSDP action,
especially in countries where the UN, NATO or the AU engage. It is important to ask why the
EU has not deployed any CSDP actions to tackle the conflict in Syria or why the EU was slow
in reacting to the crisis in Libya. Studying such cases would shed light on the reasons for the
EU’s hesitation to intervene in such situations. It would provide a more realistic assessment of
the EU’s aspirations as an actor in global security, thus exposing potential conflicts between
the EU’s normative commitment to peacebuilding on the one hand and EU foreign policy on
the other hand. However, it is beyond the scope, purpose and timescale of this research to
study such cases. Studying the EU’s approach to peacebuilding in conflicts in  Syrian or the
ISIS-occupied territories would be less relevant at this stage as the conflicts are ongoing and
have not yet reached a post-conflict phase. These crises require primarily a national, regional
and international political solution at this stage.
Based  on  these  criteria,  the  EU  missions  and  operations  in  Mali  and  BiH  were
therefore  identified  as  the  most  suitable  case  studies  for  this  research.  The  missions  and
operations  in  BiH and  Mali  have  carried  out  peacebuilding  tasks.  While  rebuilding  state
structures has been the priority for post-conflict reconstruction in both countries, they have
taken  on  different  pathways.  BiH has  become  one  of  the  most  paramount  state-building
projects in the post-Cold War era. The military operation in BiH has been the largest CSDP
undertaking. In contrast, post-conflict Mali does not need to build a new state; instead, the EU
supports  the  stabilisation  and  reform  efforts  of  existing  structures.  In  BiH,  with  CSDP
missions replacing NATO and the UN,  the EU stepped in the position of the key actor. In
contrast, the CSDP actions in Mali complement one of the largest UN peace operations with
the UN being the major player.  
 Both civilian and military instruments have been deployed in Mali and BiH, thus
allowing for the exploration of differences and similarities of EU peacebuilding with the use
of both types of CSDP actions. The deployments in Mali are among the most recent CSDP
activities,  whereas  the  EU’s  involvement  in  BiH dates  back  to  the  origins  of  the  CSDP.
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Comparing the oldest and one the most recent cases can demonstrate an evolution of and a
potential shift in the understanding and design of EU peacebuilding in the CSDP. 
In terms of geostrategic interests and proximity, Mali and BiH are located in the EU’s
immediate and broader neighbourhood. BiH was selected as an example of CSDP actions in
Europe, while Mali represents a case of a deployment outside Europe. Both countries have
different relations with the EU and its member states. BiH is a neighbouring country of the
EU and part of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) the aim of which is to prepare
the Western Balkans for future membership. As a result, the CSDP actions in BiH have been
guided  by an  EU  accession  process.  In  contrast,  Mali  as  a  non-European  state  is  not  a
prospective member of the EU. Nevertheless, Mali has maintained strong ties with the EU,
especially with France. The country has been a significant receiver of the EU development
and humanitarian aid.  France and Germany are among the top five countries in  terms of
imports to Mali. The selection of the cases from two different regions illustrates how the EU’s
different  relationships  with  and  different  geopolitical  interests  towards  these  countries
influence the nature of CSDP actions. This selection also allows assessing the level of the
EU’s ambition in the CSDP.
By selecting Mali  and BiH as  case studies,  this  dissertation attempts  to  provide a
comprehensive overview by including European and non-European, and military and civilian
missions. The purpose of these cases is to provide an insight in the operational dynamics of
the  EU’s  peacebuilding  approach  in  the  CSDP.  Instead  of  looking  at  particular  missions
separately, I analyse the role of the EU in the country while considering the full range of
CSDP activities, including current and previous missions and operations, EUSRs, negotiation
processes and other activities.
Structure of the thesis
After  this  introduction,  the next  chapter addresses concepts and frameworks that  describe
peacebuilding and peace missions. The chapter analyses the role of the EU in the evolution of
the international peacebuilding framework as adopted by the UN, while, at the same time,
tracing the impact of the UN’s institutionalisation of peacebuilding on the EU’s understanding
of  peacebuilding.  The  analysis  shows  that  the  EU  embraced  the  UN’s  understanding  of
peacebuilding while playing the key role in the UN’s shift towards peacebuilding. Chapter
three attempts to explain  the link between the peacebuilding framework and the CSDP by
discussing  the  development  of  the  CSDP as  well  as  the  peacebuilding  capabilities  and
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potential  that  the  CSDP embodies.  The  analysis  of  the  categories  of  the  CSDP actions
highlights the point that most CSDP actions are deployed in post-conflict scenarios and in the
peacebuilding capacity. Despite the UN’s impact on the EU’s understanding of peacebuilding,
the autonomous nature of the CSDP has  enabled the EU to develop its  own approach to
peacebuilding. This approach is explored in chapter four which focuses on the decision- and
policy-making  process  that  shape  peacebuilding  activities  within  CSDP actions.  In  these
processes,  peacebuilding  as  a  normative  framework  loses  its  relevance  and  becomes  a
pragmatic and politicised outcome of foreign policy-making. Peacebuilding is one of a few
areas  that  reflect  member  states’ ability  to  agree  on  peace  operations.  EU peacebuilding
missions are a result of pragmatic and rational choices as member states are more likely to
agree on peacebuilding actions rather than combat and peacekeeping operations. 
Chapters five and six focus on the operational dimension of the CSDP by analysing
particular cases of EU missions and operations in BiH and Mali. Both chapters highlight the
tension between the normative and pragmatic underpinnings of CSDP actions. This tension
makes CSDP missions different from missions of actors such as the UN. These case studies
demonstrate that the EU’s peacebuilding approach through the CSDP is not homogeneous, but
that  it  differs  from case to  case.  In  BiH,  the  EU membership  dimension has  defined the
conditions  and dynamics  of  the  entire  peacebuilding  process.  In  Mali,  peacebuilding  has
become a tool of the externalisation of the EU’s security measures aimed at the protection of
the EU borders and EU citizens. In chapter seven, the normative, procedural and operational
elements are brought together to describe the EU’s approach to peacebuilding through the
CSDP. The chapter emphasises the double-sided nature of this approach. CSDP actions with a
peacebuilding  mandate  reflect  the  normative  and  practical  commitment  of  the  EU  to
international peacebuilding efforts. At the same time, they reflect the strategic interests and
self-centred preferences of the EU, including concerns and constraints of the member states.
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2   The  Role  of  the  EU  in  the  Evolution  of  the  International
Peacebuilding Framework
The  chapter  outlines  the  conceptual  framework  of  peacebuilding  in  general  and,  more
particularly,  in  the  context  of  the  UN-EU relationship.  It  traces  the  doctrinal  shift  from
traditional peacekeeping to peacebuilding as a process of a mutual influence between the two
organisations. It explores the evolution of the consensus between the EU and the UN on the
need  for  and  the  understanding  of  peacebuilding  while  investigating  how  the  two
organisations  shaped  each  other’s  understandings  of  peacebuilding. The  UN and  the  EU
accustomed peacebuilding as part of their approaches to conflicts almost simultaneously. At
the  time  when the  UN expanded  its  peacekeeping  missions  into  peacebuilding  tasks  and
established  a  specific  body dedicated  to  peacebuilding,  the  EU  launched  its  CSDP.  The
chapter starts with a discussion on multifaceted understanding of peacebuilding and peace
operations in the scholarly literature and by the UN. It then moves on to explore the evolution
of  peacebuilding  at  the  UN  as  well  as  the  role  of  the  EU  in  the  institutionalisation  of
peacebuilding at the UN. The chapter then discusses the relevance of the UN’s shift towards
peacebuilding for the conceptualisation of the EU’s own approach to peacebuilding. 
Peacebuilding and peace operations: Conceptual frameworks
Peacebuilding emerged in a reaction to an unprecedented outbreak of intra-state conflicts after
the end of the Cold War.15 A growing number of conflicts demonstrating that violence can re-
emerge and become protracted if efforts are not made to build sustainable peace has led to a
consensus among scholars and practitioners on the importance of peacebuilding (Crocker et
al. 2001; 2007; Paris 2004; Stedman et al. 2002).16 These developments led to a shift in the
conception of security from national security to human security that emphasises the individual
rather  than  state  as  the  subject  of  security.17 These  challenges  highlighted  the  need  for
comprehensive approaches which peacebuilding became to represent. As Gross noted: 
15 Peacebuilding was not a new idea. Internationally assisted post-war reconstruction was characteristic also for
the post-WWII recovery of Germany and Japan (Tschirgi 2004, 2). 
16 Intrastate conflicts are often the result of failed states characterised by the weakening or breakdown of state
structures incapable of solving the conflict on their own.  Intrastate conflicts increasingly involve non-state
actors. Some conflicts remain local, while others have global effects, e.g. transnational terrorism and flows of
refugees (Weiss 2012; UNDP 2008). Ethno-religious and identity conflicts have been on rise since the end of
the Cold War (Kaldor 2013; Svensson 2012). 
17 The paradigm of human security created a ground for the development of the R2P doctrine which emerged in
a reaction to the failures to prevent the genocides of Rwanda and Srebrenica (Bellamy 2009; Baranyi 2008;
Gross 2013). R2P consists of three pillars: responsibility to prevent, to react, and to rebuild. Peacebuilding is
part of the responsibility to rebuild post-conflict societies (Evans 2009).
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“peacebuilding mirrors the simultaneous focus on a comprehensive approach to
conflict  management  that  has  emerged  as  a  guiding  paradigm for  the  EU,
individual  countries  and other  international  organisations  in  their  respective
attempts to align civil and military instruments. Such an approach combines
defence, diplomacy and development” (Gross 2013, 9).
The  term peacebuilding  was  coined  by Johan  Galtung  who  distinguished  it  from
peacemaking and peacekeeping. Emphasising that mere absence of direct violence does not
necessarily lead to sustainable peace, he referred to peacebuilding as an activity aimed at
creating positive peace through the establishment of non-exploitative structures that seek to
remove structural and root causes of war. In contrast, peacemaking and peacekeeping seek the
cessation of direct violence, which he defined as negative peace (Galtung 1975).18 
Nevertheless, it was the former UN Secretary-General Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali who
introduced peacebuilding to  the international  community.  Building on Galtung’s ideas,  he
defined peacebuilding as an “action to  identify and support  structures  which will  tend to
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutrous-Ghali 1992,
Art. 21). He adopted Galtung’s categories of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding,
and added preventive diplomacy. He understood peacebuilding as one of the “instruments for
controlling and resolving conflicts between and within States” (Boutrous-Ghali  1995, Art.
23). In intrastate conflicts, the focus of peacebuilding is on “rebuilding the institutions and
infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife” (Boutrous-Ghali 1992, Art. 15).
The definition of peacebuilding, however, varies depending on the actors involved and
on the nature of activities. Peacebuilding generally refers to post-conflict activities that seek
to prevent a relapse into violence.19 Peacebuilding addresses “both immediate consequences
and the root causes of a conflict” (de Coning 2008, 53; see also Newman 2013). It includes
negative and positive peace. Negative peace refers to the cessation of direct violence. Positive
peace  means  the  elimination  of  structural  violence  through  the  establishment  of  non-
exploitative  social,  economic,  civil  and  political  structures.  This  includes  economic
development,  the  reform  of  security  and  justice  sectors,  and  the  strengthening  of  good
governance and civil society (Atack 2005).20 Peacebuilding is based on the assumption that
18 Before Galtung, similar ideas were discussed by Immanuel Kant in his  Perpetual Peace which outlined
conditions for achieving lasting peace (Kant 2008), and Baruch Spinoza who claimed that peace is not a mere
absence of war but a virtue - a disposition for benevolence and justice (Spinoza 2004). 
19 Post-conflict countries are societies that have emerged from war but remain susceptible to the recurrence of
conflict. They are characterised by destroyed, devastated, weak or malfunctioning infrastructure, economy,
political structures and state institutions (Licklider 2001, 715). 
20 Peacebuilding can also include reconciliation, indigenous dispute resolution, peace education, human rights
promotion, capacity-building, justice processes, building of collective security and cooperation arrangements,
and resources cooperation (Shepherd 2012; Mac Ginty 2013a).  Some distinguish between short-term and
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functioning state structures will prevent violence (Doyle 2006, 11).  From the perspective of
state actors,  peacebuilding is a form of international assistance to post-conflict  societies.21
Both Galtung (1975) and Boutrous-Ghali (1995) understood peacebuilding as an enterprise of
the international community to support countries emerging from conflicts.
Peacebuilding is part of peace operations undertaken by the international community
to maintain international peace and security. It supplements other peace supporting measures,
namely conflict prevention, peace-enforcement, peacemaking and peacekeeping.22 The idea of
peace missions evolved after WWII alongside the assumption that such missions shall follow
common  norms  and  procedures  (Battistelli  2015,  25).23 Initially,  it  was  understood  that
peacebuilding  should  follow  after  peacekeeping.  Development  would  proceed  after
peacebuilding  which  terminates  when a  society has  developed a  capacity to  manage and
sustain its peace process without external assistance (UN 2011; de Coning 2008).
Due  to  increasingly  complex  conflicts,  peacebuilding  no  longer  follows  after
peacekeeping,  however.  The  different  elements  of  conflict  management  “overlap,  are
interlinked, mutually support  each other and often take place simultaneously”  (de Coning
2008, 53). Many conflict  situations require the deployment of peacekeeping, peacemaking
and  peacebuilding  simultaneously.  Peacekeeping  operations  have  become  increasingly
multidimensional, including a great portion of peacebuilding tasks. Scholars and practitioners
agree that peace, security, development and good governance are interlinked and need to be
pursued in tandem (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2010; Gowan and Johnstone 2007). 
Peacebuilding  has  developed into  a  complex process  combining both  positive  and
long-term peacebuilding in relation to positive and negative peace. While negative peace can be ensured
quickly, the establishment of positive peace is a long-term process (Jeong 2005). In practice, short-term and
long-term activities occur in parallel (Duke and Courtier 2010). 
21 In addition to states and intergovernmental actors, external actors in peacebuilding can be non-governmental
organisations and foreign businesses. Typical internal actors usually include national authorities, businesses,
communities and civil society (Serwer and Thomson 2008). Peacebuilding can also be an internal processes
at the national and grass-roots level without the involvement of international actors (Lederach 1997). 
22 The distinction between these actions depends on their aims and timing (whether they are deployed before,
during  or  after  a  conflict).  Conflict  prevention  includes  activities,  such  as  preventive  diplomacy  and
development,  aimed  at  preventing  conflicts  from  breaking  out  or  escalating.  Peacemaking  facilitates
mediation and seeks to bring the conflict to an end through a negotiated settlement. After a peace agreement
or  a  cease-fire,  peacekeeping  maintains  security and  monitors  the implementation of  peace  agreements.
Peace-enforcement refers to combat operations that  seek to establish security in cases when all  peaceful
means fail to reach a peace agreement (UN ‘Peace and Security’). Crisis management is another term used by
scholars  and  practitioners  with  reference  to  “the  settlement  and  containment  of  violent  conflict”
(Ramsbotham et al. 2011, 107). Scholars in European studies understand crisis management as short-term
actions, such as sanctions, mediation, combat operations, peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilisation, which
deal with an open conflict or its consequences (Gross and Juncos 2011c, 6; Whitman and Wolff 2012, 6). UN
and scholars in peace studies use conflict management as an overarching term to depict all peace supporting
measures at different stages of a conflict cycle.
23 UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) is the first ever and the oldest, still ongoing, peacekeeping
operation, establishment in 1948 (UN “The Early Years”). 
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negative peace. The UN’s understanding of peacebuilding has become a generally accepted
conceptualisation of peacebuilding. According to the UN, the objectives of peacebuilding are:
a) to restore the state’s ability to provide security and public order, b) to strengthen the rule of
law and respect for human rights, c) to build legitimate political institutions and participatory
processes, and d) to promote social and economic recovery (UN 2008, 25). To achieve these
objectives, UN-led peacebuilding can include a wide range of activities, such as: 
•  Support  to  basic  safety and security,  including mine action,  protection  of
civilians, DDR, strengthening the rule of law and SSR 
•  Support  to  political  processes,  including  electoral  processes,  promoting
inclusive  dialogue  and  reconciliation,  and  developing  conflict-management
capacity at national and sub-national levels 
• Support to the provision of basic services, such as water and sanitation, health
and primary education, and support to the return and reintegration of internally
displaced persons and refugees 
•  Support to  restoring core government functions,  in particular  basic  public
administration and public finance, at the national and sub-national levels 
•  Support  to  economic  revitalisation,  including  employment  generation  and
livelihoods particularly for youth and demobilized former combatants, as well
as  rehabilitation  of  basic  infrastructure  (UN  General  Assembly  and  UN
Security Council 2009, Art. 17).24
 
Peacebuilding brings these different aspects under one roof (Reychler and Paffenholz 2001).
As  de  Coning  framed it,  peacebuilding  “provides  for  parallel,  concurrent  and interlinked
short-, medium- and long-term programmes that work to prevent disputes from escalating, or
avoid a relapse, into violent conflict by addressing both immediate consequences and the root
causes of a conflict system” (de Coning 2008, 53). Security, peace, humanitarian assistance
and  development  -  previously  separate  paradigms  -  have  become  interconnected  within
peacebuilding (de Coning 2008). Combined civil-military approaches have also emerged as
an integral element of peacebuilding (Ankersen 2008; de Coning 2008).25
Various  peacebuilding  strategies, emphasising  different  aspects,  have  been
developed.26 Considering the diversity of peacebuilding strategies, Richmond distinguished
24 Already Boutrous-Ghali  argued  that  peacebuilding should involve “demilitarization,  the  control  of  small
arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral
reform and social and economic development” (Boutrous-Ghali 1995, para. 47). A report by United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) extends peacebuilding into “return of refugees and internally displaced
persons  (IDPs);  establishing  the  foundations  for  a  functioning  state;  [and]  reconciliation  and  societal
integration” (UNDP 2008, xviii, 3).
25 In contrast, peace-enforcement and peacekeeping missions deploy a limited number of civilian personnel.
Diplomatic and development activities rely on civilian capabilities exclusively. 
26 For example, Annan observed that different peacebuilding strategies deal “with secession and partition; with
spoilers; with transitional justice, truth commissions, and reconciliation; with elections and power-sharing;
[...]  with economic liberalisation, reconstruction and development”  (Annan 2004, para.  8). Peacebuilding
strategies  are  generally  dominated  by liberal  optimism which  takes  for  granted  that  societies  and  state
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between four generations of approaches (2011). First-generation approaches refer to top-down
practices through which peace is enforced, often by military means rather than negotiated
agreement, such as military interventions and peacekeeping. The second-generation approach
addresses  human  needs  and  promotes  peacebuilding  at  a  grass-roots  level.27 The third
approach  aims  at  the  construction  of  a  liberal  state  while  promoting  the  Westphalian/
Weberian  model  of  state  institutions,  democracy,  civil  society  and  the  market  economy.
Liberal  state-building  has  become  widely  accepted  by  democracies,  the  EU and  the  UN
(Richmond 2002; 2011; Richmond, Björkdahl, and Kappler 2011; Richmond and Mitchell
2012).  A fourth-generation approach supports  comprehensive,  contextual and case-specific
approaches. This ‘hybrid’ peacebuilding involves local, regional and international levels of
legitimacy (Richmond 2011; Richmond and Franks 2011; Richmond and Mitchell 2012). 
What  Richmond frames as the third-generation peacebuilding - peacebuilding with a
focus  on  post-conflict  stabilisation,  reconstruction  and  building  of  state  institutions  -  has
become the dominant approach pursued by state actors and intergovernmental organisations
(Call and Wyeth 2008; Mac Ginty 2013a; Richmond 2011). Paris has argued that international
organisations even prioritise the strengthening of state institutions over liberalisation (Paris
2004). Non-exploitative state institutions are seen as a fundamental condition of sustainable
peace  (Attack  2005;  Barnett  et  al.  2007;  Doyle  2006;  Galtung  1964).  State  institutions,
representing “res publica”, are the core elements of “a well-functioning state” (Hill 2003, 33).
If state institutions are ineffective, exploitative or even non-existent,  the likelihood of war
increases. Weak and failing states lose their authority functions in maintaining the rule of law,
order  and justice and in  providing basic  services  and security to  their  citizens (Englehart
2009; Rotberg 2004). State-centred peacebuilding seeks to empower such states by rebuilding
“the country’s institutional capacity for self-sustaining peace” (Doyle and Sambanis 2006,
46). This form of peacebuilding is regarded as liberal state-building: “the externally-assisted
construction and reconstruction of the institutional infrastructure” of a state (Kurowska and
Seitz  2011,  17).  State-building  involves  the  reform and/or  construction  of  legitimate  and
effective state institutions that are key to good governance (Ibid., 25 and 29). 
Liberal peacebuilding has been a subject of criticism. By creating institutions similar
institutions can be perfected (Mac Ginty 2013a).  Some scholars  promote liberal  peacebuilding (Crocker,
Hampsons  and  Aall  2005),  while  others  criticise  it  (Richmond  2005;  Roberts  2011;  Chandler  2010).
Peacebuilding strategies reflect particular political values. For instance, the US-led projects promote market-
oriented structures and democracy. International NGOs tend to emphasise the strengthening of civil society
and indigenous structures  (Barnett  et  al.  2007; Paris 2004).  Some stressed that  successful  peacebuilding
requires a balanced approach to competing demands of justice, order and security (Hyde-Price 2013).
27 This approach corresponds with Lederach’s notion of peacebuilding as not only a structural change but also a
transformation of relationships. According to Lederach (1997), peacebuilding shall encompass psychological,
spiritual, social, economic, political and military levels.
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to their  own, international actors promote particular ideologies and models of governance
(Kurowska  and  Seitz  2011,  25;  Mac  Ginty 2013a;  Richmond  2010).  According  to  Paris,
peacebuilding  activities  “have  effectively ‘transmitted’ standards  of  appropriate  behaviour
from Western-liberal core of the international system to the failed states of the periphery […
or] have supported the transformation of war-shattered states into liberal market democracies”
(Paris 2002, 637).28 Yet, as Kurowska  and Seitz claimed, condemning liberal peacebuilding
and state-building is questionable if such assistance is welcomed by the receiving country and
if it proves effective in preventing failed states (2011, 30). 
While  academic  research  has  led  to  the  development  of  idealistic  peacebuilding
frameworks  with  complex  meanings,  it  is  the  practice  which  defines  the  character  of
peacebuilding. In particular, it was the UN that shaped both the conceptual and operational
basis of peacebuilding as an instrument of conflict management. In the field, peacebuilding is
less defined through its theoretical frameworks; often, the term peacebuilding is even missing
in  documents,  such  as  UN  resolutions.  In  practice,  peacebuilding  is  refers  to  particular
activities,  such  as  the  reform or  rebuilding  of  security,  justice  and  political  institutions.
Ultimately, the aim of these practices is to build sustainable peace. This thesis adopts this
understanding of peacebuilding.
The UN’s shift from traditional peacekeeping to peacebuilding
Peacebuilding has become a normative framework in international approaches in post-conflict
reconstruction and an integral part of peace operations (Gross 2013, 10). Tardy has noted that
the UN and the EU were particularly well positioned to undertake peacebuilding tasks as their
policies were designed to cover the entire continuum of crisis management (Tardy 2012, 197).
The international community, in particular the UN, was not prepared to deal with complex
intrastate  wars  and new security challenges  after  the  end of  the Cold War. Peacekeeping
proved  inadequate  to  deal  with  intrastate  conflicts  and  to  prevent  failed  states.  These
28 Critics have argued that liberal models tend to perpetuate socio-economic inequalities, political competition
and  divisions  (Sens  2004,  Paris  1997;  2004).  Scholars  have  also  emphasised  that  state-building  often
promotes  Western  hegemony  by  imposing  prescribed  solutions  of  powerful  states  and  international
institutions (Kurowska and Seitz 2011; Sens 2004). International actors are in the position of power as they
control peacebuilding budgets and the design of projects. They may underestimate the ability of local actors
and weaken their role. Focusing on institutions can also empower new governments to an extent that they
hinder peace (Mac Ginty 2013a; Paris 1997). In addition, peacebuilding can suffer from the proliferation of
international  actors who often compete among each other.  This  incoherence derives  from the pursuit  of
divergent goals by international actors in peacebuilding (Jeong 2005, 19; Krasner 2008, 662; 2009, 243; Sens
2004; Reychler 2000, 57). At the same time, local agency should not be romanticised. Local approaches can
often perpetuate patriarchy, the dominance of one group, and non-transparent forms of governance (Mac
Ginty 2013a, 5).
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challenges emphasised the need for a more effective management of violent conflicts and
situations of failed states without the rule of law. They highlighted that traditional approaches
to peace and security, in particular peacekeeping, do not work in such environments (Cooper
2000; 2003; Gross 2013; Hannay 2008; 2013). 
Peacebuilding at the UN emerged from efforts to reform peacekeeping. Based on the
principles of impartiality,  state  sovereignty and territorial  integrity,  peacekeeping missions
were intended to keep order and peace, and observe ceasefires. Peacekeepers were mandated
to use force for the protection of UN and humanitarian workers only. The re-establishment of
order  after  violence  is  indeed  cardinal  for  post-conflict  reconstruction  (Aggestam  and
Björkdahl 2013). However, peacekeeping alone is not as sufficient as for sustaining the peace.
Peacekeeping operations failed to prevent mass atrocities in Rwanda and Srebrenica. Violence
often  recurred  even if  peace  settlement  was  reached (Bellamy 2009;  Baranyi  2008).  The
imposition of order by international actors does not guarantee lasting peace; the country needs
to develop its own capacity to sustain peace (Aggestam and Björkdahl 2013). 
Failures in peacekeeping led to a re-consideration of traditional approaches to peace
and security. With the outbreak of civil wars after the end of the Cold War, the UN also found
itself with an overload of peacekeeping operations. Increased capabilities and expertise were
needed to make operations  successful.  Peacekeeping lacked the civilian peacemaking and
peacebuilding capacities,  such as  police and legal  advisors,  to  conduct  complex missions
(Bellamy,  Williams  and  Griffin  2010;  Hannay  2008;  2013).  As  a  long-term  and
comprehensive approach, peacebuilding was believed to overcome recurring difficulties in
peace operations, such as expedient agreements, the lack of coordination between agencies,
the lack of sustained attention by the international community, and the failure by the parties to
the conflict to fulfil their agreements (Stedman and Rothchild 1996). 
Peacebuilding was introduced by former Boutrous-Ghali  in his  An Agenda for Peace
as  a  new  approach  in  addition  to  preventive  diplomacy,  development,  peacemaking  and
peacekeeping.  Boutrous-Ghali understood  these  approaches  as  constituent  elements  of
conflict management – a range of UN activities to maintain international peace and security
(Boutrous-Ghali 1992).  The  Supplement to An Agenda for Peace elaborated the conceptual
elements of peacebuilding and recommendations for its practical realisation. It highlighted the
changing nature of conflicts and an increase of intrastate wars characterised by “the collapse
of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, with resulting paralysis of governance,
a  breakdown  of  law  and  order”  (Boutrous-Ghali  1995,  para.  10-14). The  Supplement
recommended the creation of a rapid reaction force consisting of national units to prevent
33
atrocities such as those in Somalia and Rwanda (Ibid., para. 99).
Boutrous-Ghali’s  recommendations,  including  the  idea  of  peacebuilding,  were
supported  by  the  Security  Council  (UNSC),  though  the  UNSC  reaffirmed  “its  primary
responsibility […] for  the maintenance of  international  peace and security”  (UN Security
Council 1998, 1). The UNSC acknowledged the need for developing new means “based on
the Charter of the United Nations and generally recognised principles of peacekeeping, and
which would incorporate post-conflict peace-building as an important component” (Ibid., 1).
It also encouraged the Secretary-General to explore the possibilities “of establishing post-
conflict peace-building structures as part of efforts by the United Nations system to achieve a
lasting peaceful solution to conflicts, including in order to ensure a smooth transition from
peacekeeping  to  peace-building  and  lasting  peace”  (Ibid.,  2).  One  of  the  outcomes  of
Boutrous-Ghali’s  proposals was the establishment of  the Standby High-Readiness Brigade
(SHIRBRIG),  a  multinational  standby military  force  for  UN  operations.29 The  Executive
Committee on Peace and Security,  led by the Department of Political  Affairs  (DPA), was
established  to  promote  the  coordination  among  the  UN departments  and  programmes  on
peace and security, humanitarian assistance and development (UNDP Annex 6).
An Agenda for Peace was followed by the so-called Brahimi Report which undertook
a thorough review of UN peace and security activities and made functional recommendations
to  peacekeeping  operations.30 The  Report  determined  conflict  prevention,  peacemaking,
peacekeeping and peacebuilding as the principal  elements  of  the UN peace operations.  It
emphasised peacebuilding as key to the success of peacekeeping operations and the need to
build the UN capacity to pursue peacebuilding in an integrated manner. Although the report
identified UNDP and DPA as best placed to implement peacebuilding, it acknowledged that
the UN already shifted from traditional peacekeeping mandated with observing ceasefires to
more complex mission with peacebuilding tasks. It recommended a further doctrinal shift,
namely that peacekeeping operations should include civilian police,  rule of law elements,
human rights experts and other peacebuilding aspects. For the realisation of this shift,  the
report proposed institutional adjustments, including the establishment of a peacebuilding unit
within the DPA (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2000).
The UNSC embraced peacebuilding as a norm of the UN in its efforts to maintain
29 This rapid intervention tool was initiated by Denmark in 1996, largely as a result of the genocides in Rwanda
and Srebrenica. It was founded by Austria, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden,
with the Czech Republic as an observer, and Ireland and Finland joining without committing Officers to the
Planning Element. During its existence, the brigade had 23 members (Koops and Varwick 2008).
30 The report was drafted by a High-Level Panel chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi and adopted as the Report of the
Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (UN General Assembly and Security Council 2000).
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international peace and security adopting Boutrous-Ghali’s and Brahimi’s definition:
“peace-building  is  aimed  at  preventing  the  outbreak,  the  recurrence  or
continuation  of  armed  conflict  and  therefore  encompasses  a  wide  range  of
political,  developmental,  humanitarian  and  human  rights  programmes  and
mechanism. This requires short and long term actions tailored to address the
particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it.  These
actions should focus on fostering sustainable institutions and processes in areas
such as sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities,
transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect
for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of culture of peace and
non-violence” (UN Security Council 2001, 1).
Following the  Brahimi Report, the UN continued in the reform of its peacekeeping.
The 9/11 attacks further heightened the threat of state failure, underdevelopment and weak
governance in creating conditions for transnational terrorism. Kofi Annan appointed a High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change to examine new threats and challenges and
to propose structural improvements of the UN system.31 The report of the High-Level Panel
made numerous references to the 9/11 events, the deadlock in the UNSC on the situation in
Iraq, and the failure of the UN to act in the conflicts in the Western Balkans and Rwanda (UN
2004a). The report identified “a key institutional gap: there is no place in the United Nations
system explicitly designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war or to assist countries in
their transition from war to peace” (Ibid.,  83). For these reasons, the Panel recommended
establishing  a  Peacebuilding  Commission  (PBC),  an  advisory  UN  body  tasked  with
peacebuilding. In addition to post-conflict peacebuilding, the PBC was also supposed to be
responsible for conflict prevention, early warning and transition processes between conflict
management and post-conflict peacebuilding (Ibid., 83). 
In his report entitled In Larger Freedom,  Annan included the recommendation of the
Panel to establish the PBC (UN General Assembly 2005c). The proposal was accepted by the
2005  World  Summit.  The  role  of  the  PBC  is  to  support  post-conflict  peacebuilding  in
countries emerging from conflict and ensure sustained international attention  (UN General
Assembly  2005a;  UN Security  Council  2005a). The  General  Assembly  (UNGA)  and  the
UNSC established the PBC as a body responsible for peacebuilding only, excluding the three
additional  tasks  proposed  by  the  High-Level  Panel. Peacebuilding  has  also  become  an
important  element  of  operations  managed  by  the  DPA (peace-making)  and  the  DPKO
(peacekeeping). The summit endorsed the creation of an operating capability for a standby
31 The Panel consisted of 15 members and was chaired by former Prime Minister of Thailand and included
former heads of government  and foreign ministers,  replicating the membership pattern of  the UNSC. In
particular, the UK, France, USA, China, Russia, Thailand, Brazil, Norway, Ghana, Australia, Uruguay, Egypt,
India, Japan, Tanzania, and Pakistan were represented in the Panel (UN General Assembly 2004).
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police capacity in peacekeeping. In addition, the summit supported the efforts of the EU and
other regional actors in developing their own capacities, especially for rapid deployment and
standby and bridging arrangements (UN General Assembly 2005b).
The doctrinal shift in UN peacekeeping necessitated a clarity of standards and policies.
In 2006, the reform strategy Peace Operations 2010 sought to enhance the effectiveness of
the planning and management of peace operations. It focused on five areas: a) personnel; b)
the  definition  of  concepts  and  doctrine;  c)  partnerships,  in  particular  with  the  UN
Peacebuilding Architecture, to improve integrated peace operations; d) resources; and e) the
establishment of integrated organisational structures at the HQ and in the field, incorporating
political, military, police, civilian, logistical and financial expertise (UN General Assembly
2006,  7).  This  strategy  led  to  a  restructuring  of  the  DPKO  and  to  the  creation  of  the
Department of Field Support (DFS) in 2007. Building on this reform, the  United Nations
Peacekeeping  Operations:  Principles  and  Guidelines, known  as  the  Capstone  Doctrine,
presented modalities for the planning and implementation of integrated and multidimensional
peace operations (UN 2008). The reform of UN peacekeeping has continued with the policy
document New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (DPKO
and  DFS  2009)  which  has  assessed  the  major  dilemmas  facing  contemporary  UN
peacekeeping in dialogue with UN member states and other partners, including the EU. UN
peace missions have developed into multidimensional and integrated enterprises incorporating
a range of peacebuilding, peacemaking and peacekeeping elements. Most missions continue
to be framed as peacekeeping missions since they are coordinated by the DPKO. 
The  reform  of  peacekeeping  initiated  by  the  Brahimi  Report  has  led  to  a
transformation  of  UN  peacekeeping  operations  which  have  expanded  in  their  scope  and
mandate.32 Operations have become more robust, complex and multifunctional, involving not
only military but also  political, humanitarian and civilian activities.33 While first-generation
peacekeeping  operations  were  deployed  after  the  ceasefire,  second-generation  operations
intervene  in  unstable  situations  often  with  the  conflict  still  ongoing.  Second-generation
peacekeeping has been increasingly mandated to use the force for the protection of civilians.
As a result, the boundaries between peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace-
enforcement have become blurred. Today, peace operations are rarely limited to one type of
32 Operations  with  narrow mandate  (monitoring of  peace  agreements)  are  framed as  ‘traditional’ or  ‘first-
generation peacekeeping’, while complex operations that have been carried out since the Brahimi reform are
depicted as ‘second-generation peacekeeping’ (UN “History of Peacekeeping”). 
33 The military dimension can include the monitoring of the ceasefire, DDR, de-mining and civilian protection.
The  humanitarian  dimension  involves  humanitarian  aid  and  the  management  of  refugees.  The  political
dimension covers administrative support; SSR, justice and electoral reforms; and human rights promotion.
The economic part includes reconstruction and development (Battistelli 2015, 32-33; UN “Missions”). 
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activity.  Comprehensive  mandates  have  led  to  integrated  and  multidimensional  peace
operations in which different UN bodies, such as DPKO, DPA, UNMAS and UNDP, work
under one chain of command (UN “Missions”; see also Battistelli 2015; Bellamy, Williams
and Griffin 2010; Sens 2004). Second-generation missions have been continuously deployed
to remote and dangerous environments (Kmec 2017; Osterrieder,  Lehne and Kmec 2015).
While first-generation peacekeepers kept a low profile, second-generation peacekeepers have
been subjects of armed attacks and of critique by local populations and national governments
due to their involvement in internal matters (Battistelli 2015, 38).
This  reform  has  led  to  the  proliferation  of  actors  involved  in  peace  operations.
Contributing with their troops, financial resources, equipment and expertise, many states and
regional organisations have shown an increasing interest in developing their role as security
actors (Battistelli 2015, 32-33; Kmec 2017).34 The reform of peacekeeping provided the EU
with an opportunity to become a credible international security actor. Many scholars have
argued that the CSDP was created for this purpose (Giegerich 2008; 2009; Tardy 2006; 2009).
As Tardy puts it: “peacekeeping has been a key objective in the EU’s quest for fully-fledged
security actor  status.  It  is  what  the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is  all
about” (Tardy 2009, 27-28). In the light of this reform, operations not managed by the UN but
by regional actors, such as NATO, the EU and the AU, became more common (Battistelli
2015, 34). This proliferation of new security actors played , which was the key player in the
shift towards the institutionalisation of peacebuilding at the UN.
The EU’s role in the UN’s shift towards peacebuilding
EU member states played a fundamental role in the evolution of peacebuilding at the UN and
the reform of UN peacekeeping. As the key supporter of the UN system, the EU actively
promoted and advocated the idea of peacebuilding internationally. Hannay noted that Boutros-
Ghali’s idea of peacebuilding was welcomed by the EU, whereas the US was more hesitant
(Hannay 2008, 77, 184). EU member states supported the practical implementation of the
recommendations  proposed  by  the Supplement  while taking  an  active  role  in  the
establishment of SHIRBRIG. The EU’s influence in this arrangement was obvious with 16 of
23 member states and observers of SHIRBRIG being EU member states (Koops 2011). 
Nowhere was the EU’s inclination towards peacebuilding as apparent as in the EU’s
34 International NGOs, governmental agencies and civil society organisations have also become involved in
peacebuilding  processes.  Second-generation  peacekeepers  have  to  interact  with  these  new  actors.  The
proliferation of actors can sometimes lead to tensions (Battistelli 2015, 38; Kmec 2017). 
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support of the establishment of the PBC. This support became evident already during the
work  of  the  High-Level  Panel.  Only  two  EU countries,  in  particular  the  two  permanent
members of the UNSC, the UK, through David Hannay, and France, through Robert Badinter,
were represented in the Panel. As a former ambassador and permanent representative to the
European Economic Community, a representative to the UN, and a special representative for
Cyprus, Hannay possessed significant knowledge of EU and UN matters. Badinter was former
minister  of  justice,  president  of  the  Constitutional  Council,  president  of  the  Arbitration
Commission  for  former  Yugoslavia  and  a  member  of  the  Convention  for  the  European
Constitution. According to Hannay, he and his French colleague sought to represent the EU’s
interests. They held regular consultations with EU institutions and EU capitals. According to
him, they, together with Gareth Evans, former Australian minister for foreign affairs, made the
most significant contribution to the Panel’s work (Hannay 2008, 213). 
The active role of these representatives led to a harmony between the Panel’s and the
EU’s objectives. Hannay noted that
“the fit between the Panel’s proposals and EU objectives is astonishingly close,
a remarkable fact since only two of the 16 panel members came from the EU.
This fit suggests  potentially widespread support for the EU’s aim of effective
multilateralism” (Hannay, 2005). 
According to Hannay, EU member states, were best prepared to help the UN to solve the
institutional crisis it faced. The UK played a special role in this process due to its “combined
position as a country which understands and influences the evolution of US foreign policy and
as one of the two Permanent Members from a European Community which is groping its way
towards a more united approach to foreign and security policy” (Hannay 2013, 183). 
The conflicts in Yugoslavia had a significant impact on the evolution of post-conflict
engagement of both the UN and the EU. According to Hannay,  the failure to prevent the
conflicts in Yugoslavia that led to mass-killing was also caused by the divide between the UN
and  the  EU (Hannay 2008,  93).  The  Yugoslav  conflicts  led  to  an  enhanced  cooperation
between the UN and the EU in post-conflict conflict management. Hannay understood that
“the Europeans, Britain prominent amongst them, must share a good deal of the responsibility
for failing to take those opportunities” (Ibid., 163). He noted that the intention of reforming
UN peacekeeping supported the strengthening of regional peacekeeping and peacebuilding
(Hannay 2013, 253-4). The overload of peacekeeping and the increase of the UN’s costs of
peacekeeping provided justification for the involvement of regional organisations. The EU
came  to  be  seen  by  the  UN  as  an  important  partner  in  peacekeeping  and  post-conflict
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reconstruction  (Hannay,  2008).  Similarly,  Tardy  claimed  that  regionalisation  of  crisis
management became inevitable after the end of the Cold War. In addition to the difficulties
that the UN peacekeeping was facing, Tardy also noted that regional organisations offered
advantages, such as proximity, local expertise and flexibility, which the UN did not possess
(Tardy 2012, 198). 
The intention to provide a long-term support to countries slipping towards failure and
countries emerging from hostilities was the main driver behind the Panel’s proposal for the
establishment of a PBC (Hannay 2013; Hannay 2008). The EU’s support for the establishment
of the PBC was driven by the Yugoslav wars, while the 9/11 terrorist attacks were decisive to
the US support, represented in the Panel through Brent Scowcroft, for the establishment of a
PBC (Scowcroft 2008; Kessler 2004).  
The EU fully supported the work of the High-Level Panel. In its contribution to the
Panel, the Council referred to the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), in particular to new
security  challenges,  such  as  ethnic  conflicts  and  state  failures,  and  the  need  for  new
approaches to tackle them. The paper stated that
“the EU recognises that none of the challenges can be tackled on its own, as
they  are  often  closely  linked.  They demand  economic,  political  and  legal
instruments, as well as military instruments, and close co-operation between
states as well as international organisations [...] The UN is uniquely placed to
provide the framework for such co-operation” (Council of the EU 2004a, 2).
The EU recognised the need for comprehensive approaches in post-conflict situations. The
Council referred to peacebuilding as an activity that addresses the root causes of a failure of
state  institutions.  These  thoughts  are  analogous  to  the  understanding  of  peacebuilding
presented by  the Brahimi Report,  the Agenda for Peace, and the Report of the High-Level
Panel. The Council expressed hope for “measures to strengthen the UN system’s engagement
in  conflict  prevention  and  peacebuilding,  leading  to  enhanced  cooperation  between  key
departments within the UN Secretariat and intergovernmental bodies as well as to an effective
allocation of resources amongst UN system actors” (Ibid., 7). Coordinating different actors in
peacebuilding, both UN agencies and contributing countries, is one of the primary tasks of the
PBC. Similarly, the European Commission (2005a) stressed the importance of a PBC in filling
a gap in the UN system and supporting a holistic approach to peacebuilding.
The idea of a PBC was supported by the EU and its member states. Gowan argued that
“the EU’s members were widely expected to be important drivers of the reform process of the
United Nations” (Gowan 2007). The EU was expected to take a leading role in the UN reform
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process. According to Gowan, the political relevance of the PBC was decided to a large extent
by the EU states, which worked with the African bloc within the UNGA to advocate the new
body (Ibid.). Similarly, Biscop (2005b) noted that the PBC provided the EU with a new era of
engagement, including with its own military and civilian CSDP missions. The role of the EU
was seen as crucial in the PBC in providing resources and capacities. The Outcome Document
of the World Summit noted that the UN supports the efforts of the EU and other regional
organisations to develop standby capacities and provide needed resources (UN 2005).
Once the idea of a PBC was presented, the EU advocated and welcomed the intention
to establish it. A Communication from the European Commission stressed that the EU would
contribute to the work of the PBC through its European Commission and CFSP instruments.
The European Commission particularly understood its  role to be well  suited to contribute
actively to the work of the PBC by emphasising its experience in peacebuilding around the
world and the financial amounts at its disposal (European Commission 2005a). The EU saw
the PBC as a platform for its engagement in post-conflict environments. In its statement, the
EU Presidency highlighted “the EU’s role as a peacebuilder through actions throughout the
world  ranging  through  peacekeeping,  reconstruction,  institution  building  and  support  for
fledgling democracies” (EU Delegation to the UN, 2005).
EU member states played a key role in ensuring the endorsement of the establishment
of the PBC at the 2005 World Summit. They actively advocated the PBC and negotiated with
other groups of states (interview A). Initially, the Summit made the PBC a subsidiary body of
the  UNGA only (UN  General  Assembly  2005b).  This  decision  represented  a  significant
change in power distribution in the UN system. Whereas the UNSC has traditionally had the
main responsibility over the maintenance of international peace and security, the PBC, which
deals with peace and security issues, was established by this resolution as a body under the
control of the UNGA. 
The  EU’s  support  for  the  institutionalisation  of  peacebuilding  was  not  merely
altruistic. The EU backed the decision to retain the PBC under the control of the UNCS. EU
countries voted for UNSC Resolutions 1645 and 1646 and UNGA Resolution 60/180 which
made the PBC a subsidiary body of both the UNGA and the UNSC (UN General Assembly
2005a; UN Security Council 2005a; 2005b). EU member states coordinate their voting at the
UN, acting together for up to 90 per cent of votes in UN organs, including the UNSC and the
UNGA (K.E. Smith 2006; Telò 2009; Thomas 2011a, 12). Although many EU states are in
favour of a reform of the UNSC, they also enjoy significant privileges within the current
system while maintaining a relatively strong share of the seats in the UNSC. Keeping the PBC
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under the responsibility of the UNSC could ensure a continued share of the EU in the control
of UN peacebuilding (Kmec 2017).
The  interest  of  the  EU  in  controlling  international  peacebuilding  actions  is  also
demonstrated through the proposal of the European Commission that the EU participates in all
meetings of the PBC (European Commission 2005a; 2005b). However, securing an EU seat in
the PBC was not straightforward.  A decision was held up by the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation  (OIC)  until  it  was  also  granted  the  same  status.35 The  tension  over  the
Community’s  representation  in  the  PBC  also  arose  at  the  EU  level.  The  division  of
competencies between the European Commission and the Council’s CFSP generated debates
as to who should represent the EU within the PBC. In the end, an agreement was reached that
the European Community would be represented under one nameplate with two seats - one for
the Presidency and one for the Commission (Tomat and Onestini 2010). With the adoption of
the Lisbon Treaty, which granted the EU a single legal status, this problem was resolved; the
EU is now represented by its Delegation to the UN. The PBC also provided the EU with an
opportunity to enhance its influence in decision-making over matters of international peace
and  security  at  the  UN.  In  the  configurations  of  the  PBC,  namely  the  Organizational
Committee  (OC),  Country  Specific  Configurations  (CSCs)  and  the  Working  Group  on
Lessons Learned, EU member states have secured the largest share of seats (Kmec 2017).
The institutionalisation of UN peacebuilding, supported by the EU, created fertile soil
for  the  development  of  the  EU’s  own role  in  international  peacebuilding.  The reform of
peacekeeping and the shift towards peacebuilding at the UN coincided with the launch of the
CSDP which has become the EU’s most important instrument in international peacebuilding.
This link is evident for example through statements by Secretary-General of the Council of
the EU and High Representative of the CFSP (SG/HR) Javier Solana who warmly welcomed
the establishment of the PBC while stressing that the EU fully supported the UN concept of
peacebuilding. He stated that “the idea of strengthening the link between early warning, peace
keeping and post-conflict reconstruction was part of the EU’s submission to the High Level
Panel” (Council of the EU 2005a). According to him, the creation of the PBC “is entirely
consistent with the comprehensive approach in crisis management pursued by the European
Union. We stand ready to fully and actively contribute to the work of the PBC” (Ibid. 2005). 
35 In addition to the EU and the OIC, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank can take part in all
the meetings of the PBC (Kmec 2017; Tomat and Onestini 2010). 
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The EU’s agreement with the UN’s understanding of peacebuilding
The EU’s active involvement in the shift towards peacebuilding at the UN suggests that the
EU is in an agreement with the UN on peacebuilding. This involvement influenced the EU’s
own  understanding  of  peacebuilding  and  of  the  purposes  of  its  CSDP with  the  UN-EU
consensus on peacebuilding becoming apparent with the evolution of the CSDP.  The UN’s
response  to  the  new  ESDP  was  affirmative.  While  facing  shortages  of  capacity  and
capabilities, the UN welcomed the introduction of the CSDP as a crucial instrument that could
strengthened the UN peace efforts directly or indirectly.  Yet, the UN stressed that conflict
management actions by regional organisations, such as those under the CSDP, should take
place with the approval of the UNSC (UN 2004b; 2004c). 
The EU has recognised the primacy of the UN in the maintenance of international
peace and security while attempting to keep a certain degree of autonomy. Summits in Nice
and  Göteborg recalled that the ESDP would contribute to international peace and security
while recognising the primary responsibility of the UNSC for international peace and security
(Council of the EU 2000, Annex VI; 2001a, Art. 47). As Ojanen noted, the EU acknowledged
that it needed the UN since “the development of the EU as an international actor requires
international acceptance,  the only actual institutional source of which is the UN” (Ojanen
2006a).  According to  Ojanen,  this  is  the  reason why the  EU has  always  emphasised  the
primacy of the UN in the maintenance of international peace and security (Ibid.). Similarly,
Tardy has argued that the UN has provided a legal framework and legitimacy for the CSDP.
Apart from this, the EU has a strategic interest in securing the backing from the UN for its
missions, especially in situations where the EU might be seen politically biased (Tardy 2009). 
The  EU envisioned  its  CSDP not  as  an  alternative  but  a  contribution  to  the  UN
peacekeeping efforts.  The 2000 European Council  of  Nice,  which  approved an  enhanced
cooperation between the UN and the EU, stressed that:
“the development of the European Security and Defence Policy strengthens the
Union’s contribution to international peace and security in accordance with the
principles  of  the  UN Charter.  The  European  Union recognises  the  primary
responsibility of the United Nations Security Council  for maintaining peace
and international security” (Council of the EU 2000, Annex VI).
The  EU  emphasised that  EU-led  missions  would  be  conducted  in  accordance  with  the
principles of the UN Charter. Yet, the Nice Council also noted that the CSDP would mean the
development of an “autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is
not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international
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crises” (Ibid.).  The Conclusions presented the CSDP both as an instrument compatible with
the UN principles and as an autonomous capacity of the EU. 
The  2001  European  Council  in  Göteborg  recalled  the  conclusions  from  Nice  by
stressing  that the  ESDP “will  also  enable  Europeans  to  respond  more  effectively  and
coherently to requests from lead organisations such as the UN or the OSCE” (Council of the
EU 2001b, Annex, para. 7). The Council noted that the evolving ESDP should lead to “an
intensified,  mutually  reinforcing  co-operation  between  the  European  Union  and  other
international  organisations,  including the  UN, OSCE and the  Council  of  Europe,  without
unnecessary duplication” (Council of the EU 2001b, Annex 1, para. 36). The Council adopted
a Conclusion on EU-UN Co-operation in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management with an
aim of strengthening EU-UN’s “mutually reinforcing approaches to conflict prevention and by
ensuring  that  the European Union’s  evolving military and civilian  capacities  provide real
added value for UN crisis management activities” (Council of the EU 2001a, Art. 53; see also
Council of the EU 2001e, 3).
The  UN  and  the  EU  share  conceptions  of  conflict  management.  The  original
Petersberg Tasks, namely humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacemaking tasks, as well as the
priority  areas  in  the  civilian  crisis  management,  namely  police,  rule  of  law,  civil
administration and civilian protection, correspond with the UN framework for peace missions.
The  Göteborg summit  brought  the  CSDP closer  to  the  peacebuilding  framework  while
stressing that civilian crisis management is a particularly important area for the development
of co-operation with international organisations (Council of the EU 2001b, Annex V). The
formulation and construction of the CSDP followed proposals outlined in  the  Agenda for
Peace and the Brahimi Report. “Civilian and military aspects of crisis management”, “conflict
prevention” and “regional issues” were seen as the main areas of cooperation between the EU
and  the  UN  in  crisis  management.  In  addition,  the  Göteborg Council  endorsed  the  EU
Programme  for  the  Prevention  of  Violent  Conflicts which  brought  a  consolidated
understanding of actions in conflict prevention, including peacebuilding (Council of the EU
2001a, Art. 53; 2001d). In this Programme, the EU examined practical implications of the
ways of contributing to the evolving shift towards peacebuilding at the UN. It proposed to
invite  “organisations  involved  in  conflict  prevention  in  Europe  to  a  meeting  on  how  to
improve  preventive  capabilities,  in  order  to  contribute  to  the  dialogue  on  peace-building
initiated by the UN Secretary-General” (Council of the EU 2001d, 8).
The Göteborg Council suggested that the development of a capability for planning and
coordinating  police  missions  to  conduct  conflict  prevention  and  crisis  management  tasks
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should pay attention “to the experience of the United Nations, in particular the conclusions of,
and follow-up to, the Brahimi report” (Council of the EU 2001b, Annex, para. 6). In this
sense,  the  inclusion  of  the  civilian  aspects  in  the  CSDP,  in  particular  police  missions,
corresponds with the ideas of the Brahimi reform. The reasons for the shift towards civilian
aspects may indeed be the lack of political  will  resulting from military and peacekeeping
failures as well as the domestic pressure that EU countries faced in the early 2000s. However,
the evolution of civilian crisis management has not neglected the EU’s intention to support
this change at the UN. High-level officials in Brussels actively called for the deployment of
both civilian and military capabilities (see Solana below).  Tardy (2005) noted that civilian
aspects of crisis management became the most significant area of the EU-UN rapprochement. 
The Göteborg summit recalled the intention to develop a strong EU-UN partnership
that would be “strengthened by the mutually reinforcing approaches to conflict prevention and
by ensuring that the European Union’s evolving military and civilian capacities provide real
added value for UN crisis management activities” (Council of the EU 2001a, Art. 53; see also
Council of the EU 2001b, para. 37; 2001d, 7; 2001e, 3). These Conclusions were prepared by
the General Affairs Council (GAC), which also stressed the EU’s
“determination to develop and strengthen co-operation in the areas of crisis
management  and  conflict  prevention.  The  co-operation  should  develop
progressively  in  close  co-ordination  with  the  UN,  focusing  on  substantive
issues  and  concrete  needs.  It  will  increase  in  scope and importance  as  the
ESDP evolves” (Council of the EU 2001c).
The GAC acknowledged “the need for an integrated approach to conflict prevention and crisis
management,  encompassing also development co-operation and other measures addressing
root causes of conflict” (Ibid.). 
The EU understood that its support of the UN’s efforts to maintain international peace
and security through the CSDP could not stay at the level of statements but needed to be
translated into actions which required the willingness and commitment of EU member states.
In his speech in Dublin in 2004, Solana noted:
“Ultimately, I believe that the best way that Europe can contribute to building a
stronger  UN is  by building  a  strong  and  capable  Europe;  a  Europe  firmly
committed to effective multilateralism. These are not alternatives. These are
complementary. Last year, the European Union was able to respond quickly
and decisively to the UN’s call for peacekeepers in the Great Lakes region.
This is EU rapid reaction in practice. Without [the CSDP], the deployment of
military capabilities, and the ability to take the necessary decisions, we could
not have responded to this call” (Solana 2004).
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Solana’s reference to military capabilities in a militarily neutral Ireland was significant as it
stressed the attempt of Brussels to meet promises that the EU gave to the UN – in particular
the contribution of military capabilities to UN peace missions. He understood that the support
to the UN was not merely based on civilian crisis management.  Solana referred to the EU’s
role  in  peacekeeping  and  post-conflict  management,  especially  in  the  Balkans,  while
understanding it as part of the comprehensive approach. He argued that “Bosnia will be the
first  case where the EU simultaneously deploys  trade,  humanitarian,  military and civilian
instruments  on  the  ground  in  pursuit  of  a  single  objective  -  the  stabilisation  and
transformation  of  a  post  conflict  society into  one  which  some day can  be  ready for  EU
membership” (Ibid.). Although Solana did not use the term peacebuilding in the draft ESS, he
followed the UN language of integrated and comprehensive post-conflict management.
The  ESS  highlighted  that  “strengthening  the  UN,  equipping  it  to  fulfil  its
responsibilities and to act effectively is a European priority” (Council of the EU 2003c, 7).
The  ESS  emphasised  the  importance  of  complying  with  international  institutions  and
international law. It highlighted that “the EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with
the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in
short-term  crisis  management  situations”  (Council  of  the  EU  2003c,  11). The  EU’s
commitment to the UN had already been emphasised by Solana in the draft ESS:  
“the fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations
Charter.  Strengthening  the  United  Nations,  equipping  it  to  fulfil  its
responsibilities and to act effectively must be a European priority. If we want
international organizations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting
threats to international peace and security we should be ready to act when their
rules are broken (Solana 2003,14).
According to Gowan, cooperation with the UN was not seen as the main priority by Solana
prior to 2003. Gowan claimed that the UN has moved from an almost peripheral role in the
ESS to its centre due to the 2003 Iraq crisis. The invasion of Iraq put more pressure on the EU
states to restore the UN’s credibility. For Gowan, the ESS was a direct response to the Iraq
crisis and an anti-pole to the US security strategy, in particular an increased unilateral peace-
enforcement interventionism led by the US (Gowan 2007). According to Ortega, the reasons
could  go  back  to  earlier  interventionism,  namely  NATO’s  operation  in  Kosovo  in  1999.
Although  this  intervention  was  later  approved  by the  UNSC,  it  constituted  a  significant
challenge to the international order. At the time when the EU was planning its CSDP, the new
interventionism questioned what type of operations the EU would carry out (Ortega 2001).
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While stressing its compliance with international law and its own contribution to the
maintenance of international peace and security, the ESS emphasised the distinction between
unilateral interventions and peace missions with the approval of the UNSC. In this way, the
EU sought to ensure the legitimacy of its deployment of autonomous operations and missions
so that they comply with the international legal system. The ESS was a crucial document in
highlighting the linkage between the UN and the EU approaches to peace and conflict. The
Strategy made the EU’s  relationship to  the UN one of  the central  themes.  It  brought  the
understanding of peace and conflict closer to that of the UN. It identified state failure as a key
threat to international peace and security. It also noted that the EU should play a crucial role
in strengthening the UN’s capacity for crisis-management and post-conflict reconstruction. It
called for the EU to enhance its military assets and its “capacity to bring all necessary civilian
resources to bear in crisis and post-crisis situations” (Council of the EU 2003c, 11). 
Biscop  observed  that  the  ESS  came  to  correspond  with  the  UN understanding  of
human security which he framed as ‘Global Public Goods’. He noted that the ESS contained
elements based on the principle of Global Public Goods despite the fact that these were not
mentioned in the ESS. The ESS interlinks peace and security with good governance, social
and political  reform,  the  rule  of  law and human rights  (Biscop 2005b).  Similarly,  Bailes
argued that the ESS combined the political, societal, economic and strategic dimensions of
security, highlighted the need to tackle causes for conflicts from economic and social sources,
and  discussed  non-state  actors  (Bailes  2005).  This  interconnection  between  peace  and
security, and between development, good governance, human rights and rule of law is central
to the understanding of peacebuilding.
Solana made clearer references to the framework that corresponds with peacebuilding
while  emphasising  the  need  to  develop  “a  new paradigm.  Let  us  develop  more  creative
strategies for conflict prevention, crisis management, good governance, trade promotion and
human rights protection” (Solana 2005, 3-4). He stressed the need for coherence in policies
and long-term development in post-conflict crisis rebuilding (Ibid.). He argued that “peace
building and conflict  prevention lie at  the heart  of the European Union’s external action”
(Solana 2007, preface). He emphasised that “Europe can and must take more initiatives is in
developing new rules and institutions for a more complex and unstable world” (Solana 2008,
6). Solana’s  statements  suggest  that  the  EU  was  closely  following  the  reform  of  UN
peacekeeping.  Solana’s  call  for  new  inclusive  and  integrated  approaches  in  post-conflict
management matches with those made by the High-Level Panel.
The EU’s inclination to peacebuilding has been noted by Missiroli who anticipated
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that the Report on the Implementation of the ESS would focus on what the Union could do
better  in  the  broader  arena  of  peacebuilding.  It  was  expected  that  peacebuilding  would
dominate the content of the Report. According to Missiroli, peacebuilding is “the term that
resounds most favourably with European citizens” (Missiroli 2008). Unlike the 2003 ESS, the
Report  on  the  Implementation  of  the  ESS:  Providing  Security  in  a  Changing  World,
mentioned ‘peacebuilding’ and stressed its importance. It also highlighted the interconnection
between peacebuilding, conflict prevention and development (Council of the EU 2008).
The consensus between the UN and the EU with regard to peacebuilding has led to a
synergy between the two organisations in the conceptual formulation and understanding of
peacebuilding. Both the EU and the UN came to see post-conflict peacebuilding as a crucial
condition  for  rebuilding  stability  and  peace  in  societies  emerging  from  conflicts.  This
consensus was accompanied by the expansion of post-conflict activities into civilian aspects
on  both  sides,  i.e.  in  EU  civilian  missions  and  in  UN  peacekeeping  missions.  Most
importantly, the EU stressed its commitment to the UN and to the principle of the primary
responsibility of the UNSC in the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Peacebuilding as an objective in the EU-UN partnership
The consensus between the EU and the UN on the need for peacebuilding resulted in a strong
partnership in the area of conflict management.  According to Hannay, it was the end of the
Cold War that brought the two organisations to cooperate. He noted that, during the Cold War,
the then Community and the UN “might have been living on different planets for all they
knew” (Hannay 2013, 173). The relationship between the two organisations was characterised
by the atmosphere of mutual ignorance and suspicion, as noted by Hannay (Ibid.). Following
the fall of the Iron Curtain, they started to cooperate.  Novosseloff argued that the EU-UN
cooperation intensified after the Saint-Malo Summit of 1998 and the European Council of
Cologne in 1999 that decided to institutionalise the ESDP.36 According to her, the EU intended
to  become  a  credible  actor  with  new  capabilities  in  crisis  management.  As  the  largest
contributor to the UN general and peacekeeping budgets, the EU wanted to be perceived as
something more than just a “lobby group”, a “funding organisation” or a “monetary weight.”
This cooperation was also driven by the need of the UN to create effective exit strategies in
post-conflict  situations,  for which the EU was seen as a credible  actor  offering a way of
leaving a country in a sustainable way (Novosseloff 2012a). Tardy observed that the EU-UN
36 According to Novosseloff,  UN-EU cooperation is one of  the most  institutionalised forms of  multilateral
cooperation, covering the whole spectrum of conflict management (Novosseloff 2012a; Tardy 2006). 
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cooperation in the field of peace and security has been accompanied by simultaneous reform
processes. This cooperation has brought both organisations closer to each other in terms of the
conceptualisation  and  institutionalisation  of  their  relationship  and  their  approaches,
characterised by an increased exchange of information and frameworks (Tardy 2005; 2012). 
This cooperation  has  also been important  for  the  understanding of  the role  of  the
CSDP and its development. As Gowan argued:
“cooperation with the United Nations has been essential to the evolution of the
European Security and Defence Policy.  Of the 23 ESDP missions  launched
between 2003 and 2009, 15 have been deployed in countries where the UN has
a  peacekeeping  or  peacebuilding  mission.  All  EU  missions  in  Africa  have
involved direct or indirect cooperation with the UN” (Gowan 2009b, 117).
The UN and the EU started to cooperate in peacebuilding already before the launch of the
CSDP. The Presidency Report on ESDP adopted by the Laeken summit of 2001 had noted that
“the Union has begun to cooperate more fully with the United Nations in crisis
management and conflict prevention concerning the themes and in the specific
areas  endorsed  by  the  Gothenburg  European  Council.  Regular  contacts  at
different levels with the representatives of the United Nations have made it
possible  to  keep  up  the  necessary  links  on  the  main  subjects  of  common
interest.  Those  contacts  have  also  led  to  examination  [...]  of  how  the
development of European capabilities in the ESDP could contribute to United
Nations efforts in peacekeeping operations” (Council of the EU 2001f, 9).
The reference to EU-UN cooperation is important since the same summit declared the EU’s
newly established ESDP operational. In 2003, the GAC Conclusions made crisis management
a priority in the EU’s relations with the UN (Council of the EU 2003a). In the same year, the
Joint  Declaration  on  EU-UN Cooperation  in  Crisis  Management initiated  a  platform for
regular consultations between the two organisations in the field of crisis management. The
Declaration identified four areas of cooperation in planning (including cooperation between
mission planning units), training (joint training standards, procedures, planning for military
and civilian personnel, and synchronisation of training), communication (liaison offices), best
practices  (exchange  of  information)  (Council  of  the  EU  2003b).  According  to  this  joint
Declaration, the EU and UN peace missions were supposed to be not only compatible but also
comparable while showing similarity in their concepts and mandate. 
The  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European
Parliament  The  European  Union  and the  United  Nations:  The  Choice  of  Multilateralism
(European Commission 2003a) stressed the EU’s contribution to the UN system and presented
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practical guidelines for partnership between the EU and the UN. The EU-UN Cooperation in
Civilian Crisis Management Operations – Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint
Declaration  (Council  of  the  EU 2004f,  Annex  II)  defined  operational  modalities  of  this
partnership.  Exchanges  of  information  and  cooperation  between  the  two  organisations  at
decision-  and  policy-making,  training  and  operational  levels  have  taken  place  regularly
(Novosseloff 2012a; Tardy 2005). To enhance the effectiveness of this cooperation, a Steering
Committee was established between the UN DPKO and DPA and the EU institutions covering
the General Council Secretariat, the EUMS, and the Commission (Novosseloff 2012a).
In 2007, a Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management was signed
by the UN and the EU. It called for a renewed EU commitment to the UN and cooperation by
endorsing  a  number  of  operational  measures.  The  Statement  emphasised  the  need  for  an
enhanced cooperation in the areas of support to African peacekeeping capacity-building and
in the aspects of multidimensional peacekeeping, including police, rule of law and security
sector reform (Council of the EU 2007a). The Joint Statement was adopted during the German
Presidency.  Novosseloff  argued  that  the  German  government  wanted  to  strengthen  this
cooperation based on lessons from their involvement in the second EU operation in the DRC,
launched in July 2006 at the request of the UN. Germany wished to avoid the surprise element
of a UN request, which would be difficult to refuse, by emphasising the need for the EU to
have a better control over the EU-UN partnership  (Novosseloff 2012b, 156). According to
Gowan, Germany became frustrated with the experience in the EU operation in the DRC since
the structures put in place “gave EU member States too little oversight of relations with the
UN” (Gowan 2009b, 120). 
The  EU’s  commitment  to  UN peacebuilding  can  be  best  seen  through  the  EU’s
financial contributions to the UN’s general budget and peacekeeping budget. The EU member
states together make the largest financial contribution to the UN peacekeeping budget.37 The
EU’s contributions to the UN can also be understood as an impetus for the EU to strengthen
its position in the UN, including in the UN reform process. For example, a communication
from the European Commission to the Council and the Parliament recommended that
“the EU must increase its contribution with a view to adopting and applying
multilateral policies and instruments. […] the EU must take a more active role
in  the  institutional  reform  process  of  the  UN  in  order  to  increase  the
effectiveness of the system [and …] to increase the role of EU delegations to
the UN” (European Commission 2003a).
37 The EU countries  jointly fund around 40% of the peacekeeping budget  and 38% of  the  regular  budget
(almost 50% with other contributions) to the UN family.  The European Commission contributes over €1
billion to the UN annually (European Commission 2009, 2; UN “Committee on Contributions”). 
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The  European  Commission  recommended  that  the  cooperation  in  the  area  of  peace  and
security  should  develop  into  a  firm  partnership.  It  noted  that  “political  and  technical
cooperation must also be increased in the area of peace and security,  whether for conflict
prevention, crisis management or post-crisis reconstruction” (European Commission 2003a).
The recommendations of the Council and the Commission were translated into several
practical  modalities  for  cooperation  between  the  EU  CSDP  and  the  UN  peacekeeping
operations.  The  PSC  tasked  the  CMPD  with  discussing  with  the  DPKO  and  other  UN
departments  possibilities  for  enhancing  the  CSDP  support  to  UN  peacekeeping.  In
consultation with the DPKO and DFS, the CMPD prepared a list of actions in which CSDP
could support UN peacekeeping - Actions to Enhance EU CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping
(Council  of  the  EU 2011a).  This  list  included  not  only the  identification  of  civilian  and
military  capabilities  that  the  EU  member  states  could  put  at  UN  disposal  but  also  the
provision  of  an  entire  CSDP mission  or  operation  under  UN command,  and autonomous
CSDP deployments in support of UN operations. This document provides a comprehensive
and detailed overview of areas for cooperation and conceptual consistency between the EU
and the UN in crisis management.  The call for the establishment of actions for coordination
between the EU and the UN during the planning and conduct  of  EU missions/operations
deployed in support of UN operations is a major step which brings the CSDP to its original
objective of supporting the work of the UN. It also reflects Council decisions, such as  the
2003 Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management, which emphasised the
need for cooperation and partnership between the two institutions in the field of international
peacekeeping and peacebuilding (Council of the EU and the United Nations 2003).  
Accepting these actions, the PSC tasked the CMPD to prepare a Plan of Action that set
out modalities for the implementation of those actions. The Plan of Action identified areas of
conceptual  consistency  and  proposed  technical  arrangements  for  mutual  support  and
operational  aspects  of  cooperation  in  peacekeeping/  crisis  management.  For  instance,  it
referred to potential areas of EU contribution to UN peacekeeping as identified by  DPKO/
DFS, such as mine clearance, explosive ordnance disposal, and/or ammunition management
expertise.  The Plan also stressed the need to further explore commonality between concepts
and doctrine in the area of military and civilian capacities deployed in peace operations of
both organisations in order to promote interoperability. For example, the Plan suggested that
the EU should invite the UN to work together on the development of key EU concepts in the
same field. It also recommended establishing arrangements to access each other’s concepts
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library to ensure mutual access to respective concepts (Council of the EU 2012a, 23). 
Recommendations also included a call for the establishment of cooperation between
the CMPD and the UN DPKO on updating the EU rapid response concepts, including in the
contribution  of  the  EU Formed  Police  Units  (FPU) to  UN peacekeeping operations.  The
CMPD was requested to establish technical arrangements with DPKO/ DFS on cooperation in
the area of lessons learned, including in the framework of the PBC (Ibid., 28).  The Actions
and the Plan of Action refer to peacekeeping and crisis management as identical concepts.
Although peacebuilding is not mentioned explicitly, except for the reference to the PBC, both
documents understand peacekeeping and crisis management in a broader sense as a practice
that involves peacebuilding.  The EEAS also participated in the UN Doctrine Development
Group for Formed Police Units, facilitated by DPKO/ DFS, which led to the revision of the
UN policy  Formed Police Units  in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO
2010; 2017) that allows for EU-UN FPU interoperability (Council of the EU 2012a, 24).38
These proposals for policy and institutional changes suggest that the strengthening of
the  partnership  between the UN and the EU in  conflict  management  was not  only about
working together for the same cause; it served an additional objective: to develop the CSDP
as  a  tool  at  the  disposal  of  the  UN  both  under  the  UN  command  and  as  autonomous
deployments in support of UN operations.  While the EU intended to align its concepts and
doctrine with those of the UN, it further developed its CSDP in its own way. Also, while the
EU initially committed itself to support the UN efforts to maintain international peace with
the whole range of CSDP tools, including with peace-enforcement and peacekeeping, it soon
limited its actions to post-conflict peacebuilding. 
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the evolution of the consensus between the UN and the EU on the
need  for  and  understanding  of  peacebuilding.  It  has  claimed  that  the  EU  supported  and
advocated the development of peacebuilding at the normative and policy level at the UN. It
did so also through its own practice. During the period of the evolution of UN peacebuilding,
the EU planned and launched its own CSDP. The EU’s support for peacebuilding at the UN
was influenced by a number of events concerning the EU’s own security, such as the wars in
38 This policy document was a revision of the 2006 UN DPKO policies titled Functions and Organization of
Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO 2006a), and Guidelines for
Formed Police Units on Assignment with Peace Operations (UN DPKO 2006b) which outline the conditions
of deployment, potential, limitations and composition of the FPUs in UN peacekeeping operations. 
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the Balkans, the failure in Rwanda, terrorism, and the inability to act jointly in the Iraq war.
These events encouraged EU member states to act more effectively in matters of international
peace and security. Peacebuilding evolved as one of the practices to deal with such situations. 
At  the  political  level,  both  the  EU  and  the  UN  stressed  the  compatibility  and
coherence  of  their  peacekeeping and peacebuilding  approaches.  This  consolidation  of  the
UN’s and EU’s approaches to peace and security created a platform for a strong cooperation
between the two organisations in peacebuilding. The EU-UN partnership provided a platform
for the development of a common peacebuilding framework. Through this partnership, the EU
became influenced by and embraced the UN’s new ideas and approaches to peacebuilding.
The CSDP was influenced by the  UN peacebuilding  framework generated  by the  reform
process at the UN. While establishing its own CSDP, at the conceptual and operational level,
the EU followed the UN’s approaches by grasping the ideas of the UN reform initiatives such
as the Brahimi report. At the same time, this partnership served as a doorway for the EU to
contribute with its own CSDP to the UN peace efforts. The UN recognised the crucial value of
the  EU’s  contribution  to  international  peace  and  security  through  its  own  CSDP.  The
synchronisation  of  activities  in  post-conflict  management  was  proposed  by a  number  of
agreements at decision-making and policy-making levels. Although the cooperation has not
fully worked at the operational level, and although the CSDP has developed into a tool with
narrow yet more specialised and focused capabilities, whereas the UN deploys robust and
multidimensional  missions,  the  UN’s  conceptualisation  and  institutionalisation  of
peacebuilding has impacted on the EU’s own approaches to peacebuilding in its missions. 
While the EU has understood its CSDP actions as a contribution to the UN’s efforts to
maintain international peace and security,  the Councils of Nice and Göteborg had already
begun to emphasise the autonomous nature of its own policy. The autonomous character of
the  CSDP influences  the  nature  of  the  EU’s  approach  to  peacebuilding.  While  the  EU’s
approach to peacebuilding builds on that of the UN, the EU has further developed it with its
decision to focus on specific aspects of peacebuilding in its missions and operations. The
question therefore arises to what extent this autonomy can lead to a normative and practice
change of the CSDP actions with peacebuilding tasks.  Both organisations have developed
distinctive peacebuilding styles. The following chapter analyses in detail how the CSDP has
led to the development of the EU’s distinctive peacebuilding approach. 
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3  Peacebuilding and the CSDP
Having discussed the evolution of peacebuilding as a norm and practice at the UN and the
role of the EU in that process, this chapter turns attention to peacebuilding actions within the
CSDP. Although the EU stressed the contribution of the CSDP to the UN’s efforts to maintain
international peace and security, the development of the CSDP has provided the EU with an
autonomous  capacity  to  launch  missions  outside  the  UN framework.  However,  since  the
launch of its first CSDP missions, the EU has moved its focus from what was intended to
encompass a military approach within a full range of crisis management tasks to an approach
that  primarily  involves  post-conflict  peacebuilding.  While  the  EU’s  conceptualisation  of
peacebuilding is based on the UN normative framework, the CSDP has evolved in a direction
that reflects the EU’s own foreign policy preferences. The chapter starts with discussing how
EU member states have turned their attention away from the UN to EU instruments with the
development of the CSDP. After outlining how the EU frames peacebuilding, the discussion
then moves on to explore the debates on the role of the EU in peacebuilding by presenting the
normative, historical and institutional set-up of peacebuilding activities within the CSDP. 
The EU’s turn away from the UN to its own CSDP
Despite the fact that the EU saw its own CSDP as a contribution to UN peace efforts, the
creation of the CSDP enhanced the prospects of the EU’s independent actions. The CSDP
provided the EU with full autonomy in international conflict management. This autonomy
motivated the EU to shift  its  attention and resources from the UN to its  own instrument
despite  its  pledged  commitment  to  the  UN.  The  development  of  the  CSDP  logically
encouraged  the  EU  to  revisit  its  relationship  with  the  UN  as  it  increased  the  EU’s
independence from the UN in international conflict management (Ojanen 2006a; Tardy 2005).
These efforts were strengthened by the EU’s attempt to increase its influence in the UN to a
level that corresponds with its economic and political importance, including its share in the
UN budget (Ojanen 2006a). Despite the cooperation, both organisations have struggled for
their  comparative  advantages,  visibility  and  identity  as  international  actors.  They  have
developed their own interests and objectives (Gowan 2009a, 52; Tardy 2009, 47). 
For these reasons, EU countries prefer to participate in UN-mandated operations rather
than in UN-led operations (Ojanen 2006a). Through the Council structures, CSDP actions are
subordinated to the member states and not to the UN (Tardy 2005). In contrast to deployments
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under the UN command, through the CSDP, the EU can deploy autonomous missions without
a UN decision which is also dependent on non-EU states.  The rules of engagement for EU
missions are less strict  than those for UN missions. They are decided by the contributing
countries,  whereas  UN missions  are  planned and commanded by the  UN Secretariat.  EU
member states govern their missions autonomously.  CSDP deployments equip the EU with
visibility. In contrast, UN missions exhibit UN signs and UN flag, and not national symbols,
including on vehicles, aircraft and uniforms (Battistelli 2015, 25).39
With  the  establishment  of  the  CSDP,  the  EU  states  previously  active  in  UN
peacekeeping  have  shifted  their  attention  away  from  the  UN  to  their  own  instruments.
Nowhere else is this more visible as in EU states’ decision to close down SHIRBRIG after the
creation of the EU Battlegroups. Koops noted that, although the Battlegroups were designed
to support the UN, the EU reserved the right to decide whether to launch an operation under
the  UN  auspices  or  an  autonomous  operation  without  the  UNSC  approval.  In  contrast,
SHIRBRIG was a tool exclusively at the disposal of the UN. According to Koops, the creation
of the Battlegroups increased the likelihood of undermining the authority of the UN (Koops
2007). Already the first autonomous EU military operation Artemis in the DRC demonstrated
the EU’s intention to engage autonomously instead within a UN operation. The EU dismissed
the request of the UN to make the capabilities of Artemis available to the UN after the EU’s
planned departure. Instead, the EU continued to be present in the DRC (Tardy 2005). 
Although the EU is the top contributor to the UN’s general and peacekeeping budgets,
European troop contributions to UN peacekeeping have significantly decreased over the last
decade.40 While European states were main contributors until the 1990s, their contributions
declined sharply after the 1995 termination of UN Protection Force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR).
Koops and Terkovitch argued that it were the negative experiences in Rwanda, Somalia and
the Western Balkans due to which EU countries shifted their political and military attention to
NATO and, from 2003, the CSDP (Koops and Terkovitch 2016, 597).  Even states with a
strong UN-oriented  tradition  such as  Finland,  Sweden and Norway invested  more  in  EU
initiatives, or Denmark which increased its engagement in NATO (Ibid., 597).
39 Looking  at  institutional  autonomy,  Eckhard  and  Dijkstra  (2017)  have  argued  that  the  EU  is  the  least
autonomous actor as member states directly control the entire process of a mission, whereas the  UN is an
independent agent with autonomy on staff discretion, budget and operational dynamics. However, while, in
the  example  of  Kosovo,  they  claimed  that  the  independence  of  the  UN  enabled  the  member  states  to
unilaterally lobby the UN during the implementation to ensure policy outcomes closer to their preferences,
they neglected  the  significant  differences  between the  political  importance  of  UN and EU missions.  In
Kosovo, the EU mission has allowed EU member states to ensure leverage over the process.
40 In terms of personnel,  EU countries have contributed with less than 10% of the UN troops over the last
twenty years.  In  1990,  Western  EU countries  dominated  the  troop  contribution,  while  non-EU,  mainly
developing countries were increasing their personnel contributions to peacekeeping missions. See table 1 on
p. 55 (UN 2014; UN “Troop and Police Contributors Archive”).
54
Table 1: Top Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Personnel in 2015 and 2012 compared
(Source: UN “Troop and Police Contributors Archive”)
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It would be wrong to argue that small numbers cannot make a difference. As Koops
and Terkovitch argued, peacekeeping “depends on the type and quality of troops” (2016, 600).
Nevertheless, troop contributions “do matter as an important indicator for gauging a country’s
concrete  commitment  to  UN  peacekeeping”  (Ibid.).  European  contributions  to  the  UN
operation in Mali have been coined as an example of a ‘European return’ to UN peacekeeping
(Karlsrud and Smith 2015).  Yet,  as Koops and Terkovitch note,  “one mission on its  own
cannot serve as a reliable indicator for a systematic ‘return’ nor should it serve as a basis for
wider generalizations” (Koops and Terkovitch 2016, 601). 
The UN was concerned that the CSDP could have developed to the detriment of the
UN  peacekeeping  needs.  Jean-Marie  Guéhenno,  UN  Under-Secretary  General  for
Peacekeeping, for example, expressed his concern over a tendency of regional organisations,
such as the EU, to get increasingly involved in peacekeeping on their own. He stressed that, if
regional organisations acted without respect for the authority of the UN, it could harm the
primacy of the organisation: “you have to recognize that there is a unique legitimacy of the
United Nations [...]. It’s a source of legitimacy that cannot be compared to national affairs or
with any other source of legitimacy” (Guéhenno 2002, 495). He emphasised the importance of
enhancing the UN’s role and capacity in peacekeeping by calling upon developed countries to
be more active in peace operations: 
“I think there also have to be the developed countries, which were very much
present in peacekeeping in the '90s, and which had negative experiences in
Yugoslavia. They still live on the memory of that negative experience, and I
think we have to overcome that. Our reform efforts are designed, in part, to
overcome those suspicions. It would be important for the authority of the UN.
It’s important for the UN and for the international community that there be
greater participation” (Ibid., 500). 
To persuade European partners about the vitality of their contributions to UN missions, the
UN  has  promoted  inter-organisational  initiatives.  In  2011,  the  UN  even  established  the
Liaison Office for Peace and Security (UNLOPS) in Brussels to facilitate a dialogue with the
EU and NATO (Koops and Tardy 2015; Hummel and Pietz 2015). 
Nevertheless, as highlighted by  Gowan, EU states not only reduced their manpower
contributions  to  UN  operations  but  also  joined  the  US’s  interventions  without  a  UNSC
mandate. Yet, Gowan argued that the UN has remained important to European strategies for
global stability, especially in Africa where the UN has continued to be the main actor in the
areas of conflict management and peace missions (Gowan 2007). Despite existing concerns,
scholars have commented that the UN does not see the CSDP as a competitor but as a burden-
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sharing partner (Tardy 2009). The UN is less worried about competition but more about the
EU’s incapability of providing the required support (Jakobsen 2006). 
The EU’s shift towards its own instruments has also affected resources. The more the
EU countries use their resources in their own operations, the less these can be provided to the
UN (Ojanen 2006a). Resource competition shifted the EU’s support from UN peacekeeping to
the EU ‘peacekeeping’ structures (Juergenliemk et al. 2012, 20-21). Nevertheless, the EU still
possesses  sufficient  resources.  The UN missions  are  in  need of  modern  and high-quality
technical equipments and vehicles, all of which the EU could provide (Jaques 2014). The UN
has  not  only  aimed  at  increasing  the  numbers  of  European  troops  in  UN  missions;  the
emphasis has increasingly been placed on critical resources and high-quality capabilities, such
as special vehicles, medical evacuation capacities, force protection, strategic airlift and rapid
reaction units, the majority of which were, however, “tied up during the last decade in EU
CSDP activities as well as NATO’s ISAF operation” (Koops and Terkovitch 2016, 598).41 
The UN-EU relationship in  conflict  management  is  also hindered by political  and
structural tensions. While cooperation is recognised at political levels by both organisations, it
comes second in everyday work in institutional settings of the DPKO and the EEAS (Tardy
2009, 52). Novosseloff claimed that, apart from the established formal contacts and desk-to-
desk  dialogues  between the  two Secretariats,  most  recommendations  of  the  UN-EU joint
statements have not been implemented. Both organisations are deploying their missions in the
same countries but not necessarily coordinating with each other  (Novosseloff 2012b).  Most
EU actions have technically not been deployed in direct support of the UN operations, with
the exception of the EU operation in CAR and EU mission in Kosovo (Gowan 2012; Tardy
2005). Gowan noted that the absence of a full EU-UN cooperation is caused by the lack of
political will at the Council level (Gowan 2009a). 
Interviews  with EU  officials  confirm  that  cooperation  is  mutually  recognised  but
constrained by a sense of competition: 
“We have an EU-UN action plan agreed. […] One point on the agenda is better
coordinated planning. We just have finalised with them a modalities paper on
how we want  to  do this.  We are  in  early stages  of  fact  finding […].  It  is
improving, I would say. This is on paper. It is perfectly agreed. In practice, ... it
depends sometimes on personalities  and yes,  there is  always an element  of
competition, unfortunately” (interview 2).
The sense of competition between the two organisations’ approaches is especially present at
the operational level. For example, an EU official compared the effectiveness of the EU and
41 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was a NATO-led operation in Afghanistan.
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UN missions in Mali: 
“Look at the case of Mali. It is a mess – what the UN is doing. They have been unable
to build the mission. They have been neither successful nor effective. And it is such a
large mission. […] our mission is small but effective” (interview 3).
While EEAS and UN departments exchange information between each other, it is the PSC
which decides on a substantive CSDP support to UN operations. The Plan of Action (see p. 49
of this thesis) stressed that implementation of cooperation requires an approval from the PSC
(Council of the EU 2012a). 
While EU and UN missions have many similarities, they also differ in many aspects.
The UN has a robust structure to manage its missions which are also larger in terms of their
size and personnel. In 2014, the UN deployed more than 97,000 peacekeeping personnel (UN
2014), whereas the number of EU personnel in CSDP missions and operations was around
4,000.42 In addition, the DPKO, the DPA and the PBC employ significantly more staff as the
CSDP structure.43 The EU limits itself to small CSDP missions, while other organisations such
as the UN, the AU and the  Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are
putting far greater numbers of personnel into their missions (Gowan 2012, 2).  EU missions
are small in size and focused on particular tasks in contrast to large-scale UN missions. They
are  mostly  deployed  in  countries  already  pacified  to  some  degree  by  others.  While  the
decisions to launch UN missions are taken by governments that do not necessarily intend to
hazard their own soldiers, the EU has to carefully consider risks and political responsibilities
for its deployments (Crane 2012, 188-192). 
 The establishment of the CSDP has equipped the EU with a great degree of autonomy
in  international  conflict  management.  This  autonomy has  encouraged  the  EU  to  turn  its
attention away from the UN to its own CSDP. This EU’s focus on its own approaches reflects
a  shift  in  the  world  affairs  from  a  system  in  which  the  UNSC  has  had  the  primary
responsibility over the matters of international peace and security to one in which other states
are  increasingly interested  in  having a  greater  share  of  this  responsibility.  Peacebuilding,
which does not necessarily require the deployment of combat forces, enables states such as
EU countries to enhance their  role in the maintenance of international peace and security
(Kmec 2017).  Consequently,  this  EU’s shift,  by and large,  influences its  understanding of
peacebuilding. 
42 The number of the CSDP personnel is inaccurate due to flexible deployments in Somalia (EEAS 2014).
43 For instance, the DPKO that manages peacekeeping operations has almost 490 professional employees in the
UN HQ and over 20,000 staff in its field operations, which excludes contributions by member states (UN
General Assembly 2016).
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The EU’s puzzling understandings of peacebuilding
The term peacebuilding has found its way into the EU’s lexicon, though it remains ill-defined
and  often  confused  with  conflict  prevention  and  crisis  management  (Duke  and  Courtier
2010).44 CSDP missions and operations have been increasingly highlighted as examples of
peacebuilding  (K.E.  Smith,  2008;  Blockmans,  Wouters  and  Ruys  2010;  Merlingen  and
Ostrauskaite 2005a; 2005b; 2006) and state-building (Stewart 2011) by many scholars. Duke
and Courtier argued that the CSDP peacebuilding activities fit “nicely into the UN thinking on
the implementation of post-conflict peacebuilding” (Duke and Courtier 2010, 28). Similarly
as UN missions, CSDP peacebuilding actions support the stabilisation, reform or building of
state structures.  Referring to Richmond’s categorisation of four peacebuilding approaches,
Richmond, Björkdahl, and Kappler argued that, although a fourth-generation peacebuilding
has not yet fully evolved, EU peacebuilding has a potential to develop into such an approach
due to the EU’s ability to bridge the international, national and grass-roots levels. Yet, they
claim that EU peacebuilding in the CSDP, continues to reflect the third-generation category as
it focuses on the stabilisation of state institutions (2011).
At the same time, CSDP continues to be framed under crisis management despite the
fact that most CSDP actions carry out peacebuilding tasks. K.E. Smith argued even in 2008
that  the term crisis  management  has been used for  activities  which “should [...]  be more
properly termed conflict prevention or peacebuilding, as in its ubiquitous use to describe all
ESDP missions” (K.E. Smith 2008, 180). For her, the terminology of crisis management and
CSDP did not reflect the reality of the EU’s engagement.  CSDP operations/missions have
been of peacebuilding and conflict prevention character rather than of peace-enforcement or
peacekeeping character (Ibid., 180-181). According to scholars, this confusion of definitions
could hamper the EU’s coordination with other international organisations, as there are no
equivalents to the term crisis management in the UN, the OSCE or other organisations (K.E.
Smith 2008, 181; Nowak 2006c, 17-18; Stewart 2011; Gross and Juncos 2011c). 
This  terminological  confusion  has  its  roots  in  the  division  of  labour  between  the
Commission and the Council with regard to international peace, especially under the pillar
system which provided for the division of competences from 1993 to 2009. The Commission
has seen its role in long-term conflict prevention and development, while leaving short-term
crisis management to the Council (Gross and Juncos 2011c; Stewart 2011, 34). Peacebuilding,
such as economic development and reconstruction, had a long history in the first Community
44 Many scholars have noted that the definition of concepts used by the EU to address conflicts is notoriously
problematic and elusive (Duke and Ojanen 2006; K.E. Smith 2008, Gross and Juncos 2011c). 
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pillar.  Since  2003,  peacebuilding  has  also  significantly  increased  within  the  CSDP
(Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 216–218). Stewart observed that EU conflict prevention,
under which she also understands peacebuilding, shifted away from development to CSDP as
CSDP actions became increasingly tasked with conflict prevention and peacebuilding rather
than the management of open conflicts (2011). Peacebuilding has become an important part of
the Council’s crisis management in addition to Commission’s activities.
At the same time, the EU also developed short-term conflict prevention instruments
under the first pillar. The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and
the Instrument  for Stability (IfS)45 have supported peacebuilding activities  in the areas of
public administration, institution building, DDR, democracy building, and the promotion of
human rights and the rule of law (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 220). The EU also
extended  the  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  pillar  into  external  instruments  for  the  crisis
management and conflict prevention, especially the tasks related to the rule of law and the
fight against terrorism (Kurowska and Seitz 2011; Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 220).
Before the launch of the CSDP, the Commission’s Communication on the EU and the
Issue  of  Conflicts  in  Africa:  Peace-Building,  Conflict  Prevention  and  Beyond (European
Commission 1996) identified peacebuilding as the best approach to respond to the rise of
intrastate conflicts in Africa. It referred to the inability of UN peacekeeping and humanitarian
aid  to  ensure  sustainable  peace.  The  Communication  understood  peacebuilding  in  a
comprehensive way by stressing the interrelationship between security, peace, development,
justice and democracy. It determined peacebuilding as a measure suitable to three phases of
conflict. 1) Peacebuilding in situations without a potential for conflict can include capacity-
building, development, democracy-building, good governance, civil society and institution-
building. 2) In situations of tension, peacebuilding can focus on political dialogue, sanctions,
observation and humanitarian aid. 3) Peacebuilding in post-conflict situations includes DDR,
de-mining, humanitarian relief, political dialogue, conflict resolution, and the establishment of
viable  governmental,  political  and  socio-economic  structures.  Although  understanding
peacebuilding as a policy applicable to all the stages, the Communication already sensed that
peacebuilding would be best suited to the post-conflict phase:
“Activities of conflict prevention in a wider sense should be summarised under
the term peace-building. Defined as such, a policy of conflict prevention would
apply  mainly  in  a  situation  of  tension  […].  Peace-building  measures,  by
contrast, could apply in all phases of conflict and peace. However, as peace-
building measures will generally embrace projects and programmes with the
45 IfS was succeeded by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) in 2014.
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longer-term aim of the stabilisation of societies, their impact will be greatest in
non-violent situations” (European Commission 1996, part III). 
The formulation of peacebuilding in post-conflict situations in this Communication resembles
Boutrous-Ghali’s definition of peacebuilding (see p. 31 and 33 of this thesis). 
The  Communication  was  a  response  to  Council  Conclusions  on  the  Role  of
Development  Cooperation  in  Strengthening  Peace-Building,  Conflict  Prevention  and
Resolution (Council of the EU 1995).46 The Conclusions focused on situations of open war
and an imminent outbreak of violence, in which the EU’s contribution could take the forms of
early warning, diplomacy and peacekeeping, including through the WEU (Ibid.). In contrast,
the Commission’s Communication suggested that the EU should move beyond early warning,
preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping by foregrounding peacebuilding as the most suitable
approach to tackle conflicts.
The 2001  Communication  from  the  Commission  on  Conflict  Prevention put
peacebuilding  under  the  overall  measure  of  conflict  prevention.  It  described  conflict
prevention as both short-term and long-term measures, covering the stages before and after
the outbreak of conflicts (European Commission 2001). The Communication stressed that the
Commission  “is  closely  following  the  implementation  of  the  Brahimi  Report  and  fully
subscribes to the peace-building approach set out in the Report” (Ibid., 26). Gross and Juncos
correctly noticed that only one aspect of a conflict  cycle is missing in this Commission’s
definition,  namely the management of open conflicts. By excluding the activities of crisis
management, the Commission demarcated clear lines between the responsibilities of the two
organs (Gross and Juncos 2011c, 5). The exclusion of this phase is striking given the fact that
the Communication from 1996 referred to measures in an open conflict.47
In contrast to the Commission, the Council saw its responsibility in the area of crisis
management, primarily through the CSDP. The Council’s EU Programme for the Prevention
of Violent Conflicts (2001d) attempted to bring the understanding of respective actions closer
to  that  of  the  Commission.  It  distinguished  between  long-term and  short-term actions  to
prevent conflicts. It  referred to long-term conflict prevention as activities that address root
46 Also titled as Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa.
47 Between 2003 and 2011, scholarly and EU documents referred to the Commission’s distinctive definitions of
peacebuilding, conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution outlined on the website of
the Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) Development and Relations with the African, Caribbean and
Pacific Group of States States (ACP). After the 2011 restructuring to DG for International Cooperation and
Development (DG DEVCO), the link ceased to exist. In this source, peacebuilding was defined as “actions
undertaken  over  the  medium and  longer  term to  address  root  causes  of  violent  conflicts  in  a  targeted
manner”; conflict prevention as “actions undertaken over the short term to reduce manifest tensions and/or to
prevent  the  outbreak  or  recurrence  of  violent  conflict”;  conflict  management  as  actions  “to prevent  the
vertical or horizontal escalation of existing violent conflict”; and conflict resolution as “actions undertaken
over the short term to end violent conflict” (in K.E. Smith 2008, 170; Bayne 2003, 19). 
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causes of conflicts and include “development co-operation, trade, arms control, human rights
and environment policies as well as political dialogue” (Council of the EU 2001d, para. 11).
Short-term prevention actions range from “diplomatic and humanitarian instruments for short-
term prevention”  to  “structures  and capabilities  for  civil  and military crisis  management,
developed within the framework of the ESDP” (Ibid.). According to the Programme, CSDP
missions and operations are instruments the aim of which is “to strengthen the EU’s capacity
for action in the crucial field of conflict prevention” (Ibid., 2 para. 3). 
As the previous chapter already noted, the ESS does not include any reference to the
term  peacebuilding.  Nonetheless,  it  contains  references  that  reflect  general  principles  of
peacebuilding. The Strategy identified five major threats to European security, including the
threat posed by regional conflicts and failed states. It emphasised the need to tackle these
challenges in a comprehensive way:
“In  failed  states,  military  instruments  may  be  needed  to  restore  order,
humanitarian  means to  tackle  the  immediate  crisis.  Regional  conflicts  need
political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in
the  post  conflict  phase.  Economic  instruments  serve  reconstruction,  and
civilian  crisis  management  helps  restore  civil  government.  The  European
Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations”
(Council of the EU 2003c, 7).
The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy directly referred to the
need for peacebuilding to tackle root causes of conflicts before they break out with the use of
a comprehensive approach, including the CSDP (2008). 
However, the lack of a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding within the EU has
added to the terminological confusion around peacebuilding. The EU has not developed a
strategy specifically dedicated to peacebuilding, which has been acknowledged by the EEAS:
“if  the  EU  is  to  play  a  role  as  an  actor  in  international  peacebuilding,  a
peacebuilding  strategy  should  be  set  up.  Such  a  strategy  would  seek  to
overcome both the conceptual diversity and the institutional fragmentation in
view of  coordinating  the  diverse  instruments,  providing  for  the  appropriate
resources and capabilities” (DG for External Policies 2010, 1). 
EU peacebuilding consists of distinct activities carried out by different bodies. The CSDP
stands  for  EU  missions  and  operations.  The  Commission  promotes  democratisation  and
development. The HR/VP and the EUSRs are responsible for diplomatic and mediation tasks
(Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008, 218; Richmond, Björkdahl,  and Kappler 2011, 457).
Nevertheless, Gross and Juncos have observed that, although the distinction between conflict
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prevention and crisis management was sketched out in different EU documents, developments
in practice have blurred it. With the rapid institutional and operational developments, crisis
management and conflict prevention, as well as long- and short-term approaches have become
treated jointly (Gross and Juncos 2011c, 4-5). Similarly, Blockmans observed that, while these
definitions are terminologically distinguished in Articles 17(2), and 43(1) of the TEU, the
dividing lines between different categories are in practice blurred (Blockmans 2008a). 
The Treaty of Lisbon brought more coherence in policies and structures dealing with
conflict  prevention  and  crisis  management.  It  included  conflict  prevention  under  the
Petersberg Tasks (TEU, Art. 43). The Treaty refers to CSDP actions as “crisis management
operations” (TEU, Art. 38). It does not use the term peacebuilding. However, “military advice
and  assistance  tasks,  conflict  prevention  and  peace-keeping  tasks”  and  “post-conflict
stabilisation” fall under the category of peacebuilding. The concept of peacebuilding has also
been mainstreamed in the EEAS working culture since the adoption of the Treaty. The idea of
peacebuilding was particularly promoted by the former HR/VP Catherine Ashton  who was
strongly passionate about it and was pushing for its integration in the CSDP (interview 18). 
The 2011 Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention emphasised the role of “long-
term structural conflict prevention” in complementing “shorter term crisis management and
peace support operations” (Council of the EU 2011d, 1). The document made a distinction
between “prevention of conflicts” and “prevention of relapses into conflict” (Ibid.) with the
latter  standing  for  peacebuilding.  With  the  creation  of  the  EEAS,  conflict  prevention
instruments previously situated in the Commission and crisis management tools previously
located within the Council were merged into one structure. 
Despite the many attempts to harmonise concepts, policies and institutions, the EU’s
terminology related  to  instruments  dealing  with  international  peace  and  security  remains
confusing.  Nevertheless,  this  confusion  does  not  diminish  the  EU’s  role  in  international
peacebuilding  through the  CSDP.  Despite  the  absence  of  the  term ‘peacebuilding’ in  the
Lisbon Treaty, the mandates of CSDP actions, as well as the working culture of the CSDP
directorates, EU missions and operations carry out a wide range of peacebuilding tasks. As the
following chapters demonstrate, these tasks are spelled out directly rather than being framed
under  a  single  term of  peacebuilding.  Policymakers  and  practitioners  focus  more  on  the
content of particular actions rather than the use of concepts and theoretical frameworks. At the
same time, bringing the EU terminology in the line with internationally agreed concepts in the
area of peace and security could prove beneficial for the EU and other actors. 
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EU peacebuilding and the evolution of the CSDP
The evolution of the EU’s autonomous approach to peacebuilding can be traced within the
development of the CSDP itself.48 The forming of the CSDP reflects an attempt by the EU to
gain  independence  in  international  conflict  management  from  other  actors,  in  particular
NATO and the UN. Not only has the EU’s approach to peacebuilding been shaped by the
particularities of the CSDP, but it has also impacted on the development of the CSDP itself.
The CSDP emerged in a series of reactions to historical events rather than on the grounds of a
planned design (Howorth 2014, 22-23; Petrov 2011, 49). It was built on its predecessors: the
WEU  and  the  European  Political  Cooperation  (EPC)/  CFSP.49 These  frameworks  were
designed to handle mutual self-defence of the Community rather than conflicts abroad (M.E.
Smith 2004; K.E. Smith 2008; Petrov 2011; Hill 1992).
The  ESDP  was  envisioned  as  an  EU’s  autonomous  instrument  for  international
military  crisis  management  and  peacekeeping  rather  than  peacebuilding. In  1992,  the
Petersberg Declaration50 opened the way for the WEU to engage in military activities abroad.
These  activities,  framed  as  Petersberg  Tasks,  included:  “humanitarian  and  rescue  tasks;
peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”
(Petersberg Declaration 1992, Art.  II.4).51 WEU states  agreed “to make available  military
units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks” (Ibid.,
Art. II.2). During this time, changes also took place within the European Community with the
establishment  of  the  CFSP in  1993 that  superseded  the  EPC.  While  the  CFSP remained
intergovernmental, the Maastricht Treaty granted the Commission a right of initiative in the
CFSP and envisioned further development of the CFSP which “shall include all questions
related to the security of the Union,  including the eventual framing of a common defence
policy” (Maastricht Treaty 1992, Art. J.4; see also Edwards 1994). The Petersberg Tasks were
incorporated into the TEU through the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997, Art. 17). 
The wars in the Balkans accelerated the development of EU’s own arrangements for
international  crisis  management  (Petrov  2011).  At  a  summit  in  Saint-Malo  in  1998,  the
representatives of France and Great Britain declared that the EU “must have the capacity for
48 For a detailed overview of the evolution of the CSDP, see Howorth (2014) and Petrov (2011).
49 Established in 1954, in the aftermath of the collapse of the European Defence Community, the WEU sought
to safeguard the post-WWII recovery in Europe and mutual assistance in resisting any aggression. The EPC,
established in 1970, coordinated foreign policy of the European Community through regularised meetings of
officials and ministers. It was not part of the institutions of the Community (Tonra 2001).
50 The  Petersberg  Declaration  was  adopted  during  a  ministerial  summit  of  the  Council  of  the  WEU  at
Petersberg, the former Seat of Allied High Commission, in June 1992.
51 In the Petersberg Tasks, peacemaking means peace-enforcement. In contrast, in academic literature and UN
vocabulary, peacemaking stands for mediation and conflict resolution (Tardy 2015a, 23). The term ‘peace-
making’ was considered by the WEU more sensitive than ‘peace-enforcement’ (EEAS 2016f). 
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autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them,
and a readiness  to  do so,  in  order  to  respond to international  crises  without  prejudice to
actions by NATO” (Joint Declaration para. 1 and 2). This Franco-British agreement laid down
a political path for a future CSDP (Keukeleire 2010; K.E. Smith 2008). Petrov argued that the
results  from  Saint-Malo  coincided  with  the  growing  popularity  of  the  concepts  of
humanitarian  intervention  and  conflict  prevention.  EU  member  states  favoured  the
development of conflict prevention capabilities rather than a European army (Petrov 2011).
In 1999, the European Council at its summit in Cologne declared that the EU should
be able to undertake Petersberg Tasks independently by replacing the WEU. The term crisis
management was formally introduced to frame the EU’s reactive actions. The Council decided
to establish an ESDP as a policy on conflict prevention and crisis management within the
CFSP (K.E.  Smith  2008;  Keukeleire  2010;  Gross  and  Juncos  2011c;  Petrov  2011).  The
Helsinki Summit in 1999 reaffirmed the decisions from Cologne and agreed to create the
ESDP and a Rapid Reaction Force for military crisis intervention. The summit set specific
headline goals,  including that  by 2003, the EU should be able  to  deploy Rapid Reaction
Forces of upto 60,000 troops within a period of 60 days capable of delivering the Petersberg
Tasks.  The summit  agreed to  establish structures  to  coordinate  the  ESDP – the  PSC, the
EUMC and the EUMS (K.E. Smith 2008). As argued by Howorth, European leaders were
certain “that Europe, if it  were ever to become a significant global actor in its own right,
would need its  own institutional framework, centrally located in a European capital  city”
(Howorth 2013, 16). The creation of central structures responsible for CSDP decision- and
policy-making, coordination, oversight and implementation has led to “ever greater delegation
of  authority  and  responsibility  away  from  the  member  states  and  towards  the  central
institutions  of  the  EU”  (Ibid.,  17).  This  ‘Brusselsization’ has  enhanced  the  autonomous
character the EU as an actor in international conflict management through its CSDP.
The Petersberg Tasks were designed for military crisis management similar to those of
NATO and the first-generation of UN peacekeeping. Nevertheless, Sweden and Finland were
in favour of civilian crisis management. Under their influence, the European Council in Santa
Maria de Feira in 2000 agreed on the civilian dimension of the ESDP and set up a Committee
for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. The Council defined four priority areas in the
civilian  crisis  management,  namely  police,  rule  of  law,  civil  administration  and  civilian
protection.  In  contrast  to  the  Petersberg  Tasks,  these  tools  were  designed  to  address
peacebuilding rather than the management of ongoing crises (Freire and Galantino 2015, 4).
The Council set concrete targets of generating 5,000 police officers by 2003, out of which
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1,000 should be deployable in 30 days. A year later, the target also included 200 rule-of-law
experts, a pool of civilian administration experts and up to 200 civilian protection personnel
(Shepherd 2012).  The Council  also finalised the conceptual background of the ESDP and
opened the way for its formalisation (Petrov 2011). The tasks of the Rapid Reaction Force
were  extended  into  humanitarian  aid,  rescue  services,  mine  clearance,  DDR,  support  for
democratisation, monitoring of elections and human rights, and conflict mediation (Debiel
and Fischer 2000, 17). This extension has coincided with and reflected the reform process of
UN peacekeeping operations initiated by the Brahimi Report (see chapter two).
The ESDP was formally established as a policy for both conflict prevention and crisis
management by the Treaty of Nice in 2003. The establishment of the CSDP for the purposes
of both conflict prevention and crisis management tasks emphasises the comprehensive and
all-inclusive character of this instrument. In other words, the aim of the CSDP is not only to
manage open crises  but  also to  support  efforts  and establish conditions  that  will  prevent
conflicts. The reference to both conflict prevention and crisis management in the founding
treaties allowed for the inclusion of peacebuilding tasks. 
With the establishment of the CSDP in 2003, the EU took over the role of the WEU in
crisis management. The PSC, the EUMC and the EUMS were officially established as the
institutional basis for the ESDP. In the same year, the EU launched its first missions (Petrov
2011; de Zwaan 2008). The launch of the CSDP coincided with the ESS which prepared a
normative ground for this new instrument. The ESS represented a positive commitment of the
EU to global  engagement  (Cooper 2003;  Biscop 2005a).  The CSDP, with its  institutional
arrangements, strengthened the EU’s actorness in international peace efforts. It provided the
EU with an autonomous instrument to carry out independent peace missions. 
The peacebuilding character of the CSDP was strengthened with the extension of the
scope of civilian crisis management in the 2008 Civilian Headline Goal into integrated crisis
management, monitoring missions, support for the EUSRs, and SSR/ DDR programmes. The
aim of  this  headline  goal  was  to  “[integrate]  multifunctional  resources,  [to  improve]  the
connection of conflict prevention and crisis management (…), [and to create] synergies [and
better dialogue] between development cooperation and civilian crisis management experts”
(Politico-Military Group 2005, 121–128). The Headline Goal called for the deployment of
integrated civilian crisis management missions and for a coherence of the CSDP with long-
term Community programmes (Council of the EU 2004c). The 2010 Civilian Headline Goal
re-emphasised civil-military cooperation, readiness and employability. It identified the need
for additional experts on transitional justice and conflict analysis, and the creation of Civilian
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Response Teams, a pool of experts prepared for rapid deployment (Council of the EU 2007c).
Developments took place also in the area of military goals; the 2010 Headline Goal called for
a more coherence in deployments. It also adopted the EU Battlegroups concept with an aim of
generating 1,500 reaction forces deployable within ten days (Council of the EU 2004d). These
Headline Goals fostered the shift in the CSDP from classical military tasks to peacebuilding. 
The shift  towards  peacebuilding  and a  comprehensive  list  of  peace  operations  are
reflected in the expansion of the Petersberg Tasks in the Lisbon Treaty.52 In addition to the
three initial tasks, further tasks were added. The expanded list includes “joint disarmament
operations,  humanitarian  and  rescue  tasks,  military  advice  and  assistance  tasks,  conflict
prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including
peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation” (TEU Art. 43(1)).  This expansion  reflects the
shift  from traditional peacekeeping to comprehensive peace operations with peacebuilding
components. However, the EU has not fully utilised these tasks. Despite  encompassing also
crisis  management tasks to tackle open conflict,  the CSDP comprises mainly post-conflict
peacekeeping  and  peacebuilding  missions  (Missiroli  2015).  As  King  noted,  although  the
expanded “Petersberg tasks theoretically included potentially robust forms of engagement,
they quickly became associated with softer forms of intervention, and indeed, these were the
only missions to which the EU would commit itself” (King 2015, 256). EU operations have
“been small-scale, relatively begin militarily and strategically peripheral” (Ibid.,  261).  The
extensive focus on post-conflict peacebuilding and civilian crisis management rather than the
management of open conflict has impacted on the perception of the EU’s international role.  
Types of CSDP operations and missions 
The objective of the EU’s international  action is  to “promote its  values and interests  and
contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable
development of the Earth” (TEU Art. 3(5)). For the purposes of preserving peace, preventing
conflicts and strengthening international security, the EU shall pursue common policies and
actions  (TEU Art.  21(2)).  The  CSDP was  designed  for  these  purposes  -  as  a policy  for
international conflict management, the ultimate aim of which is to protect the EU’s security
(Biscop and Withman 2013a; Ginsberg and Penska 2012; Pohl 2014). The CSDP therefore
intersects  the  security  of  the  EU  and  external  security,  which,  according  to  Biscop  and
52 The Treaty of Lisbon has enhanced consistency in the ESDP by creating the EEAS under the authority of the
HR/VP. The post of the HR/VP was created by merging the office of the High Representative for the CFSP
and European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy. 
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Whitman (2013a), is best depicted in the title of the 2003 ESS ‘A Secure Europe in a Better
World’. They argue that the aim of the CSDP is “to safeguard European security by improving
global security” (Ibid., 1). Nevertheless, in contrast to what the name ‘CSDP’ might indicate,
the CSDP is not about the territorial defence of the EU; it stands for peace missions deployed
outside the EU (Howorth 2014; Keukeleire 2010, 61; Mérand 2008, 3-5; Tardy 2015a). 
The Petersberg Tasks,  as expanded by the Lisbon Treaty,  represent different  peace
missions that reflect the stages of international engagement in a conflict - from the time before
the outbreak of a conflict to post-conflict reconstruction. The Treaty adds that “[a]ll these
tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in
combating terrorism in their territories” (TEU Art. 43(1)). The Treaty distinctly formulated
the function of the CSDP as providing the EU with an “operational  capacity drawing on
civilian  and military assets”  that  can  be  used  on “missions  outside  the  Union for  peace-
keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the
principles of the United Nations Charter” (Ibid. Art. 42(1)). 
In practice, the Petersberg Tasks are difficult to translate into particular missions. The
mandates of missions rarely or ever refer to these tasks. Instead, they refer to actual objectives
of missions. The EU refers to its CSDP actions as civilian missions and military operations
usually bearing  in  their  name their  specific  tasks.  In  particular,  civilian  missions  include
European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), European Union Border Assistance Mission
(EUBAM), European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX and EUJUST), European Union
Police  Mission  (EUPM  and  EUPOL),  European  Union  Police  Advisory  Team  (EUPAT),
European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP),  European Union Aviation Security
Mission  (EUAVSEC),  European  Union  Advisory  Mission (EUAM) and  European  Union
Security Sector Reform Mission (EU SSR and EUSEC). Military operations include European
Union  Force  (EUFOR),  European  Union  Naval  Force  (EUNAVFOR),  European  Union
Military Advisory Mission (EUMAM) and European Union Training Mission (EUTM). EU
missions should be understood in the sense of their purpose, i.e. what they actually do. They
stand for peace missions (Howorth 2014, 144; Freire and Galantino 2015), or peacekeeping
and peacebuilding missions (Tardy 2015a). As a result, the CSDP covers a range of different
tools that the EU can use at its disposal to respond to any aspect of a conflict at any stage. 
Scholars use different categories to depict particular CSDP missions and operations.
Howorth distinguished between a) military, b) military training, c) police, d) rule of law, e)
support and assistance, f) monitoring and g) border assistance missions (Howorth 2014, 144-
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189).53 Building on these categorisations, I organise the CSDP missions/operations according
to the stages of the conflict cycle while taking into account at what stage of the conflict they
are deployed,  in  particular  as  peacekeeping,  peacebuilding  or  peace-enforcement  actions.
CSDP missions/operations cover different aspects of international assistance in a conflict from
its outbreak to post-conflict stabilisation. Missions with tasks such as capacity-building for
and reform of police/ army sectors, the development of rule of law structures, and all other
tasks aimed at  the reform, reconstruction,  and building of state structures were framed as
peacebuilding. Peacekeeping refers to operations mandated with the maintenance of the safe
and secure environment.  Operations mandated to  use combat  forces are framed as peace-
enforcement. This categorisation helps us to refer to EU missions and operations with the use
of  terms  such  as  peacekeeping  and  peacebuilding,  thus  bringing  them closer  to  the  UN
terminology. It also allows us to understand the nature and purposes of the missions.
As of July 2017, the EU has launched 34 CSDP missions and operations: there were
fifteen ongoing and nineteen completed actions. Civilian missions – nine ongoing and thirteen
completed (including civil-military missions) – are in the majority as there have been only
twelve military operations.54 Table 2 (p. 70) provides an overview of ongoing and completed
missions  and  operations.  A  considerable  number  of  EU  missions/operations  has  been
deployed to post-conflict situations. More than two thirds of missions and operation (27) have
contained peacebuilding tasks. They include missions such as EUAVSEC in South Sudan,
EUMM in Georgia and EULEX Kosovo. Military missions such as EUFOR Althea in BiH,
EUTM in Somalia and EUTM Mali have also included peacebuilding tasks. These actions
address structural causes of conflicts by rebuilding and reforming state institutions. 
Peacebuilding and peacekeeping overlap in some cases such as EUFOR Althea in BiH.
While some actions were deployed to countries with ongoing conflicts, their mandate was
responding to a previous conflict. For example, the EU mission in Ukraine has responded to
the Maidan Revolution and not to the ongoing conflict in the east. It is tasked with the reform
and rebuilding of the country’s civilian security sector (Council of the EU 2014d). Operations
in  CAR and  Afghanistan  were  deployed  to  post-conflict  situations.  Despite  the  fact  that
violence broke out again in these countries, their mandates were not changed to address the
new situation. In the early years of the existence of the CSDP, the EU was more active in
deploying to ongoing conflict situations in a peacekeeping capacity. Recent deployments have
been mainly of peacebuilding nature and in post-conflict situations. 
53 Other scholars use similar or slightly amended categorisations (see Grevi et al. 2009; Tardy 2015a). 
54 This number excludes a new planned civilian CSDP mission in Iraq to support post-conflict the stabilisation
and civilian SSR, established by the Council on 19 July 2017 (Council of the EU 2017c).
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Table 2: CSDP Missions and Operations as of July 201755 
Mission 
type
Mission name, country Mission mandate Stage of the 
conflict at the 
deployment
Scope of the 
mission
Current/ ongoing
Military 
operations 
EUFOR Althea
BiH
Executive: monitor the 
peace agreement and 
maintain security;
Non-executive: train 
military forces and advise 
the Ministry of Defence
Post-conflict Peacekeeping/
Peacebuilding
EUTM Somalia
Somalia (and Uganda)
Security sector 
development and training 
of Somali soldiers
Post-conflict Peacebuilding
EUNAVFOR Somalia 
known as Operation 
Atalanta
Executive: protect vessels 
of the WFP and other 
ships, and deter and disrupt
piracy off the coast of 
Somalia
Ongoing crisis Peacekeeping/
Peace-
enforcement
EUTM Mali
Mali
SSR, DDR and training of 
military forces
Post-conflict Peacebuilding
European Union Naval 
Force Mediterranean 
(EUNAVFOR MED) 
known as Operation 
Sophia
Executive: capture vessels 
and enabling assets used by
migrant smugglers and 
traffickers 
Non-executive: capacity-
building and training of the
Libyan Coastguard & Navy
Ongoing crisis Peacekeeping/
Peace- 
enforcement/ 
Peacebuilding
EUTM RCA 
CAR
SSR, training of military 
forces
Post-conflict/ 
recurrence of 
violence
Peacebuilding
55 This categorisation is based on the analysis and coding of the tasks of the mandates of the CSDP missions
and  operations  contained  in  Council  decisions  for  each  mission/operation.  Howorth  and  other  scholars
consider the EUMM in Former Yugoslavia, EU Special Representative Border Support Team (EUSR BST) in
Georgia, European Union Planning Team (EUPT) for Kosovo, and the European Union Naval Coordination
Cell (EU NAVCO) in Somalia as CSDP missions. The last two actions were operated directly by the General
Secretariat of the Council and preceded an actual CSDP mission/operation (EU Council Secretariat 2007a;
2008).  EUSR BST was  part  of  the structure  of  the EUSR for  South Caucasus  (EU Council  Secretariat
2007b).  The EUMM in former Yugoslavia is often considered as the first  ever CSDP mission as former
SG/HR Solana referred to it as the pioneering EU mission (EU Council Secretariat 2007c). However, the
EUMM was launched in 2001, before the operationalisation of the CSDP. It was coordinated by the SG/HR
and  never  included  into  the  CSDP.  EUMM  succeeded  the  European  Community  Monitoring  Mission
(ECMM), which had operated in the Western Balkans from 1991 until the end of 2000. It was closed in
December 2007. Due to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the mission operated in different countries. In the
last year of its operation, EUMM operated in BiH, FYROM, Montenegro and Serbia. The mission was also
active  in  Albania,  Croatia,  Slovenia,  Hungary  and  Bulgaria  (EU  Council  Secretariat  2007c).  European
Administration  of  Mostar  (EUAM) was  another  important  non-CSDP mission  between  1993  and  1996
(Juncos 2013, 99-101). EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine is often listed as a CSDP missions. Nevertheless, the
mission is managed by the Commission and not the CSDP structures. In addition, the EU military operation
in  support  of  humanitarian  assistance  operations  in  Libya  (EUFOR  Libya)  was  established  but  never
launched (Council of the EU 2011c). For an overview of different aspects of civilian and military operations,
see Howorth 2014, 144-187; Keukeleire 2010; Shepherd 2012; Duke 2008; Tardy 2015a).
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Type Mission name, country Mandate Stage Scope
Civilian 
missions
EUBAM Rafah 
Palestinian Territories
Monitor and assist with 
border crossing 
(related to the Agreement on
Movement and Access 
between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authorities from 
2005)
Post-conflict Peacekeeping
EU Police Mission for the
Gaza Strip (EUPOL 
COPPS) Palestinian 
Territories
Establish police, criminal 
justice and rule of law 
apparatus (including 
training and advice)
Post-conflict Peacebuilding
EUMM Georgia
Georgia
Monitor the peace 
agreement (including advice
to state authorities) 
Post-conflict Peacekeeping/ 
Peacebuilding
EULEX Kosovo
Kosovo
Executive: adjudicate and 
prosecute constitutional, 
civil and criminal cases; 
Non-executive: reform of 
the rule of law and the 
justice system
Post-conflict Peacebuilding
EUCAP Sahel Niger 
Niger
SSR, including training to 
police and security forces
Post-conflict Peacebuilding
EUCAP Nestor
Horn of Africa (Somalia, 
Djibouti, the Seychelles 
and Tanzania)
Regional maritime capacity 
building
Post-crisis/ 
crisis 
prevention  
Peacebuilding
EUBAM Libya 
Tunis
Support the Libyan 
authorities in improving and
developing the security of 
borders 
Post-conflict Peacebuilding
EUCAP Sahel Mali
Mali
SSR; train and advise police
and gendarmerie 
Post-conflict Peacebuilding
EUAM Ukraine
Ukraine
Civilian SSR – advise and 
train agencies responsible 
for law enforcement and 
rule of law
Post-conflict Peacebuilding 
Completed
Military EUFOR Artemis/DRC
DRC
Civilian protection, 
stabilisation of the security, 
humanitarian assistance
Continuing 
humanitarian 
crisis
Peacekeeping
EUFOR Concordia 
FYROM
Post-conflict stabilisation Post-conflict Peacekeeping/ 
Peacebuilding
EUFOR DR Congo
DRC
Support MONUC during 
elections
Post-conflict Peacekeeping
EUFOR Chad/ RCA
Chad
Protect civilians, refugees 
and humanitarian staff; 
facilitate humanitarian aid
Continuing 
conflict
Peacekeeping
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Type Mission name, country Mandate Stage Scope
EUFOR RCA 
CAR
Stabilise security, protect 
civilians, facilitate 
humanitarian aid
Continuing 
conflict 
Peacekeeping
EUMAM RCA
CAR
Preparation for SSR (advise 
state authorities)
Continuing 
conflict 
Peacebuilding
Civilian EUPM BiH
BiH
Establish a functioning 
police sector
Post-conflict Peacebuilding
EUPOL Proxima
FYROM
Monitor, mentor and advise 
police
Post-conflict Peacebuilding
EUPOL Afghanistan
Afghanistan
Rule of law and SSR; train 
police forces
Post-conflict Peacebuilding
EUPAT FYROM
FYROM
Develop a police service Post-conflict Peacebuilding
EUJUST Themis 
Georgia
Rule of law reform: mentor 
and advise Ministers, 
officials and relevant bodies 
at the governmental level
Post-conflict 
(refers to the  
revolution in 
2003)
Peacebuilding
EUJUST LEX 
Iraq
Rule of law reform: 
establish a criminal justice 
system; train and advise 
authorities
Post-conflict Peacebuilding
EUPOL Kinshasa 
DRC
Mentor, advise and train a 
police unit
Post-conflict Peacebuilding
EUPOL RD Congo
DRC
SSR in the fields of policing
and the justice system 
Post-conflict Peacebuilding
Aceh Monitoring Mission
(AMM), Aceh/ Indonesia
Monitor the peace 
agreement
Post-conflict Peacekeeping
EUAVSEC South Sudan Train, mentor and advise 
security services on aviation
security 
Post-conflict Peacebuilding
Civil-
military
Mission 
planned and
delivered as
civil-
military 
action
European Union Support 
Mission to AMIS
Darfur/ Sudan
Financial, personnel and 
political support to peace 
talks; technical and training 
support to African Union 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS)
Post-conflict Peacekeeping/ 
Peacebuilding
Civilian 
missions, 
extended 
into 
military 
aspects
EU SSR Guinea Bissau
Guinea Bissau 
SSR, capacity-building, 
training, advice (police, 
army, naval forces, air 
forces, prosecution services)
Post-conflict Peacebuilding
EUSEC RD Congo
DRC
SSR: reform of the army Post-conflict Peacebuilding
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Military operations address security issues and use military capabilities. One group of
military operations, which are of a peacekeeping nature, tackle the immediate consequences
of conflict. These missions can be mandated to monitor peace agreements, protect civilians,
ensure  security  and  assist  with  humanitarian  tasks.  They can  be  authorised  to  use  force.
Peacekeeping operations, such as Artemis in the DRC in 2003 and EUFOR in the DRC in
2006, were deployed to stabilise the situation before the arrival of the UN troops and UN
election observers. The current operations Atalanta and Sophia are the only two operations
that can be categorised under ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks’ and/or ‘tasks of combat forces
in  crisis  management’.  Nevertheless,  even  these  operations  are  not  typical  military
interventions as they are not intended for combat purposes in war. The use of direct fighting in
both operations is minimal and casualties unlikely (Tardy 2015a). Military operations with
peacebuilding  tasks  address  structural  causes  of  conflict  by  focusing  on  the  capacity-
development (training) of military forces, the reform of the military sector, and mentoring and
advisory functions. Some operations have combined peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks
such as DDR, humanitarian relief, assisting with the return of refugees and IDPs. Tardy noted
that military operations are seldom the final solution to the conflict. Their aim is to create a
platform for a political settlement (Ibid., 23). 
Civilian missions deploy civilian (non-military) personnel from civilian institutions of
EU  member  states  and  address  issues  of  non-military  character,  such  as  monitoring  the
political  and  security  situation,  policing,  assisting  with  humanitarian  aid,  public
administration, the reconstruction and setting up of institutions, providing legal protection,
strengthening and reforming the rule of law and justice, border assistance, and police and the
SSR. Civilian capabilities are deployed to train police personnel, judges, custom officers and
prosecutors; to provide expertise in policy-making and legal advice; to monitor the reform
processes and peace agreements; and to stabilise and reconstruct state institutions of justice,
rule of law, border management and security sector. According to Tardy, civilian missions
correspond to the ‘military advice and assistance tasks’, or ‘conflict prevention and peace-
keeping tasks’ enshrined in Art. 43 of the TEU (Ibid., 23). The vast majority of these missions
are deployed in post-conflict scenarios. The 2008 and 2010 civilian headline goals outlined an
ambition to develop capabilities with regard to policing, rule of law, civilian administration
and civil protection. The goal was to provide a pool of 6,000 policemen, a couple of thousand
judges, civil servants and other experts at the disposal of civilian missions. 
Civilian missions by far outnumber military operations. The transformation from an
initially military-driven focus to civilian one also includes the shift from military operations
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with combat forces to military training and reform of defence sectors. According to Shepherd,
this has also been driven by the 2003 ESS which outlined new threats and emphasised that
these complex threats could not be tackled by purely military means. The EU has understood
that  the  CSDP  should  be  used  in  a  coherent  manner,  alongside  political,  diplomatic,
development, trade and economic instruments. To enhance the coherence of the EU external
action in conflict situations, the EEAS and the Commission published a Joint Communication
on the  Comprehensive  Approach to  External  Conflict  and  Crises  (European  Commission
2013). The Communication proposed the adoption of a common strategic vision for conflict
situations,  mobilising  resources,  ensuring  long-term  commitment  in  peacebuilding,  and
linking internal and external policy areas. In practice, this means that missions and operations
should  work  in  cooperation  with  EU Delegations,  EUSRs,  EU regional  policies  (such as
European Neighbourhood Policy [ENP] or the Strategy for Security and Development in the
Sahel) as well as member states’ embassies. 
In line with the comprehensive approach, the EU intended to launch integrated civil-
military missions (Council of the EU March 2011e). Civil-military coordination (CMCO) has
become the key framework to represent these efforts. The CMCO “covers internal EU co-
ordination of the EU’s own civil and military crisis management instruments, executed under
the responsibility of the Council” (Council of the EU 2009c, 6). It represents an attempt to
coordinate  the  EU’s  response  to  a  crisis  in  an  integrated  manner.  Some  scholars  have
emphasised the importance of CMCO within the CSDP as a necessary element of successfully
addressing the complexities of post-conflict environments (de Coning 2008; Stewart 2011;
Rietjens and Bollen 2013). Other scholars, such as K.E. Smith, viewed the combination of
civilian and military instruments as dangerous, with the military component potentially taking
over  the  civilian  component  (2008).  In  practical  terms,  this  coordination  means  creating
integrated peace missions with a use of civilian or military capabilities; a synergy in training
for personnel; the sharing of tools, logistical support and spaces; and combined procedures to
compile lessons learned (Council of the EU 2009c; 2011e; EEAS 2011b). Although the EU
called for integrated civil-military missions, deployments with combined civilian and military
elements have not been launched except the EU Support Mission to AMIS. 
Despite  the absence of  integrated civil-military missions,  civil-military cooperation
(CIMIC) exists between EU military forces and civil-based actors. In countries, such as BiH,
the  DRC,  Mali  and  Somalia,  both  civilian  missions  and  military  operations  have  been
deployed simultaneously or consecutively. Some civilian missions, such as EU SSR Guinea
Bissau, EUSEC RD Congo and Support to AMIS, involved military advisers and personnel
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alongside civilian staff; they are thus often framed as civil-military missions. As chapter six
shows,  military  operations,  such  as  EUTM  Mali,  also  comprise  civilian  personnel,  in
particular training officers on human rights, gender aspects and legal issues. 
Although CSDP actions have been designed as short-term instruments, most missions
and operations have assumed a long-term character as they have been extended several times
(Duke and Courtier 2010, 27; Tardy 2015a). Tardy has claimed that civilian mission have an
average duration over five years and tend to last longer than military ones. According to him,
civilian missions are at the heart of the tension between the long-term needs of countries in
transition and the short-term commitments of EU member states. This applies especially to
missions that focus on reform processes, such as the SSR, which by nature require a long-
term engagement (Tardy 2015a, 25; see also Malešič 2015, 161).56 
The variations in the strength, duration and country of deployment depend on case-
specific factors, such as the needs by and geopolitical strategic importance of the host country,
as well as the concerns and willingness of member states. Past relations of member states with
host countries can influence decisions whether a member state intervenes, such as in the case
of France which pushed for a CSDP operation in Mali, or not intervene, such as Belgium
which  decided  not  to  play the  leading  role  in  the  CSDP action  in  the  DRC (Freire  and
Galantino 2015, 7).  Military operation Althea is  the longest ongoing operation which has
received  enough  political  support  from most  member  states  for  its  continued  extension.
Recent military missions in Somalia, Mali and CAR have assumed a long-term character. 
Most  importantly,  a  military mission  is  sometimes  accompanied  or  followed  by a
civilian mission, as it is the case of BiH, FYROM, Mali, Somalia and CAR. Even the shortest
of all missions, EUPAT in FYROM, was part of the series of three different missions which
contributed to peacebuilding in the country. Further, while operations and missions usually
start as actions with a modest mandate focusing on specific dimensions of peacebuilding, they
often extend their scope into new areas. For instance, the mandate of the operation Althea was
extended  from peacekeeping  and  stabilisation  to  capacity-building  and  training  to  BiH’s
security forces.
The expansion of the civilian aspects of the CSDP has led to the introduction of what
Kurowska and Seitz frame as state-building activities which include assisted construction or
reconstruction of the institutional infrastructure of a state.  They have emphasised that the
56 Established in 2004 and still ongoing, operation EUFOR Althea is the lengthiest CSDP operation. EUPAT
FYROM was the shortest mission, deployed for six months only. Althea has also been the most numerous
military operation in terms of personnel. EULEX Kosovo has been the largest civilian mission in terms of
personnel with over 2,000 staff, whereas EUAVSEC South Sudan, with only 13 people, was the smallest (see
Howorth 2014, 150; Freire and Galantino 2015, 7).
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CSDP  should  be  seen  against  the  broader  EU’s  state-building  repertoire,  while  their
understanding of state-building is an equivalent of peacebuilding (Kurowska and Seitz 2011).
State-building activities promote good governance and the SSR. These practices focus on
systemic reforms with the use of civilian projects (or military in soft terms) rather than state-
building with the use of ‘hard’ military instruments. EU state-building practices have become
the most dominant feature of the CSDP. Yet, Kurowska and Seitz claim that, through these
practices, the EU has become invasive while prescribing regulatory practices and norms in
post-conflict societies in the pursuit of its own security and according to its own vision (Ibid.).
CSDP actions with peacebuilding tasks resemble the characteristics of what Richmond
frames as a third-generation approach to  peacebuilding (2011).  The primary task of these
actions is to stabilise and/ or reconstruct the institutions of a functioning state. These missions
and operations support structural reforms in the areas of the rule of law, security sector and
jurisdiction  apparatus  (DG  for  External  Policies  2010).  This  does  not  mean  that  the
stabilisation of state institutions has been the sole task of EU peacebuilding.  Peacebuilding
carried  out  under  the  CSDP  is  part  of  a  wider  variety  of  different  EU  peacebuilding
programmes which  run in parallel or in the aftermath of missions. These activities include
development,  humanitarian  assistance,  promotion  of  human  rights,  support  to  elections,
diplomatic activities, conflict resolution and mediation.57  
For these reasons, CSDP actions should be better understood as coming within the
realm of  peace  missions  or  peace  support  operations  (Missiroli  2015;  Tardy 2015a).  The
CSDP is a comprehensive toolbox of different instruments of conflict management, including
peacemaking, peace-enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Freire and Galantino add
preventive diplomacy as another tool in the CSDP since mediation, conflict prevention and
early warning are part of the CSDP (Freire and Galantino 2015, 2). The CSDP comprises a
broad range of instruments for peace support actions. With these instruments at its disposal,
the EU is a unique actor in international conflict management (Gross and Juncos 2011c, 5).
The question here is not why CSDP peacebuilding actions are not framed within the realm of
peacebuilding,  but  rather  why most  CSDP missions  and  operations  are  of  peacebuilding
character and what CSDP peacebuilding actions stand for. 
57 DGs, EU Delegations, EUSRs and agencies have been responsible for these activities. For instance, DG for
European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) is responsible for humanitarian aid and
DG Enlargement for promoting peace in candidate countries. DG Development and EuropeAid Cooperation
Office  were  responsible  for  development.  The  IcSP provides  financial  help  for  short  and  longer-term
responses to conflict. Peacebuilding projects under this instrument focus on various issues such as mediation
and interim administrations. The Development Cooperation Instrument and the European Development Fund
coordinate funding for development projects. The ENPI and the European Instrument for Democracy and
Human Rights are other instruments that the EU uses in peacebuilding (Blockmans, Wouters and Ruys 2010).
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Institutional competence: The complexity of CSDP decision- and policy-making
The  EU’s  approach  to  peacebuilding  through  the  CSDP is  defined  by  the  autonomous
character of CSDP decision- and policy-making. These processes make CSDP peacebuilding
actions  not  only  normative  commitments  but  also  results  of  EU  foreign  policy,  which
distinguishes them from the UN. The CSDP is an intergovernmental area of EU decision- and
policy-making. As a body that decides on the directions of the CFSP and defines its main
principles,  the European Council  is  the main actor  with regard to CSDP decision-making
(TEU Art. 21, 26 and 42). Decisions to launch missions/operations are taken by the FAC by
unanimity.58 However, while these decisions are taken by EU foreign ministers in the FAC, it
is Council’s preparatory bodies, namely the PSC, CivCom, the EUMC and the PMG, which
plan and oversee these actions. The actual negotiations on the CSDP take place within these
bodies. Representatives in these bodies are delegated by their capitals to decide on the launch,
agenda, planning and management of missions and operations (Klein 2011, 74). Insights into
the CSDP structures help us to understand how peacebuilding activities in CSDP missions and
operations are decided, designed and planned as foreign policy actions.
The PSC is  the  most  important  committee  in  the  CSDP decision-making process.
Under the responsibility of the Council and the HR/VP, the PSC exercises the political control
and  strategic  direction  over  the  CSDP actions.  It  assesses  the  international  situation  and
defines policies within the CFSP and the CSDP, and prepares the EU’s response to a crisis. It
meets at ambassadorial level. Many scholars noted that it is not the FAC but the PSC where
decisions  on  CSDP are  made  (Bickerton  2011;  Duke  2005;  Juncos  and  Pomorska  2006;
Juncos and Reynolds 2007; Howorth 2010; 2014; Meyer 2006). Howorth refers to the PSC as
the “key policy-shaping instrument”, “script-writer for CSDP” and “a major decision-shaping
and even decision-making agency of the CSDP” (Howorth 2014, 45; see also Howorth 2010).
According to Meyer, the PSC represents the “workhorse” of the “ESDP decision-shaping and
control” (Meyer 2006, 116). Juncos and Reynolds name the PSC a “government in shadow”
since  PSC ambassadors  are  given powers  to  decide  in  the  manner  of  governments.  PSC
ambassadors actively shape the definition of national foreign policy preferences rather than
simply bring them to the table to be bargained over (Juncos and Reynolds 2007). 
58 Exception are decisions implementing a previous EU decision or for decisions related to European Defence
Agency (EDA) and PESCO, where decisions are taken by qualified majority voting (TEU Art. 42). When
establishing an operation or mission, the Council formally adopts two decisions. The first one ‘establishes’
the operation on the basis of the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) prepared by the CMPD and marks the
beginning of the operational planning phase. Once planning and force generation are completed, the Council
formally launches the operation/ mission through a second decision (Tardy 2015a, 25-26). 
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Many scholars explain the role of the PSC in EU decision-making through the lens of
the socialisation theory (Howorth 2014, 2010; Juncos and Reynolds 2007; Meyer 2006, 112-
135). These scholars have observed that social interaction among the ambassadors contributes
to the alternation of national preferences and an increased commitment to cooperation within
an EU framework. Their research has revealed that PSC ambassadors do not bargain over
their  national  positions  settled by their  capitals  and then brought  to  Brussels.  Instead,  by
adopting  a  problem-solving and consensus-oriented approach,  they look for  solutions  and
compromise. Decisions in the PSC are shaped by international norms and rules, as well as
routine interactions that build confidence and trust. Ambassadors do indeed report directly to
their capitals; nevertheless, they possess significant leverage to influence opinions at home. 
The PSC is supported by the EUMC, CivCom and the PMG. The EUMC provides
advice to the PSC on all EU military matters. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the
member states, who are represented by their permanent military representatives. The EUMC
monitors the execution of the EU military operations. CivCom, the equivalent of the EUMC,
is  responsible  for  overseeing  civilian  missions.  It  provides  advice  to  the  PSC  on  the
development of strategies for civilian crisis management. The PMG carries out preparatory
work  covering  the  political  aspects  of  EU  military  and  civil-military  issues,  including
concepts and capabilities. It prepares Council conclusions and provides recommendations for
the PSC. It contributes to the development of horizontal policy and partnerships with third
states and other organisations.  The Chairmen of the EUMC and CivCom are the primary
contact points for the commanders of the operations and missions.
Similarly as in the PSC, scholars studying CivCom and the EUMC have argued that
socialisation is the key factor in consensus-building in these bodies (Cross 2010; Howorth
2014,  49).  They  have  claimed  that,  although  the  officials  in  the  two  committees  are
answerable to the decision-makers in their capitals, their ability to persuade as a group plays
an increasing role in the development of the CSDP. In the case of the EUMC, ‘esprit  de
corps’, namely  the similar  level  of  expertise,  seniority,  common recruitment  patterns,  the
intensity of meetings, shared professional norms and the ability to persuade the capital, makes
it possible to reach agreements and overcome political obstacles generated by the capitals.
Scholars have observed that, although CivCom representatives lack the common recruitment
patterns and seniority characteristic for the PSC and the EUMC, they share a common desire
to move the EU forward, which helps to generate a shared mindset and consensus.
My research confirms previous findings that policy-making in the four committees is
consensus-oriented. National representatives seek to compromise. They work in cooperation
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not only with diplomats from other delegations but also with officials from the EEAS who are
in charge of the planning and conduct of missions. They try to get an understanding of what
can  and  what  cannot  work  in  a  mission  to  feed  this  information  back  into  the  strategic
thinking in the capital. They attempt to bridge positions between the capitals and the EEAS,
and signal to the EEAS where the capitals stand. Personal contacts, communication with other
countries’ representatives and attempts to get early information help to shape the consensus. 
Interviews further reveal that, while communicating with their capitals, representatives
from Council committees from larger countries tend to receive precise instructions from their
capitals,  whereas  representatives  of  smaller  states  enjoy  more  independence  in  making
proposals on behalf of their countries. Representatives play a crucial role in forging the views
of  their  capitals.  All  interviewed representatives  noted  that,  when reporting  back to  their
capitals,  they  rarely  write  a  verbatim  report  of  the  meeting.  Instead,  they  provide  an
interpretation of what was discussed. They are often creative and propose possible solutions
back at home. These insights into the operational dynamics of the Council preparatory bodies
help  us  to  understand how member  states’ representatives  design  and plan  peacebuilding
actions and why they opt for particular activities. 
The  major  weakness  of  the  research  that  focuses  on  socialisation  in  the  Council
committees is that it is based explicitly on interviews with officials in institutions and not with
politicians. The overemphasis on the socialisation effect overlooks some important aspects.
First, national governments take the final decisions. Council preparatory bodies are indeed
crucial, yet not as decisive as governments. Representatives in committees are part of a larger
hierarchical system; they receive instructions from their ministries. They represent the opinion
of their ministry, even if this opinion deviates from their own position. They would not agree
on any issue which would be against the interests of their capitals. Second, it is obvious to
expect  a  consensus  when  representatives  tend  to  avoid  issues  which  are  known  to  be
incompatible. Yet, there are many issues on which it would be difficult to agree. Third, while
socialisation plays well for officials in committees, it  does not  necessarily translate to the
political level in member states. Facing their electorate, the heads of governments have often
different positions even if a mission is launched. Representatives in Council committees have
similar characteristics to officials in national ministries. As Hill observed, officials’ agency
plays a substantial role in policy-making; yet, it is dependent on the government. Officials in
ministries prepare policies in the line with their government’s interests (Hill 1993). 
This thesis therefore understands the Council preparatory bodies as agents who are
important  for CSDP policy-making but  whose role  depends on their  governments.  In this
79
sense,  peacebuilding  activities  within  the  CSDP are  generated  through  a  policy-making
process that combines the supranational and intergovernmental levels. This process is best
described through Howorth’s term ‘supranational intergovernmentalism’ when he used it to
describe decision- and policy-making in the CSDP. Howorth refers to the EUMC and CivCom
to demonstrate that “the distinction between intergovernmental negotiating and supranational
consensus-building  becomes  blurred  to  the  point  being  virtually  meaningless”  (Howorth
2014, 49). In this process, the lines between supranational institutions and intergovernmental
negotiations among member states have been blurred (Ibid., 69). It remains unclear to what
extent the EEAS is considered a part of Howorth’s framework. The scholarship tends to keep
the EEAS away from the discussions on the CSDP decision-making. Howorth himself only
describes  the  work  of  the  EEAS  which,  according  to  him,  should  represent  a  unified
diplomatic corps of the EU, in the service of both CFSP and CSDP (Ibid., 63). 
Despite the intergovernmental nature of the CSDP policy-making, the EEAS and the
HR/VP are crucial actors in these processes. The Lisbon Treaty has reinforced and enhanced
the role of the HR/VP who chairs the meetings between EU foreign and defence ministers. As
a result, the HR/VP, representing the supranational level of the EU, plays an important role in
coordinating the decision-making on CSDP matters and in building consensus between the
member  states.  The  HR/VP,  assisted  by  the  EEAS,  is  responsible  for  proposing  and
implementing CSDP decisions (TEU Art. 22, 27, 42). Also, chairpersons of the PSC, CivCom
and the EUMC are officials from the EEAS and the PMG is chaired by a representative of the
HR/VP, thus linking the intergovernmental structures to the EEAS (Council of the EU 2010a).
Chairpersons have their offices located in the EEAS. As highly experienced senior member
states’ diplomats, they play a significant role not only in coordinating the committees but also
in shaping outcomes of the negotiations. 
Furthermore, respective directorates of the EEAS are involved in policy formulation,
planning  and  coordination  as  any  other  foreign  ministry.  The  EEAS  structures  directly
involved in CSDP policy-making are the CMPD, the CPCC and the EUMS.59 The CMPD is
responsible for the political-strategic planning of missions and operations by ensuring their
coherence and effectiveness and by developing CSDP partnerships,  policies,  concepts and
capabilities. It prepares the CMC for the launch of an operation or mission. The CPCC is
responsible  for  the  planning  and  operational  conduct  of  civilian  missions.  The  EUMS
coordinates  military  operations  and  missions  that  require  military  support  as  well  as  the
creation of military capabilities. Its areas of work include early warning, situation assessment,
59 Before the Lisbon Treaty, these structures operated within the Council’s General Secretariat. 
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strategic planning, communication and information systems, concept development, training
and  education,  and  support  of  partnerships.  The  EU  Intelligence  and  Situation  Centre
(INTCEN) and SECPOL directorate provide support to relevant missions and operations if
they are asked to do so, but are not directly involved in planning and command.60
The CSDP structures have been gradually expanding with the rise of new demands.
This  development  also  reflects  the  shift  towards  more  comprehensive  approaches  which
combine military, civilian and political tasks. The creation of the ‘CSDP and Crisis Response:
Prevention of Conflicts, Rule of Law/ SSR, Integrated Approach, Stabilisation and Mediation’
(CSDPCR.PRISM) division, also abbreviated as PRISM, in 2016 directly under the DSG-
CSDPCR demonstrates the strong determination to realise the integrated approach.61 PRISM
covers the political dimension of the CSDP, including missions and operations. It has been
linked to the work of the EUMS and the Political Affairs Secretariat, which were previously
separated from other CSDP directorates. The division is supposed to be a focal point for the
coordination  of  an integrated approach to  the EU responses  to  conflicts  and crises  while
interlinking EU delegations, EEAS and Commission’s services, and possibly activities of the
EU member states.  In 2017, the EU decided to establish a  Military Planning and Conduct
Capability (MPCC) within the EEAS tasked with the planning and conduct of non-executive
military missions (Council of the EU 2017b).
In contrast to the Council preparatory bodies, the role of the CSDP directorates of the
EEAS has  not  been studied in  depth so far.  The role  of the EEAS has not been seen as
decisive in CSDP decision- and policy-making.62 The absence of research on the role of the
EEAS in CSDP policy-making is understandable from the point of view that the EEAS is a
relatively young institution. Nevertheless, scholars have acknowledged the role of the pre-
Lisbon institutions in CSDP policy-making. For example, Grevi pointed out that not only the
member states but also the Council Secretariat formed the core of ESDP decision- and policy-
60 Other CSDP structures include EDA, European Security and Defence College, the EU Satellite Centre and
EU Operations Centre (For more details on these structures see EEAS 2016g).
61 The division is a result of the restructuring of the previous division ‘Coordination and Crises Response’, later
renamed  to  ‘Coordination  and  Support  (CSDP 1)’,  then  to  PRISM  and  now to  CSDPCR.PRISM.  The
division replaced the dissolved managing directorate Crisis Response and Operational Coordination (CROC)
during the restructuring of the EEAS. CROC was responsible for a swift response to crises and conflicts.
However, CROC was not linked to the CSDP structures. With the restructuring, one of its three divisions
titled  ‘Crisis  Response,  Planning  and  Operations’ was  shifted  directly  under  the  DSG  and  renamed  to
Coordination and Crises Response. The two other divisions, namely EU Situation Room and Consular Crisis
Management,  were  shifted  to  INTCEN  which  was  also  incorporated  into  the  CSDP.  CSDPCR.PRISM
changed its focus and extended the areas of activity as well as the number of staff (interview 21). 
62 Studies on the EEAS have mainly focused on the legal and institutional dynamics of the service, the modes
of its establishment, the performance of the EEAS in the implementation of EU foreign policy and the EEAS
officials’ attitudes to the new body (Duke 2011; Juncos and Pomorska 2013; 2014; Spence and Bátora 2015;
Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013; Vanhoonacker and Reslow 2010; Wouters and Duquet 2012).
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making. He especially emphasised the role of the SG/HR in impacting on the ESDP through
his engagement in crisis diplomacy (which often preceded ESDP instruments) and by shaping
a consistent discourse about the purposes and requirements of the ESDP.63 These observations
also apply to the EEAS. With the Lisbon Treaty, many Council units became part of the EEAS
with enhanced functions in policy-making (Council of the EU 2010a, Annex).
The  agency  model  of  foreign  policy-making  prosed  by  Hill  (2001;  2003)  and
bureaucratic politics introduced by Allison (1971) as re-adopted by Barnett and Finnemore
(2004) can also aid our understanding of the role of officials in policy-making. According to
Hill, bureaucracies – professionals in foreign ministries – are a key part of foreign policy-
making. As agents, they perform three important duties: information-gathering, policy-making
and expertise, and record-keeping (Hill 2003, 72-77). Nevertheless, ministries and bureaucrats
“are constrained by their terms of reference, their superiors and the culture (or ‘expectations’)
of their group”, while at the same time, they are enabled “to interpret their given roles in new
ways on the basis of their personalities and particular circumstances” (Ibid., 89). In a similar
way,  Barnett  and  Finnemore  (2004)  assert  that  international  organisations  are  not  only
intergovernmental  bodies  where  states  would  dominate  decision-making;  they  are  also
bureaucracies with authority to make rules and so exercise power.
But, other scholars have pointed to the limited role of the EEAS in the CSDP policy-
making processes. Using the principal-agent model, Furness, for example, has depicted the
EEAS as  an  agent  acting  on  behalf  of  several  principals,  namely the  member  states,  the
President of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council Presidency.
While  these  principals  have  attempted  to  establish  controls  over  the  EEAS,  Furness  has
claimed that the service has indeed sought to build its autonomy. Yet, its autonomy will vary
across policy areas. According to him, the EEAS is more likely to accomplish autonomy in
the EU development policy, whereas in the area of the CSDP, “[t]he EEAS does not have a
strong agency role in the mission, but rather facilitates coordination and acts as a link between
Member States” (Furness 2013, 121).
In spite of these limitations, my research confirms the central role of EEAS officials in
the formulation of policies. Officials are part of the policy-making process and can influence
63 The participation of the SG/HR in the European Council provided scope for channelling ESDP dossiers at the
highest political level. The Secretariat’s Policy Unit, the DG E for External Relations and Political-Military
Affairs, the EUMS, the CPCC and the SG/HR provided policy advice and coordination for ESDP. The DG E
also played a fundamental role in the development of ESDP by contributing to the formulation of policy
priorities,  supporting coordination, steering the evolution of military and civilian CMCs and capabilities,
running exercises and providing input at the political strategic level on EU crisis response. The Coordination
Unit of DG E was tasked with supporting the proceedings of the PSC and the Commission’s DG RELEX
Counsellors working group by providing input on dossiers and functions of the Secretariat. The Director
General of DG E chaired the Crisis Management Board and attended PSC meetings (Grevi 2009).
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policies  to  a  certain degree by introducing new ideas and by formulating the wording of
drafts. With the inclusion of member states’ diplomats in the EEAS, officials have learnt to
see themselves not as rivals to member states’ officials but as a part of one system. Diplomats
sometimes move from Council committees to work in the EEAS or vice versa. They have
learnt to consult on policy drafts with diplomats in their own or other national delegations or
directly  with  member  states’ ministries.  Similarly,  national  representatives  tend  to  also
perceive the EEAS officials as their colleagues.
In short, the CSDP is an area that intersects the role of the member states and the
supranational institutions. Both member states and EU institutions are involved in the multi-
level governance process of the CSDP. Member states pursue their preferences within the
Council committees. Nevertheless, they do not act only as independent entities; through the
Council, they are part of established procedures which assist them in reaching a consensus.
Although member states are directly involved in policy-making in the CSDP, their influence is
mediated by the EU’s institutional setting (Gross and Juncos 2011a, 147). Also, the EEAS
represents  an  influential  actor  as  it  can  propose  ideas  and  initiates  actions.  The  direct
involvement of the member states in all the stages of policy-making on CSDP actions makes
the CSDP a truly autonomous instrument. The character of CSDP peacebuilding actions is
therefore  defined  by  this  independence  in  policy-making  that  combines  both  the  EEAS
structures  and the  Council  preparatory bodies  and which  allows the  pursuit  of  individual
bureaucratic agency and national preferences. This process differs from that of the UN where
member  states  are  key  decision-makers  but  are  not  directly  involved  in  policy  design,
planning  and  implementation,  which  is  the  responsibility  of  the  DPKO.  The  question
therefore arises to what extent the autonomous character of the CSDP is responsible for EU
peacebuilding missions being narrowed to specific aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding.
Conclusion
The chapter has discussed how the CSDP allowed the EU to shift its attention away from UN
frameworks  to  its  own  instruments  in  the  area  of  international  conflict  management.  It
outlined the evolution of the EU’s own peacebuilding practice within the CSDP as well as
terminological  problems  with  regard  to  the  EU’s  conceptualisation  of  peacebuilding.  It
discussed different types of CSDP missions and operations and CSDP decision- and policy-
making processes and structures. EU peacebuilding within the CSDP represents a novelty in
the  international  system.  Although  the  CSDP  was  initiated  to  deliver  military  crisis
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management tasks, CSDP missions and operations carry out mainly peacebuilding tasks.
CSDP missions and operations have increased the EU’s leverage and visibility in third
countries. The autonomous character of the CSDP influences the nature of the EU’s approach
to peacebuilding since the EU can decide on and change its own modalities of its activities
under the CSDP. From this perspective, EU peacebuilding carried out within the CSDP has
developed into an approach with narrowed focus, centring on primary state-building activities.
This approach stands in contrast to that of the UN which has developed multidimensional
peacebuilding policies and missions. UN continues in deploying peacekeeping tasks (such as
protection of civilians, monitoring and keeping peace) alongside peacebuilding tasks, such as
the rule of law reform, justice reform, human rights and development. As a result, while the
EU’s approach to peacebuilding builds on the UN’s approach, the EU has decided to focus on
specific aspects of peacebuilding only in its missions and operations.
The chapter has generated some important questions for further analysis: What are the
reasons for deploying substantively more missions with peacebuilding tasks than operations
in open conflicts? Why has the EU been almost inactive in peace-enforcement, when these
tasks are one of the core elements of the Petersberg Tasks? On the one hand, the inclination
towards deployments in post-conflict  situations may be a result of the reluctance of some
member  states  to  engage  in  certain  stages  of  the  conflicts,  in  particular  in  the  peace-
enforcement and peacekeeping capacity. It may also reflect the capabilities shortages and the
reluctance of the states to expose their civilian and military personnel to risky situations and
dangerous environments. On the other hand, it may reflect the increasing commitment of the
EU  to  international  peacebuilding  which  is  based  on  the  understanding  that  stable  and
functioning  state  institutions  are  central  to  the  solidification  of  a  sustainable  peace.  The
following chapter analyses these questions by looking at how and to what extent the CSDP
decision-making structures shape the EU’s approach to peacebuilding under the CSDP. 
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4  The Decision- and Policy-Making Level of CSDP Peacebuilding
The previous chapters have demonstrated that, although the EU has embraced the normative
shift  towards peacebuilding,  it has developed its  own autonomous peacebuilding approach
within the CSDP. This chapter explores how this approach is constructed through the CSDP
policy-making processes. The chapter analyses how policymakers in the Council preparatory
bodies and the EEAS develop CSDP peacebuilding activities as actions of the EU’s foreign
policy  and  why  they  decide  on  actions  that  mainly  deliver  peacebuilding  tasks.  These
processes  have  generated  a  particular  peacebuilding  approach  that  the  EU pursues  in  its
CSDP: in everyday policy-making, peacebuilding as an international normative framework
loses its relevance to a certain degree. It becomes a pragmatic and political part of EU foreign
policy which reflects the EU’s autonomy in international conflict management and which is
shaped  by member  states’ preferences.  But,  this  autonomy also  reveals  political,  policy-
making and operational constraints and capability-expectations gaps in CSDP actions. The
chapter starts with analysing how policymakers in CSDP structures understand peacebuilding
in everyday policy-making. It then  explores the reasons for EU states’ preference for post-
conflict and peacebuilding actions. The second part analyses the dynamics of policy-making
that generate peacebuilding missions and operations by looking at the aspects of the duration,
objectives  and  purposes  of  missions.  The  analysis  establishes  that  CSDP peacebuilding
actions reflect not only the EU’s normative commitment to international peacebuilding but
also its self-centred preferences, concerns and constraints.
CSDP peacebuilding: Focus on content rather than concept
In the expanded list of the Petersberg Tasks, peacebuilding could stand for “military advice
and assistance tasks,” “conflict prevention” and “post-conflict stabilisation” (TEU Art. 43(1)).
Conflict prevention is understood in the Treaty both as a prevention of conflicts before their
outbreak  and  as  a  prevention  of  another  conflict  in  a  post-conflict  situation.  Similarly,
“military advice and assistance tasks” can be delivered before, during and after a conflict. The
EU has deployed mainly in post-conflict situations – after parties reached a ceasefire and/or
signed a peace agreement. Indeed, many post-conflict situations continue to be affected by
fighting and insurgencies despite the fact that the parties agreed on a ceasefire. However, even
in such situations, CSDP actions are not directly tasked with the management of an open
85
conflict; they focus on stabilisation, and capacity- and institution-building measures. 
As  discussed  in  the  previous  chapters,  in  spite  of  the  EU embracing  the  idea  of
peacebuilding and in spite of the majority of CSDP actions having carried out peacebuilding
tasks, the EU has not framed these actions as peacebuilding missions. Peacebuilding as a term
is also rarely used by EU policymakers in reference to CSDP actions in their everyday work.
On the one hand, as one EEAS official put it: “the ethos of peacebuilding, even if it is not
named,  is  at  the  centre  of  debates.  It  is  a  shift  towards  a  more  coherent  policy,  more
responsive  action,  the  need  to  identify  actors  and  to  use  more  tools.  The  ethos  of
peacebuilding  is  valued”  (interview  4).  On  the  other  hand,  EU  documents  frame  CSDP
instruments under the term ‘crisis management’. However, EU officials and representatives do
not use this term either; they tend to refer to CSDP instruments simply as (civilian) missions
and (military) operations and to particular activities with which these actions are tasked. 
A definition  of  concepts,  such  as  those  characteristic  for  academic  discourses,  is
difficult to maintain in everyday policy-making. In the policy-making world, concepts mean
policies, policy instruments and technical words. An EEAS official explained: “We talk here
about  civil-military concepts.  But,  the EU does  not  have a  clear  definition of a  concept”
(interview  4).  Member  states’  representatives  and  EEAS  officials  work  with  political
documents that refer to principles, instruments and actions rather than ‘abstract’ concepts. The
absence  of  the  word  ‘peacebuilding’ in  policymakers’ vocabulary  is  also  a  result  of  the
specialised focus of missions. Missions are designed to achieve countable objectives outlined
in  their  mandate.  Besides,  the  lack  of  institutional  coherence  explains  the  absence  of
peacebuilding in the working language of policymakers. Parts of the CSDP are physically
disconnected from the EEAS. Geographical desks do not have enough contact with the CSDP,
while there is a lack of understanding among CSDP staff on the work of geographical desks. 
Further, the difference between civilian missions and military operations in terms of
their origin and purpose is another reason for the lack of a clear definition of CSDP concepts.
Military concepts were already in place when the CSDP was launched since EU member
states had been active in military operations of the UN or NATO. There has been a consensus
of  what  the  concept  of  a  military  operation  should  include,  such  as  combat  actions,
peacekeeping,  force protection and humanitarian tasks.  The Petersberg Tasks reflect  these
military concepts. In contrast, civilian concepts evolved from scratch. The EU launched its
civilian missions at the time when the UN was expanding its missions to civilian tasks. The
concept of a civilian mission was a novelty. Civilian concepts have been influenced by the
military ones; SSR, border control, justice reform and training missions have been deployed
86
as missions with modalities similar to those of military operations. The differences between
civilian  and  military  instruments  lead  to  a  disparity  in  conceptual  understandings.  This
influences the understanding of peacebuilding by the two sides. The military regards the term
‘peacebuilding’ as a civilian concept hardly applicable to military operations. Staff in civilian
mission are more supportive of the peacebuilding terminology. 
When it comes to missions, the CMPD is responsible for political-strategic planning of
CSDP actions,  including  the  development  of  CSDP policies  and  concepts.  The  CMPD
conceptualises  CSDP  activities  with  an  aim  of  producing  a  coherent  understanding  of
concepts  used  in  civilian  and  military  approaches.  The  directorate  develops  concepts  in
cooperation  with  the  CPCC for  civilian  missions  and  the  EUMS in  the  case  of  military
operations. It also organises an inventory of policy concepts – which policies are used, which
are not needed any more and which are missing. While such an inventory is useful, the real
impetus comes not from systematic  approaches but  from member states.  The content and
design  of  concepts  is  a  political  process,  accompanied  by  an  intra-institutional  fight.
Interviews suggest that other directorates and Council committees are reluctant to be guided
by the CMPD. As one official claimed: 
“there is no real top-down management. The development of concepts is rather
an  ad  hoc process.  Military  staff  do  not  recognise  our  [CMPD]  work  of
creating concepts for them. They work according to their own rules. CPCC
[staff] do not follow the CMPD but develop their own concepts. They work
together by good will but not by direction” (interview 5). 
Interviews suggest that EU policymakers understand peacebuilding as a term linked
more with the UN rather than the EU. One member of CivCom argued when referring to
peacebuilding that
“It is not the language that is used. It is UN language. It is very vague – you
can define anything and everything under peacebuilding. It is very academic to
discuss  the  definition  for  peacebuilding,  peacekeeping  and  etc.  Everybody
comes with different things” (interview 25).
An officer of a CSDP division in the EEAS provided a similar perspective: 
“We do not use this terminology in civilian CSDP, although it is not de-linked
from  it  either.  […]  We  speak  of  capacity-building  in  post-conflict
reconstruction.  And  we  do  it  through  security  sector  reform,  training,
mentoring [and] advising. These are the terms we use” (interview 2).
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Instead of using terms such as peacekeeping or peacebuilding,  the EU refers to  particular
tasks of respective missions. 
By avoiding UN language, the EU has attempted to build its own identity independent
from the influence of the UN. The previous chapter stressed that the establishment of the
CSDP has led to a sense of competition between the two organisations. The avoidance of UN
language corresponds with this argument as it allows the EU to contrast its work with that of
the UN. EEAS officials are indeed aware of the cooperation with the UN in peace missions.
Some officials compare what the EU does with the work of the UN or ask advice from their
colleagues  responsible  for  the  partnership  with  the  UN.  Some  EEAS officials  also  have
previous experience of working with the UN and bring UN ideas to the EEAS. An official
noted that “certain ideas of the DPKO structures are ‘floating’ around” (informal interview
C).  Some  also  worked  at  their  national  foreign  ministries  in  divisions  dealing  with  UN
matters. Nevertheless, EEAS officials concentrate on the EU and refer to EU language. 
The little attention given to the UN in the EU’s conceptual development is also a result
of the complex process that involves the CPCC, the EUMS and the CMPD preparing draft
concept notes submitted to Council committees. Through their involvements in the drafting
process, they can shape the decisions by proposing respective actions. The extent to which
these proposals are accepted is a matter of an agreement by the Council committees which
actively work with the draft and often reformulate ideas. Once the draft is returned back to
CSDP directorates, they make only slight amendments.
Although officials agree on the importance of clearly defined concepts, including that
of peacebuilding, they focus more on actual policies. Peacebuilding as a concept makes sense
only  in  connection  to  actual  policies  and  activities  that  it  represents.  The  term  crisis
management  is  also  rarely  used  by  policymakers  in  their  everyday  policy-making.
Policymakers rarely refer to particular Petersberg Tasks, except of stabilisation. They refer to
specific actions and activities carried out in missions and operations. In case of peacekeeping
and crisis management, the reference is made to monitoring of borders and military assets, or
civilian protection.
Representatives themselves acknowledge that, although the CSDP was set up to deal
with all the Petersberg tasks, it mainly focuses on post-conflict stabilisation. For example,  a
representative of CivCom claimed that: “CSDP was designed and conceptualised as a crisis
management instrument. But neither was it set up nor is it used in this way. It has never been
crisis management” (interview 29). He continued: 
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“I think out of all the [civilian] missions have had, only three could qualify as
crisis  management  missions:  Georgia,  Aceh and  EUBAM Rafah.  Those are
missions where the EU intervened at a certain stage of a crisis, in particular at
the moment of ceasefire, where the EU tried to do a specific task as part of
crisis management. But all others can be qualified as post-conflict capacity-
and institution-building, which [...] is a very different kind of work. […] CSDP
cannot be a crisis management instrument” (interview 29).64 
A representative  of  the  PSC  highlighted  that  the  rarity  of  the  use  of  the  term
peacebuilding reflects the fact that peacebuilding is a  very broad term. In some contexts, it
also includes development, which the CSDP does not do. Instead, he explains that the CSDP
is  narrowed to  concrete  areas,  such as  the  SSR or  justice  reform,  which  are  part  of  the
peacebuilding  domain  where  the  CSDP  can  have  an  added  value  (interview  28).  A
representative from the EUMC noted that: 
“We are contributing to stabilisation efforts. We are trying to make the security
structures in the host country more robust. We do Petersberg tasks – vast area
of  different  things  that  CSDP  can  do.  But  in  fact,  we  are  very  narrow.
Peacemaking  [understood  here  as  peace-enforcement]  is  not  something  we
could not do… we have an article in the treaty on the coalition of willing [...]
We could go further. But, are we willing to do it?” (interview 36).
EEAS officials understand the CSDP in a similar way. As one official put it:
“CSDP is about crisis management. But, it is peacebuilding and post-conflict
stabilisation  in  fact  which  we  do  mostly.  After  the  crisis  is  solved  and
stabilisation  achieved,  then  the  EC  can  step  in  and  do  development  for
example” (interview 5).
Stabilisation has become part of the CSDP to such an extent that representatives use the term
to encompass all the Petersberg Tasks. While policymakers understand stabilisation within the
CSDP either as the first phase of or synonymous to peacebuilding, they generally agree that
stabilisation focuses on the areas of security,  order,  rule  of law and justice.  This is  done
through capacity-building and reform programmes aimed at the reconstruction or building of
state structures that can ensure the sustainability of order and peace. 
64 The  three  mentioned  missions  have  been  deployed  in  situations  of  status  quo  – frozen  conflicts;
Nevertheless, they have also been tasked with peacebuilding in addition to peacekeeping.  
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The EU’s preference for post-conflict peacebuilding engagements
This research identified six main reasons why CSDP missions and operations engage more in
post-conflict  activities rather than crisis  management.  First,  member states’ preference for
peacebuilding is driven by the positivist nature of peacebuilding insofar as it is based on the
belief that the reconstruction and/or building of functioning state institutions prevents further
violence and conflict. An increasing number of cases of countries that relapsed into violence
after  reaching a ceasefire  have led the EU to acknowledge that  merely keeping peace or
intervening  militarily  does  not  guarantee  the  sustainability  of  the  peace  and  order.
Peacebuilding  is  needed  to  ensure  that  the  country  regains  its  institutional  capacity  for
sustaining order and peace on its own. These purposes are embedded not only in official
documents  and treaties,  as  discussed  in  two previous  chapters;  they are  also  reflected  in
decision-  and  policy-making  processes  that  lead  to  CSDP deployments.  Representatives
highlighted  the  need  for  post-conflict  reconstruction,  stabilisation  and  capacity-building
activities in order to build sustainable peace as to prevent further violence. In this sense, the
logic of CSDP actions with peacebuilding tasks complies with the international peacebuilding
framework and the UN’s understanding of peacebuilding.
The  second  reason  for  the  focus  on  post-conflict  peacebuilding  is  pragmatic.  The
CSDP is a result of political will – an agreement among 28 member states. The ability to
agree on peacebuilding actions, however,  reflects the lack of the political  will  of member
states  to  agree  on  peacekeeping  or  peace-enforcement  actions.  As  the  above  quote
highlighted, the EU has great difficulties in agreeing on peace-enforcement and peacekeeping
actions (interview 36). Peace-enforcement is out of question for most EU countries due to
negative experience with such engagements  and due to  the lack of capabilities.  Although
many EU countries, even non-NATO members, are, to some extent, willing to provide their
troops  for  peacekeeping  tasks,  their  readiness  is  still  limited  and  determined  by  their
geopolitical  preferences,  lack  of  capabilities  and  security  concerns.  Launching  civilian
missions in crisis management mode is even more difficult due to the lack of civilian experts,
security concerns and technical constraints. Peacebuilding deployments often remain the only
options for the EU to show its actorness. 
The preference for peacebuilding could therefore be seen as a result of the member
states’ ability to agree on an action. Edwards noted that reaching an agreement among the
member states is rarely easy. And yet, when the members agree and research a consensus, the
EU’s influence can be significant, especially if it is known that it had been difficult to arrive at
the consensus (Edwards 2013, 76). The ability to agree on such actions, which also involve
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military assets, reflects the emergence of an EU strategic culture.  The EU is unlikely to be
expected to use the CSDP for peacekeeping or peace-enforcement deployments to end direct
fighting or to protect civilians. The understanding among member states is that these tasks
could be pursued within PESCO which was proposed by the Lisbon Treaty. Yet, this invention
remains in its early stage and requires a concrete realisation. Biscop commented that, to reach
a decision on a policy such as this, and to turn it into an action, the right mindset of states is
needed. He argued that the creation of such a mindset requires participating states to subvert
their national defence planning by the commonly agreed capability targets and to adapt their
national defence industrial interests to multinational priorities (Biscop 2017a, 13; 2017b). 
Third, post-conflict peacebuilding activities are easier to launch because of the legal
conditions which make it difficult to launch crisis management operations. CSDP military
operations are legally launched on the basis of a combination of an EU Council decision and
either an invitation by the host state or a UNSC resolution under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter.  International  actions  with  the  use  of  force  require  an  approval  of  the  UNSC.65
Ongoing  operations  Althea  and  Atalanta  as  well  as  past  operations  EUFOR  RCA,  two
operations in the DRC (2003 and 2006) and one in Chad (2008-9) were established on the
basis of a UNSC resolution. The mandate of the operation Sophia was extended to include
tasks that required an approval of the UNSC. However, obtaining UNSC approval can be
difficult.  For instance, the EU struggled with the opposition of Russia at the UNSC when
seeking to extend the mandate of Sophia beyond European waters (interview 31; see also
Tardy 2015b). It took until June 2016 for the UNSC to adopt Resolutions 2278 (2016a) and
2292 (2016b) which enabled the EU to extend its operations on the high seas off the coast of
Libya (Council  of the EU 2016c). In contrast,  deployments without combat forces do not
require approval of the UNSC. EU military training and monitoring operations as well  as
civilian missions have been established at the request and with the consent of the host states.66
65 The UNSC, under powers granted to it by the UN Charter (Chapter VII), is responsible for the authorisation
of collective actions with the use of force to restore or enforce international peace and security (UN 1945). 
66 The first two phases of the EU NAVFOR Med operation (Sophia) are an exception as Sophia operated in
territorial  (European)  waters  and  on  the  high  see  in  accordance  with  applicable  “international  law,  in
particular  with  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  1982 United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Law of  the  Sea
(UNCLOS),  the 2000 Protocols against  the Smuggling of  Migrants  by Land,  Sea and Air  (the Protocol
against the Smuggling of Migrants) and to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the 1979 International Convention
on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), the 1976 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment
and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean (Barcelona Convention), the 1951 Geneva Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees and the principle of non-refoulement and international human rights law” which
allows such operations (Council of the EU 2015, preamble at 6). In 2016, the EU secured the consent from
the Libyan authorities to extend the operation’s mandate to training of the Libyan coastguards and navy
(Council of the EU 2016c).
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Fourth, activities in the post-conflict  phase are more likely to receive political  and
public acceptance at home, across the EU and in the receiving country than actions that use
force. The presence of a foreign military in peace-enforcement and peacekeeping missions is
not  always  positively embraced neither  by the  sending country nor  the receiving  one.  In
contrast, post-conflict activities, such as training, mentoring and advice, tend to be positively
perceived by the host government and the public. The EU deploys its missions by consensus
not only from the side of the member states but also form the side the host country. Such a
consensus  is  often  possible  only  after  the  ceasefire  when  consent  can  be  granted  by  a
recognised  political  authority.  For  these  reasons,  EU  member  states  generally  prefer
deployments after a ceasefire is reached – in a post-conflict phase. Peacebuilding therefore
often remains the only option for the EU in such situations.
To ensure the acceptance of an EU mission by the receiving state, the EU undertakes a
careful assessment of the needs of the country in the planning phase. This includes a fact-
finding  mission  during  which,  the  EU  team meets  the  receiving  country’s  governmental
officials.  The team asks what the country needs  and what the EU is  expected to do,  and
clarifies what the EU can deliver. The result of these discussions forms an agreement on what
the CSDP should do. This agreement is sealed with a letter of invitation to the EU, which
provides a basis for a mission. Then, the operational planning team undertakes another field
trip to plan details and practical modalities. While the EU has an established procedure, the
aim of the planning phase is to ensure national ownership or at least effective partnership. 
Fifth, the way EU member states decide on and set up missions, makes it difficult to
deploy CSDP actions in crisis  management. One representative explained this  in terms of
“having 28 member states to decide how to proceed in a fast-moving and politically charged
environment means that  you cannot  have a crisis  management,  because you are too late”
(interview 28). The CSDP does not have at its disposal a set-up and personnel who are ready
for an immediate deployment. A mission and operation has to be set up from stretch. The EU
needs first recruit personnel and arrange logistical, technical and medical practicalities. The
planning and recruiting period can take from six months to a year and half from the moment
when the member states agree on a mission. As one representative argued: “[t]hat’s not crisis
management. […] We pretend that we are doing crisis management, whereas in fact we are
doing  post-conflict  capacity-building”  (interview 29).  Although  the  EU has  Battlegroups,
CSDP procedures make a rapid deployment difficult. The provisions for PESCO could solve
this problem by accelerating the procedures and planning (see Biscop 2017a; 2017b). 
Sixth,  post-conflict  engagements  are  also  preferred  by  the  member  states  due  to
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security concerns. Every state wants to ensure the highest possible standard of security for
their personnel to sell CSDP actions back home to their public and parliaments. There are
costs  to  this,  however.  Deployments  in  crisis  management  require  high  financial  and
operational (e.g. force protection) costs. Political costs of sending a person to a mission which
may end into deadly casualties are much higher (interview 29, 31). Yet,  peacebuilding as
interpreted through security concerns has also constraints as peacebuilding deployments are
increasingly taking place in complex security situations. Even if peace agreement is reached
and order established, small-scale fighting or terrorist attacks may reoccur. 
There is a growing awareness among both national representatives and EEAS officials
that the EU has to think strategically about what the CSDP is for. Since the CSDP does mainly
post-conflict capacity-building, stabilisation and reconstruction, then the EU perhaps needs to
rethink the ways of engagement through the CSDP. Post-conflict peacebuilding is a different
area. Interviewees highlighted that the EU has to rethink the relationship to the European
Commission because there is an overlap in post-conflict engagement. As one representative
claimed: “We pretend there is no such overlap, because we do crisis management and they do
long-term stuff. But this is not true; we are involved in long-term activities. We have to better
define  ourselves  and  rethink  some  of  the  procedures,  especially  the  connection  to
development”  (interview  29).  The  reasons  for  the  EU’s  preference  for  peacebuilding
demarcate boundaries of the aspirations of EU peacebuilding missions. These missions are
examples of the EU’s evolving strategic culture as they represent the commonly acceptable
range  of  legitimate  policy  instruments  for  international  conflict  management.  These
instruments encompass both normative positions (the norm of international peacebuilding)
and patterns of behaviour (the existence of the instrument, and the willingness of member
states to act and to provide resources). These findings therefore confirm research by Cornish
and Edwards (2001, 2005) and Meyer (2006) on EU foreign policy (see chapter one).
A dilemma over short-term versus long-term missions
The increasing involvement of the CSDP in post-conflict peacebuilding and stabilisation has
raised questions about the duration of missions. The mandates of most CSDP missions tend to
be extended. Missions and operations in the DRC, CAR, FYROM and Georgia, the mandates
of  which  were  not  extended, were  replaced  by  another  CSDP  action.67 Peacekeeping
67 While it could be argued that EUFOR Tchad/RCA is an exception, the operation focused on the protection of
refugees escaping the conflict in the DRC, thus forming part of CSDP actions in the DRC. The operation was
also replaced by a UN force of the UN Mission in CAR and Chad - MINURCAT (Council of the EU 2009a).
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operations  tend  to  be  generally  shorter,  while  military  training  and  civilian  missions  are
longer. This is not surprising given the fact that stabilisation and the reconstruction of state
structures  needs  time.  Officials  and  representatives  agree  that,  although  missions  and
operations are planned as short-term engagements, most develop into long-term enterprises.
As one official noted:
“CSDP missions and operations have been going for a long time. So yes, they
are not really short-term. But member states are concerned about long term
commitments. They push for missions and operations which have short-term
perspectives, which are doable and achievable” (interview 5)
Nevertheless, while member states understand the need for long-term approaches, they
agree that CSDP deployments should remain short- or medium-term and not long-term for
political and pragmatic reasons even if missions are prolonged. Short-term mandates enable
the EU to estimate the achievements of missions. They allow for the prediction of countable
results and outputs. Once a mission has achieved these goals, it can exit the country and leave
the work to  other  actors  such as  the Commission.  CSDP missions  are  target-oriented.  As
short-term missions, they can easily achieve their targets, whereas it is difficult to identify
targets for long-term missions. In this sense, short-term missions serve political interests at
home. As interviews with national representatives suggest, member states’ governments are
aware of the need to justify CSDP actions, including the financing and the deployment of
personnel, before their legislature and electorate. It is easier to convince national parliaments
and the public about a two-year rather than ten-year deployment. 
The tension between short-term and long-term approaches originates in the division of
labour between the Council and the Commission. The Council has had a preference for short-
term crisis-management through the CSDP, whereas the Commission has opted for long-term
capacity-building engagement (Anesi and Aggestam 2008). The CSDP aims at strengthening
state structures, whereas the Commission orients its activities towards the wider society. This
division was clearly visible in the case of the DRC, where the PSC proposed to divide the
EU’s activities into two parts: one to be implemented by the Commission with a Community
approach and the other by the Council with an ESDP approach (Ibid.). The operation in the
DRC was then criticised for a “failure to better link military crisis management with wider
peace building” by keeping security and development compartmentalised, and for the inability
to integrate the military operation in a political strategy (Saferworld and International Alert
2004, 7–8).
Importantly, member states’ hesitation for long-term deployments is linked to security
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concerns – their willingness to put their people at risk. Countries such as Syria or Libya pose
a challenge to many member states as to whether they are willing to deploy a mission with the
consent of one party only, to one region only and to a highly insecure environment (interview
25).  Security  and  protection  of  personnel  deployed  in  missions  is  important  for  the  EU
institutions and member states for political  reasons. Short-term missions are less likely to
have casualties, thus granting the EU a high degree of political legitimacy. CSDP actions have
not suffered many casualties despite recent missions in Afghanistan and Mali being targets of
terrorist attacks. The EEAS does not keep a public record of causalities in the CSDP actions.
The personnel in missions are not EEAS staff but personnel from the contributing countries. It
has even tended to keep information on casualties less noticeable. I identified three fatalities
in CSDP actions, though the nature of the contract of the persons killed and the circumstances
under which they were killed leaves room for interpretation to what extent these casualties
count as CSDP casualties.68
Nevertheless,  for  countries  such  as  Libya,  with  an  unstable  political  and  security
environment, the understanding is that the EU needs to stay involved and to contribute in
stabilising the situation. At the same time, member states understand that there are practical
limits to such engagements. Ministries of interior, which provide police personnel, are not
willing to deploy to environments with high security risks. For these reasons, the EU training
is carried out outside Libya – in Tunisia. Similarly, basic security requirements are necessary
to  create  conditions  where  other  actors  can  act  and  where  long-term  activities,  such  as
development, can take place. For instance, a development, in places such as Kabul, without
force  protection  would  not  be  possible  (interview  25,  31).  Due  to  the  increasingly
deteriorating security conditions in countries of deployment, missions and operation continue
to  have  short-term  mandates,  yet  increasingly  embedded  within  long-term  perspectives.
Missions’ mandates are generally extended several times, making these deployments part of a
long-term peacebuilding.
Finally, member states’ hesitations for long-term deployments are linked to financial
issues; long-term deployments require considering the impact on the efficiency of the mission
68 In 2013, a Lithuanian officer serving in EULEX Kosovo was shot dead. It remains unclear whether this was a
political or criminal attack since perpetrators remain unknown (EEAS 2016h). In 2015, a British citizen was
killed and other persons injured after a suicide car bomber rammed a vehicle of the EU mission in Kabul.
Both the EU and the UK did not  count  this death as  a  CSDP casualty,  claiming that  the person was a
contractor (Ward 2015). Yet, this casualty could be considered as ‘official’ since contractors have become a
critical part of the civilian missions, making almost a third of the personnel (interview 29 and 31). According
to one interviewee, the deteriorating security conditions were the main reasons behind the decisions of the
EU to close the EUPOL mission in Afghanistan in 2016 (interview 29; see also Wellman 2016). In June 2017,
a Portuguese serviceman of EUTM Mali was killed in an attack on a leisure centre located in the suburbs of
Bamako (EUTM PAO 2017). 
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in terms of the budget. Short-term missions help the EU to manage its capabilities. Long-term
missions  would  be  constrained by financial  aspects  as  funding is  foreseen for  short-term
actions. Financial aspects are also linked to security concerns since deployments in high-risk
environments require high costs for security arrangements. 
Peacebuilding in CSDP missions as part of a comprehensive approach
Policymakers  understand  CSDP  activities  as  a  contribution  to  peacebuilding  within  a
comprehensive  approach.  Within  EU  foreign  policy,  a  comprehensive  approach  has  two
connotations.  The  first  refers  to  a  coordinated  and  coherent  CFSP,  which  involves  an
application of all relevant instruments in a consistent manner and the coordination among the
relevant EU institutions. The second understanding refers to CMCO/CIMIC (see p. 74 of this
thesis). This double-meaning has its origin in the difference between the UN’s and NATO’s
understandings of a comprehensive approach, which provided the basis for the development
of the EU’s own comprehensive approach.69 
The call for more coherence in EU external action, particularly in crisis management,
has been stressed by the ESS and the Report on the Implementation of the ESS. The Civilian
Headline Goal 2008 specified that coherence should be in the use of Community activities
and ESDP instruments to improve the effectiveness of the EU crisis management (Council of
the EU 2004c). Earlier, the Commission had identified disaster response, crisis management
and CSDP as areas that needed to be pursued in a more coherent way. It proposed better
strategic planning and enhanced cooperation in joint assessments, strategies and actions with
the Council (European Commission 2006a).
The  Treaty  of  Lisbon  laid  down  the  foundations  for  the  realisation  of  the
comprehensive approach. It pointed to the need for consistency in its external actions and
between external policies and internal policies with external dimension at several places (for
example Articles 13(1), 16(6), 18(4), 21(3) of TEU). From this perspective, a comprehensive
approach means coordinating EU foreign policies and actions. The Treaty has emphasised that
the  EU’s  conflict  prevention,  crisis  management,  development  and  humanitarian  aid
operations should be coordinated and consistent with those of international organisations, in
particular those forming part of the UN system (TEU Art. 2, 21, 42, 212, 214). The reference
to the UN system implies both consistency with the UN’s approaches to conflicts, including
69 The UN understands comprehensiveness in the context of human security, whereas NATO refers to it in terms
of civil-military synergies (Pirozzi 2013, 5-6). Since the Brahimi reform process, the UN also refers to civil-
military synergies, but does not understand this as a comprehensive approach. 
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peace missions, and compliance with UN rules embedded in the UN Charter. 
The idea of a comprehensive approach has been mainstreamed in references to the
EU’s approaches  to  conflicts  and crises.  ‘The EU’s  Comprehensive Approach to  External
Conflict and Crises’ (European Commission 2013; Council of the EU 2014e) clarified the
understanding of the EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises and set out
practical steps for the implementation of the recommendations of the Lisbon for coherence in
the  EU’s  actions  in  external  conflicts  and  crises.  The  EU’s  comprehensive  approach  to
conflicts and crises therefore:
“covers all stages of the cycle of conflict or other external crises; through early
warning  and  preparedness,  conflict  prevention,  crisis  response  and
management to early recovery, stabilisation and peace-building in order to help
countries getting back on track towards sustainable long-term development”
(European Commission 2013, 2). 
A comprehensive approach in this particular area means applying the whole range of different
tools – political, diplomatic, security, development, humanitarian, economic and trade – in a
coordinated manner to tackle the entire conflict cycle (Gross 2008; Pirrozi 2013). 
For  policymakers,  a  comprehensive  approach  means  the  deployment  of  different
military or civilian tools which do not require the use of combat force. As one official said:
“Peacebuilding  as  such  is  much  more  complex;  it  involves  civil  society,
economic development, [and] social issues. This is what we try to do through
comprehensive  approaches.  The  UN  proposed  integrated  planning.  We  do
comprehensive approach, which means that we accept civilian CSDP mission
[in  addition  to  other  components].  We  must  ensure  that  we  talk  to  the
Commission and that we know what they are doing and how far we can be in
synergy with them. Then, the whole package, the whole EU engagement e.g. in
Mali, in Horn of Africa, is peacebuilding. But I cannot say civilian CSDP is
peacebuilding  –  it  is  one  contribution  to  it  and  we  do  not  use  that  term”
(interview 2).
Many scholars have pointed out that the CSDP, as a set of different tools of foreign policy, has
enhanced the EU’s actorness (Rieker 2006, 513). Mace has concluded that “the ‘added value’
of EU crisis management is the Union’s ability to deploy a range of instruments, financial,
civilian and military, in a coordinated manner” (Mace 2004, 474). Nowak has argued that “the
projection  of  ‘lasting  peace’ and  stability  abroad  requires  that  the  EU  uses  a  variety  of
instruments in a coherent manner, and deploys an appropriate mix of instruments in order to
address pre-crisis, active crisis and post-crisis situations” (Nowak 2006b, 9).
Based on this perspective, peacebuilding is complementary to other measures. It is one
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of the tools used to address the entire conflict cycle. CSDP peacebuilding actions often follow
up on previous crisis  reactive and management measures undertaken by other actors.  For
example,  the  missions  and  operations  in  the  Western  Balkans  replaced  UN  and  NATO
missions. The CSDP actions in Mali followed as stabilisation measures in the peacebuilding
phase after the termination of the Serval operation. Operations Atalanta and Sophia, which
serve in a crisis reaction mode, are also deployed with a simultaneous use of other missions
and tools that address the root  causes (see chapter three).  In other words,  comprehensive
approach  in  crisis  management  is  about  different  instruments  being  made  available.
Nevertheless, the EU does not always make other instruments and resources available. The
overwhelming use of peacebuilding tools and the absence of other instruments in conflict
management is hardly a demonstration of comprehensiveness. Rather, it is a result of the lack
of political will and resources being made available to tackle international conflicts.
The Joint Communication,  mentioned above, also mentions  coherence between the
work of the EU Delegations, diplomatic expertise in the EEAS, EUSRs, and CSDP missions
and  operations.  It  stresses  that  “comprehensiveness  refers  not  only  to  the  joined-up
deployment of EU instruments and resources, but also to the shared responsibility of EU-level
actors and Member States” (European Commission 2013, 3). The Communication emphasises
the role of member states in achieving the comprehensive approach: “the EU’s comprehensive
approach is a common and shared responsibility of all EU actors in Brussels, in Member
States and on the ground in third countries” (Ibid., 4). 
Further,  the  development  and  security  nexus  are  seen  not  only  as  a  core  of  a
comprehensive approach but also serve as a justification for it: 
“Sustainable development and poverty eradication require peace and security,
and the reverse is equally true: fragile or conflict-affected countries still remain
the  furthest  away  from  meeting  the  Millennium  Development  Goals.  The
connection between security and development  is  therefore a  key underlying
principle in the application of an EU comprehensive approach” (Ibid.).
Even earlier the 2004 Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP suggested that in order “to
contribute to coherence between security and development, synergy between EU development
assistance activities and civilian crisis management under ESDP should be elaborated and
better developed, including in post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction” (Council of the
EU 2004b). 
To  achieve  a  full  comprehensiveness  in  the  EU’s  actions  towards  conflicts,  the
Communication from 2013 proposed a number of practical steps: 1) develop a shared analysis
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and understanding of the situation; 2) define a single, common strategic vision for a given
conflict situation; 3) focus on conflict prevention before a crisis emerges or violence erupts;
4)  mobilise  the different  strengths  and capacities  of  the EU; 5)  commit  to  the long-term
engagement in peacebuilding, state-building and sustainable development; 6) link different
policies and external and internal actions; 7) make better use of EU delegations; and 8) work
in  partnership  with  other  actors  such  as  the  UN  (European  Commission  2013).  The
Communication emphasised the need to address the underlying causes of conflict in order to
build  peaceful  and  stable  societies,  for  which  long-term  strategies  are  essential.  The
Communication noted that the “objectives of sustainable peace and development must be at
the core of the EU’s response from the outset – the EU must also have a long-term vision for
its short-term engagements and actions” (Ibid., 8). For these purposes, the Communication
recommended establishing coordination systems between long-term and short-term objectives
through dialogue among EU stakeholders to coordinate and, where possible,  combine EU
instruments,  such  as  political  dialogue,  conflict  prevention,  reconciliation,  development,
CSDP missions and operations, and stabilisation activities under the IcSP (Ibid., 9). 
Enhancing  coherence between long-term and short-term objectives requires linking
security  and  development  instruments.  In  their  revision  of  the  EU  policy  on  the  SSR,
submitted as a  joint communication  to the Council and the Parliament, the 2016 Dutch and
Slovak Presidencies  saw the  SSR as  a  platform for  a  realisation of  the development  and
security  nexus (European  Commission  2016a).  The  Council  endorsed  the  joint
communication  while  understanding  the  SSR as  a  key  component  of  all  the  stages  of  a
conflict cycle. The Conclusions describe the objectives of the SSR as “reinstating accountable
security institutions and restoring effective security services to the population, thus providing
the  environment  for  sustainable  development  and  peace”  (Council  of  the  EU  2016e,  2).
Officials and representatives understand this nexus as a step-by-step approach in sequences in
which  security  precedes  development.  Development  requires  a  secure  environment.  This
approach corresponds with state-oriented peacebuilding theories which emphasise that it is
cardinal to first stabilise the situation before development (informal interviews). 
Consistency between short-term and long-term approaches also includes ensuring that
the  country  is  capable  of  self-governing  its  capabilities  after  the  completion  of  the
mission/operation. Freire and Galantino argued that, to make a successful exit, the EU needs
to ensure “a smooth downgrading of the EU’s presence sustained on long-term peacebuilding
goals” (Freire and Galantino 2015, 9). For these reasons, short-term goals of a mission need
“to  be  accompanied  by  a  longer-term  strategy  in  terms  of  sustainability  of  the  efforts
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developed from that EU presence” (Ibid.). While missions and operations fulfil their mandates
in training police, military and judges, and reforming state institutions, the country often does
not have the ability to sustain this status due to the lack of resources. After soldiers, police
officers  or  judges  who received the training return to  their  work,  they are underpaid and
under-equipped. The EU has been considering moving beyond capacity-building in the SSR
and considering to provide the host countries with equipments. In this sense, the concept of
‘train and equip’, known as capacity-building for sustainable development (CBSD), has been
promoted, meaning that the EU could provide the host country with military and civilian
assets. This concept is understood as a realisation of the security-development nexus. This
provision would require legal and structural changes (informal interviews). 
The  Global  Strategy  (EUGS)  has  (re-)introduced  the  concept  of  an  integrated
approach. Building on the concept of the comprehensive approach, the integrated approach
represents an enhanced level of ambition that requires a further strengthening of the way in
which the EU brings together expertise and institutions in conflict prevention, resolution and
stabilisation (EU Global Strategy 2016). As already discussed, the recent restructuring of the
CSDP part of the EEAS, especially the  creation of the CSDPCR.PRISM division, can be seen
as an attempt to realise this integrated approach.70 The creation of the post of the HR/VP with
a responsibility for both conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation was hoped to be be
a remedy for the lack of coherence in the EU crisis management as it merged the relevant
work of the Commission and the Council Secretariat (Nowak 2006a, 11; Rummel 2005). The
HR/VP and the EEAS were established to ensure consistency in the EU’s external action
(TEU Art. 18(4)). This institutional change has increased the potential of the EU “to make its
external action more consistent, more effective and more strategic” (European Commission
2013, 2). The EEAS has brought different tools of crisis management, geographic desks and
the EUSRs together under one ‘roof’. Relevant departments of the General Secretariat and the
Commission  were  transferred  en  bloc to  the  EEAS  (Council  of  the  EU  2010a,  Annex).
However, this has not led to an actual interaction among directorates despite that the Council
insisted that “[f]ull coordination between all the structures of the EEAS shall be ensured”
(Council of the EU 2010a, Art. 4(3)). The effectiveness of the structural changes depends on
the willingness of directorates to cooperate. 
70 CSDP directorates  SECPOL,  INTCEN,  the  CMPD and the  CPCC are  directly responsible  to  the  DSG-
CSDPCR. The EUMS is a managing directorate with its six directorates reporting directly to the HR/VP.
Through CSDPCR.PRISM, the EUMS has been also linked to the DSG-CSDPCR (see p. 81 of this thesis). 
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CSDP peacebuilding missions and civil-military synergy versus cooperation
The civil-military synergy tends to be seen from a narrow perspective of the comprehensive
approach. This understanding originates from NATO’s approaches (see Pirozzi 2013, see the
section above). Civilian-military synergy/ coordination (abbreviated as CMCO) has been seen
as an added value of the EU’s approaches to tackling conflicts, and especially suitable to post-
conflict peacebuilding (see p. 74 of this thesis). Due to security concerns, carrying out civilian
tasks is possible only after ceasefire, and in most cases, only after reaching a peace settlement.
For instance, Shepherd commented that “it is particularly this type of civilian-military synergy
where  the  EU  could  develop  its  unique  approach  to  the  current  security  environment”
(Shepherd 2006, 85). In other words, “this synergy could also take the form of a mixture of
paramilitary units that are structurally not geared to war-fighting but could operate effectively
in conflict prevention or post-conflict reconstruction and state-building environments” (Ibid.).
However, other scholars, such as Bickerton, have observed that civil-military synergies have
been used as a justification for the CSDP and the EU’s performance in crisis management
(Bickerton 2011, 60). He argues that the invention of civil-military synergies, which puts the
emphasis on performance in the CSDP, is a result of an arbitrary policy-making process and
intra-institutional rivalries between different actors within the EU. It is a result of a fight of
competencies between the Council and the Commission over the civilian dimensions of crisis
management, which were formerly under the responsibility of the Commission (Ibid., 67).
Nonetheless, this perspective neglects important political and practical constraints, such as
those elaborated in this chapter, which hamper the realisation of civil-military synergies.
To make the more ambitious CMCO operational, the EU adopted the Comprehensive
Planning Concept with the aim of delivering a coordinated and coherent response to a crisis
on the basis of an analysis of the situation which would consider all the relevant aspects. Such
situations often involve more than one EU instrument. During the comprehensive planning,
officials are supposed to identify interdependencies, priorities and sequence of activities and
make use of resources in a coherent manner. The  CMCO requires all the respective CSDP
directorates to work together in a coordinated way. This approach applies to all phases of the
planning process for an operation conducted under the political control and strategic direction
of  the  PSC  (Politico-Military  Group 2005).  Elaborated  by  the  British  Presidency,  the
Comprehensive Planning Concept represents a “systematic approach designed to address the
need for  effective  intra-pillar  and inter-pillar  co-ordination  of  activity by all  relevant  EU
actors in crisis management planning” (Council of the EU 2005b, 15). 
Despite the significant emphasis put on civil-military synergies, the EU’s record of
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such joint missions is very poor.  In more than ten years of the existence of the CSDP, there
have  not  been  many  situations  where  a  joint  civil-military  mission  would  be  seen  as  a
possibility.  Only  one  mission  has  been  planned  and  deployed  jointly  as  a  civil-military
mission - the  EU Support to AMIS in Darfur. This mission was launched by a single joint
action and was coordinated by a joint civil-military coordinating group, CIVMIL in Brussels,
consisting of both military and civilian officials who met regularly to discuss the progress of
the  mission.  However,  the  coordination  in  the  field  was  still  difficult  since  civilian  and
military personnel had not been used to working with each other; as one official noted: “I
know that, in the field, they would not talk to each other at all. It was those of us here in
Brussels among the commanders who talked to each other, but not on the field – there were
two different  missions  basically”  (interview 8).  According  to  one  interviewee,  Chad was
another case when a joint civil-military mission was suggested by the CPCC (interview 11).
However,  this  proposal was not accepted.  The other  missions,  which are framed as civil-
military missions, EU SSR Guinea Bissau and EUSEC RD Congo missions, were missions
with civil-military components but coordinated by the CPCC for the former and by the EUMS
for the latter. The mission in Guinea Bissau was a very small mission consisting of military
and civilian advisers who advised and trained the security sector authorities (EU Council
Secretariat 2010). EUSEC RD Congo attempted to replicate what was done in Guinea Bissau
with a stronger focus on the military side (EEAS 2015). However, the coordination of the two
elements was problematic since the command of the two aspects of the mission was not sorted
out.  The  legal  service  claimed  that  EUSEC  RD  Congo  was  a  civilian  undertaking  and
therefore falling under the authority of the CPCC. Yet, the CPCC was not responsible for the
coordination of the mission. At the time when the mission was still active, an EEAS official
noted that 
“[i]t  hangs  in  the  air.  There  is  no  chain  of  command.  It  is  not  a  military
mission, it is not a civilian mission. It is sort of loosely connected to some of
liaison officers who are located here in Brussels. This is a huge mistake, I think
it is not right and it also does not make sense. The other argument against this
merge, which institutionally would make sense, is political. [...] Police makes
good progress; it is well received. As the military touches up their own issues,
they want to have their freedom of actions in the East, which is not the right
thing. But anyway, this is why we have much more reluctance. And therefore,
sometimes, we accepted it while saying: if we merged the two, we might put
the police success at risk, because of problems on the military side. This is a
good  reason,  I  think,  to  leave  them  in  parallel  [as  separate  missions]”
(interview 1). 
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Launching joint  civil-military missions  would be complicated because civilian and
military missions are different in their nature, source of funding, structures, command and
control. Designing a set-up that serves both requirements –  military chain of command and
civilian  chain  of  command –  brings  further  organisational  challenges.  As another  official
argued: “Civil-military synergies look good at the conceptual and paper level, but in practice
civil and military work separately” (interview 10). Bringing different tools in one mission
would  mean  one  main  point  of  contact,  control  and  command.  Civilian  and  military
instruments have different processes and different lines of financing. The Commission, which
covers financially civilian missions, has its own budget and operates on different procedures
and processes as compared to the military instruments. This is not unusual as different chains
of  command or  financing also occur  at  the national  level.  Nevertheless,  there are  several
instances where military and civilian elements work together at the national level despite the
fact  that  the  ministry  of  interior  and  the  ministry  of  defence  are  operating  differently.
Similarly, civilian  and  military  components  have  worked  together  under  one  chain  of
command in most UN missions since the Brahimi reform.
In contrast to joint civil-military missions, officials and representatives are supportive
of the idea of civil and military instruments deployed in parallel as separate missions. They
referred to cases of FYROM, BiH, Palestine and Mali where civilian missions and military
operations were in place simultaneously. The co-location of two missions, one military and
one  civilian,  in  these  cases  has  been  very  smooth.  They  complemented  each  other  and
coordination took place at the stages of planning and conduct. Mali is the latest example of a
civilian mission launched alongside a military operation. When the civilian CSDP mission
was planned, a merged scenario was not considered. Both the member states and the EEAS
accepted that two different missions should be deployed. The planning and coordinating team
for  EUCAP Sahel  mission  included  also  advice  of  officials  from the  military  side.  The
coordinating  and planning team built  on the  work,  expertise  and advice  of  EUTM Mali.
Considerations were made about a potential use of assets used by EUTM Mali, in particular in
terms of logistical, security and medical arrangements. 
Furthermore, most civilian missions, especially those dealing with the SSR, tend to
have military advisers or experts. Civilian experts and police officers are often integrated into
military mission. The recognition of the need for the deployment of different experts within
one mission has  developed gradually within the civilian CSDP. First civilian missions were
purely police missions. However, the EU (at the level of CivCom and the CPCC) has realised
that police was not enough. For example, the EU had to combine policing with prosecutor
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services to ensure that evidence-based policing would be interlinked with courts. Currently,
there is no single police mission which does not have a link to the justice element.
The composition of personnel in a mission or operation depends on the mandate. If the
mandate is about monitoring to be carried out by police experts, then it would be difficult to
include  other  experts,  such  as  from public  administration  or  legal  sectors.  Nevertheless,
monitoring missions have often expanded into capacity-building. EUBAM Rafah monitoring
mission in Palestinian Territories has included capacity-building. It also depends on the needs
of the receiving country and on what the EU can offer. In South Sudan, the EU proposed
much more activities for the civilian mission, but the member states were not able to fulfil
these promises. The initial plan covered aviation security of the entire palate of activities.
However,  this  was too  ambitious  for  the  EU states  which  struggled  to  provide  sufficient
experts and resources. The mission engaged in a limited number of activities at the end. As in
many other cases, the main objective was to ‘show the flag’ (informal interview D).
These observations only partially correspond with Bickerton’s arguments that “there is
no clear strategic understanding of what civil-military cooperation actually means for the EU,
nor is there any effective implementation of the concept in practice” (Bickerton 2011, 67).
Representatives  and  EEAS officials  indeed  agree  that  the  realisation  of  joint  missions  is
difficult.  As a result,  the EU now refers to  cooperation (CIMIC) rather than coordination
(CMCO) in civil-military issues (Council of the EU 2016d). Nevertheless, the push for civil-
military cooperation in the CSDP in the latter sense (as separate missions deployed in parallel)
is another way the EU attempts to realise this approach. The increasing tendency in civilian
and military deployments in parallel is possible only after ceasefire. It reflects the EU’s shift
towards deployments in post-conflict peacebuilding scenarios.
CSDP peacebuilding missions: Reflecting the EU’s common preferences
Peacebuilding activities within the CSDP are not only about normative ideals; as the Lisbon
Treaty states, the aim of external action is also the protection of the Union’s citizens and the
EU’s  security.  Stabilisation,  reform  and  rebuilding  of  state  institutions  through  CSDP
peacebuilding missions and operations in third countries, especially those in the EU’s close
and  broader  neighbourhood,  indirectly  contribute  to  stability  and  security  of  the  EU.
Nevertheless, the recent migration crisis in the aftermath of conflicts in the Middle East and
North Africa as well as the growth in transnational terrorism has encouraged the expansion of
the CSDP to serve the EU’s common interests, in particular to enhance the security of the EU
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and  its  citizens,  in  a  more  pronounced  way.  These  developments  have  blurred  the  lines
between external and internal security policy. Scholars have already assessed the impact of
external security challenges on internal security as well as internal security challenges on the
EU foreign policy  (Aggestam and Hill 2008; Hill 2007; Hill 2013). The 2003 ESS indeed
highlighted  that  “the  internal  and  external  aspects  of  security  are  indissolubly  linked”
(Council of the EU 2003c, 2). Being launched in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the
ESS identified transnational terrorism as one of the most serious security threats to Europe
(Ibid., 3 and 6). 
The  ESS  referred  to  migration  as  a  future  challenge  for  the  EU  security  in  two
instances.  First,  the  ESS  claimed  that  global  warming  would  encourage  competition  for
natural resources and thus “create further turbulence and migratory movements” (Ibid., 3).
Second, the ESS mentioned migration in reference to failed states and organised crime (Ibid.).
The Internal Security Strategy acknowledged “the growing links between the European Union
internal and external security” (Council of the EU 2015a, 8). These new security challenges
were reflected by policymakers who, under the current CSDP provisions, did not see much
room for the CSDP in these areas, including illegal migration and refugees (Lindstrom 2015). 
With the increasing pressure on European leaders to solve the refugee crisis, the CSDP
has been used to tackle illegal migration and the refugee crisis. Frontex,71 the EU’s border
management  agency,  has  been  mainly responsible  for  tackling  the  immigration  of  illegal
migrants  to  the  EU  through  coordination  and  through  individual  operations  and  projects
(Council of the EU 2006).72 However, these efforts were not sufficient in preventing the mass
flow of refugees and migrants to Europe. In addition to Frontex, the CSDP has been activated
to tackle this crisis. The current migration crisis is an example that demonstrates the shift in
the focus of the CSDP from external to homeland security.  
In May 2015, the Council established an EU military operation, EU NAVFOR Med
Operation, the first of its kind to address the challenge of migration. The Sophia operation has
71 Frontex is a commonly used name for the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG).
72 In 2006, the Operation Poseidon Sea (renamed to Poseidon Rapid Intervention in 2015) became the first joint
surveillance operation conducted by Frontex. The operation has been patrolling the eastern Mediterranean
Sea with the aim of controlling irregular migration flows towards the EU and tackling cross-border crime. In
2010, Frontex Joint Operation Poseidon Land was launched to control border migration flows at the borders
between Turkey and Greece and between Turkey and Bulgaria (Frontex 2014). The Italian government was
the first country to react to increased immigration to Europe, in particular to the Italian shores. After failed
attempts  to  convince  European  partners  to  launch  an  EU operation,  it  deployed  its  own  naval  and  air
operation Mare Nostrum between October 2013 and October 2014. The operation commenced in October
2013 and lasted for a year. But, by the end of 2014 and during 2015, the migratory flows increased rapidly
with large numbers of migrants arriving in the EU not only through the Mediterranean Sea but also overland
through south-eastern Europe. In a response to the rising numbers of migrants, the FAC launched Operation
Triton in 2014 conducted by Frontex. Unlike Mare Nostrum, Triton focuses on border protection rather than
search and rescue of migrants. The operation also operates closer to the Italian coast.
105
implications for both external and internal security policy of the EU. The operation fights and
disrupts the business model of human smugglers and traffickers. It systematically identifies,
captures and disposes vessels as well as assets used or suspected of being used by migrant
smugglers  and  traffickers  (Council  of  the  EU 2015c).  As  a  result,  the  Sophia  operation
contributes to the protection of European borders. It signifies a watershed for the CSDP as it
brings the idea of collective defence to an operational momentum that has not been seen
before  in  the  history  of  the  CSDP.  The  operation  has  also  extended  its  activities  to
peacebuilding; it provides capacity-building and training of, and information sharing with, the
Libyan Coastguard and Navy (Council of the EU 2016c). The operation therefore intersects
crisis response and peacebuilding tools.
In  addition  to  Operation  Sophia,  EUCAP  Sahel  Niger  and  EUCAP  Sahel  Mali
missions have been adapted to address the flow of migrants in the countries of origin and
transit.  The  Council  agreed  to  reinforce  these  civilian  missions  to  provide  support  in
preventing irregular migration and combating associated crimes (Council of the EU 2015c).
The EU is preparing to adapt the mandate of the EUCAP mission in Mali in a similar way
(interview 7). The EU also decided to deploy Frontex liaison officers to every country in the
Sahel  region  and  to  grant  the  HR/VP (the  EEAS  and  the  missions)  access  to  Frontex
documents (Council of the EU 2016b). Other civilian missions and military operations could
follow  the  pattern.  This  is  significant  change  in  the  scope  of  training  and  stabilisation
missions. Post-conflict peacebuilding, which aims at the reconstruction and building of stable
state structures, is also a vehicle in the service of the protection of EU external border by
halting migration flows already in countries of origin and transit. The CSDP has indeed had a
double purpose – the contribution to international peace and security, which ultimately shall
lead to the security and protection of EU citizens. Yet, before the migration crisis, the EU did
to use the CSDP to directly protect its borders. 
Also, the attempts of some member states to launch a CSDP mission in cooperation
with Frontex in the Western Balkans to tackle the flow of refugees in 2015/2016 demonstrate
that the nexus of external and internal security challenges can be operationalised within the
CSDP.73 Although the Council decided to leave this issue to Frontex, the European Asylum
Support Office and member states, the external dimensions of the ongoing migration crisis
has been acknowledged by the Council (Council of the EU 2015d). Earlier, the expansion of
73 Eastern European member states and Austria were discussing a possibility of launching a CSDP mission in
FYROM to assist the country with the flow of refugees. The realisation of such a mission was not welcomed
by FYROM. Some Western EU states also opposed the idea. Instead, the countries decided to send police
troops to FYROM and other countries in the West Balkans on the basis of bi-lateral agreements (interviews
23 and 32).
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the resources for and increased cooperation within Frontex in 2011 suggested that the member
states prioritise the defence of EU borders over remote peace missions. The new operational
rules for Frontex were adopted during the time of defence budget cuts in many member states.
It was surprise to many that the CSDP did not undergo a similar change (Fiott 2013). The
Visegrad Group countries have called for an expansion of the CSDP. They have stressed that
more synergy is needed between the CSDP and the area of Freedom Security and Justice since
the  links  between  external  and  internal  security  are  strengthened.  Such  an  intensified
cooperation  is  important  to  tackle  “contemporary and emerging horizontal  issues  such as
hybrid threats, terrorism, organized crime, foreign fighters and irregular migration,  border
management, energy security and cyber security” (European Council 2015). 
The launch of the Operation Sophia and the expansion of the mandates of missions in
the Sahel signify a shift from a traditional approach to the CSDP to a new form of the CSDP
that focuses on the security and defence of the EU borders. These developments in the CSDP
can encourage the exploration of new ways of using the CSDP in other context. The EU may
turn away from peacebuilding within the CSDP or use peacebuilding activities for the sole
protection  of  its  security.  The  Mali  case  study will  discuss  this  tendency in  depth.  This
expansion of CSDP activities confirms arguments by Cornish and Edwards (2001), and Meyer
(2006) of an evolving EU strategic culture; EU member states agree on common actions,
including military operations, to tackle issues which combine the member states’ commonly
perceived normative commitment  and self-centred preferences  (in  this  case concerns).  By
launching missions to tackle migration flows, the member states have demonstrated that they
have  developed  institutional  confidence  to  deploy military  force as  part  of  a  commonly
acceptable policy instrument (i.e. CSDP) based on the recognition of the EU’s legitimacy as
an international actor. 
CSDP missions: Building peace or pursuing EU member states’ preferences?
CSDP peacebuilding  missions  and operations  as  actions  of  EU foreign  policy reflect  the
preferences, concerns and constraints of EU member states. The CSDP is one of the few areas
of the EU’s foreign policy which remains  highly intergovernmental,  thus primarily in  the
hands  of  the  member  states.  Member  states’ preferences  pursued in  the  CSDP shape the
character  of  missions  and  operations.  The previous  chapter  highlighted  how socialisation
processes  within  the  Council  committees  has  led  to  a  convergence  of  member  states’
preferences despite the fact that the EU member states represent different political traditions.
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Nevertheless,  member states continue to pursue their  own priorities,  often driven by their
internal  politics  and  historical  ties.  For  example,  the  French  Government  takes  a  strong
interest in the conflict in Mali due its close political, economic, cultural and historical ties as
well as because of the large Malian diaspora in France (Gebauer and Hengst 2013). Freire and
Galantino have claimed that political and cultural differences continue to affect the progress
of the CSDP. Member states lack a common perception on policies and the means required to
accomplish them as they have different perceptions of threats, different views on the use of
force and instruments, different defence traditions and diverging geopolitical interests. They
have argued  that  divergences  in  member  states’ positions  impede  a  more  integrated  EU
defence and security strategy and thus the decision-making in peace operations. EU countries
have  different  normative  frameworks  for  missions,  different  level  of  ambition  and
willingness, and different provision of capabilities (Freire and Galantino 2015, 3-8). As result,
the aspirations that the EU with the use of its CSDP has are short-lived and oriented towards
actions on which member states agree and for which member states are capable to act and
provide their resources and capabilities.
Despite  these  limitations,  the  Lisbon Treaty and the  subsequent  structural  changes
have enhanced the coherence in policy-making in the CSDP. When authority is consolidated
and institutionalised at the EU level, the member states become bearers of those policies and
maintain  their  commitment  to  the  common  foreign  policy  goals  (Exadaktylos  2012).
Nevertheless, Edwards and Rijks have reminded us that a single institution for the CFSP and
the CSDP cannot be automatically regarded as an ultimate path to a common policy. They
have pointed to other limits of the EEAS:
“a new institution  in  itself  is  unlikely to  bridge  fundamental  differences  of
opinion on issues of foreign policy. Common procedures can neither replace
nor (on their own) create common policies. Political agreement on the means
and  objectives  of  the  EU’s  external  relations  will  remain  the  ultimate  and
critical factor for success of the European External Action Service” (Edwards
and Rijks 2008, 20). 
Although the EEAS can influence policies by providing its input, the member states, through
the Council,  maintain the primary responsibility for the shape of the Union’s CSDP. This
ultimately affects the coherence in peacebuilding policies which continue to be shaped by
member states’ preferences. 
Situating  the  CSDP in  an  overall,  coherent  and  comprehensive  strategy  requires
prioritisation of policies and objectives. Scholars have highlighted that priorities for the CFSP,
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including the CSDP, should be realistic (Andersson et  al.  2016; Biscop 2016;  Biscop and
Coelmont 2010). The reality of the EU deployments reflects the nature of the capabilities of
the EU. Considering the capabilities of the member states, a more divergent picture appears in
relation to what priorities the EU should pursue in its CSDP. Furness argued that the big three,
France, Germany and the UK have strong policy preferences and a global presence. Spain,
Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Poland, Denmark, Belgium and Portugal have strong interests
and influence in specific policy areas and regions. In contrast, smaller member states delegate
specific functions and focus on a limited number of issues (Furness 2013, 111). France, the
UK and Germany continue to understand their role in foreign policy as global players. They
are often supported by member states from the Mediterranean. As such, they wish the EU
acted  as  a  truly  global  actor.  Nevertheless,  they  find  themselves  often  limited  in  their
capacities too, as clearly demonstrated by the case of Libya. 
In contrast, Eastern European countries and smaller EU states, especially non-NATO
members,  emphasise the need to  focus on certain aspects  of the CSDP and on particular
regions. Scholars have observed that Eastern Europeans concentrate their foreign and security
interests around four geographical regions: the Eastern Neighbourhood, the Western Balkans,
Russia  and  Central  Asia  (Tulmets  2014).  Austria  and  the  Visegrad  Group  countries  are
primarily concerned with the Western Balkans, with the Visegrad Group also dealing with
Eastern Neighbourhood countries. Baltic states focus on Russia and Ukraine. This geographic
prioritisation originates not only from historical and cultural ties but also from geographic
proximity and economic ties between Central-Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans and/or
Eastern  Neighbourhood  (Ibid.).  Currently,  the  prioritisation  of  the  Western  Balkans  is
especially in the focus for Eastern Europeans and Austria due to the refugee crisis:
“the Western Balkan is the epicentre of our contemporary discussions, as we
are considering whether it is possible to manage the current flow of refugees
with a CSDP operation” (interview 33). 
This  prioritisation  leaves  Eastern-Europeans  and  Austria  limited  room  for  an
involvement in CSDP actions in Africa or the Middle East. Austria and Eastern European
states are indeed aware of the need to participate in missions in Africa. However, deployments
to African countries lack any significant political support. Eastern Europeans and Austrians do
not have any particular political or economic interests in Africa. Eastern Europeans often lack
clearly defined  foreign  and security  policies  in  this  region.  Their  contributions  to  CSDP
actions in Africa are often results of bureaucratic efforts of respective ministries rather than
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political  priorities  of  their  governments  (see  Weiss  2014).  Such  involvements  also  face
practical problems, including the lack of appropriate language skills, especially in French-
speaking countries, and are also driven by security concerns of deploying in countries with
terrorist threats. As one representative of CivCom argued:
“Even if we sent personnel to an African country, granted that they would have
interpreters there, we could not do this because of security reasons. Imagine
only, how our staff would communicate with locals in case of an emergency or
a terrorist attack” (interview 22). 
Nevertheless, neither Eastern European states nor Austria have opposed decisions to
launch new missions  in  Africa  or  in  the  Middle  East.  Eastern  Europeans tend to  remain
passive  when it  comes  to  decision-making and planning on CSDP actions  in  Africa,  and
follow the majority, or larger states (interview 34). In contrast, larger states tend to be more
decisive and active in shaping both decisions and policies in the CSDP. For example, France
and Germany were strongly opposed to a CSDP involvement in Ukraine. Germany was keen
to expand the civilian mission and the military operation in Mali to ensure that their staff is
deployed in Mali rather than in more dangerous CAR (interview 24 and 29). Yet, Germany
tends to follow French interests when it comes to deployments in French-speaking Africa.
The EU has launched more civilian missions than military operations.  On the one
hand, this reflects demands and needs of countries of deployment. On the other hand, this also
shows the limits of the military power of the EU. This limitation is caused by different views
on civilian and military approaches among member states. France and the UK remain key
players in military operations. Civilian missions take priority over military operation in case
of  non-NATO  member  countries  which  believe  that  civilian  approaches  to  post-conflict
reconstruction are fundamental in ensuring lasting peace. At the same time, these countries do
not  neglect  the  importance  of  military  operations.  In  fact,  non-NATO EU countries  also
provide  military personnel  to  military operations.  For  other  states,  civilian  approaches  to
conflict management may be prioritised due to limited military capabilities. For example, the
historical reasons for Germany’s reluctance to engage in executive operations is no longer the
only concern. Expertise and preparedness to engage in direct fighting in remote areas such as
northern  Mali,  as  compared  to  the  quality  of  the  French  and  British  armies,  is  of  main
concern.  In  contrast,  Eastern  European  countries  contribute  with  personnel  to  military
operations more than to civilian missions. This is due to the lack of expertise in respective
areas  such  as  judicial  and  police  reform,  as  well  as  due  to  the  lack  of  language  skills
(interviews 22, 23, 26, 27, 30, 34).
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CSDP  peacebuilding  actions  require  strategic  prioritisation.  The  prioritisation  of
geographical interests would be welcomed by policy makers at the EEAS who claimed that
the EU strategy needs to be specific. Strategies with a focus on particular regions or areas
would be more helpful in guiding the planning, coordination and implementation of CSDP
missions and operations. An official said that the EU needs:
“more systematic strategies and conflict analysis. And strategy because that is
what we really need. I would like to go to Afghanistan with an EU strategy, or
CAR EU strategy, or Sahel EU strategy. That is what we need for planning and
what is not systematically done. I need a guideline. What is it what the EU
wants to do in order to plug my planning into it” (interview 3).
Geopolitically focused strategies for particular regions would also allow for a more realistic
planning and design of CSDP actions. Such strategies could help to resolve the dilemma of
short-term versus long-term missions since short-term CSDP missions/operations could be
planned and deployed as part of a long-term strategy.
The EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel is a model example of a
coherent and comprehensive strategy for a particular region; it incorporates the vision of what
a comprehensive approach should look like (see pp. 96-100 of this thesis). The strategy adopts
a holistic and regional approach to multidimensional, cross-border and interrelated problems
in the Sahel region (Council of the EU 2011b; 2015c). The EU uses all the instruments in the
Sahel in the context of its comprehensive approach. In the Sahel, the EU deploys three CSDP
missions and operations, namely EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger,
with  different  peacebuilding  tasks,  in  parallel  at  the  same time.  The  work  of  the  CSDP
missions and operations is complemented by activities of the EUSR for the Sahel and the EU
Delegations in the Sahel countries. 
As the Sahel strategy demonstrates, a particular strategy can lead to new developments
in the CSDP. The Sahel strategy has encouraged the regionalisation of the CSDP missions and
operations in the region (see chapter four). Nevertheless, these new developments raise new
security  concerns  as  the  northern  areas  are  potential  to  terrorist  threats.  Deployments  in
remote regions of the country with poor infrastructure and no paved roads may most likely
increase the costs of the operation and the mission. It may be challenging for the EU to secure
not only its staff in such remote areas, but also to ensure regular supplies. While it is planned
that the EUTM staff will not be involved in executive tasks, the deployment of trainees in
protection activities will shift the scope of the mission from capacity-building to a “harder”
engagement  (interview 10). The design of  firm objectives  needs  to  take  into  account  the
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problem of  the  contemporary unstable  and constantly changing  international  environment
with regard to international peace and security. Deployments in increasingly insecure remote
areas need to be considered before the EU commits itself to an engagement. 
A conflict varies from case to case, and requires a case-specific approach. This seems
to be a paradigmatic problem of CSDP missions and operations. The agenda, mandates and
operational parameters of CSDP missions and operations have not changed significantly since
the launch of the first operations in 2003. Reassessing the scope and mandates of the CSDP
will be necessary in the light of the contemporary challenges. These developments suggest a
further shift in the evolution of peacebuilding practices, namely that peacebuilding activities
may  need  to  continue  alongside  other  combat  and  protection  activities.  With  increasing
security challenges, in particular the threat of terrorism, training and capacity-building need to
be accompanied by peacekeeping and peace-enforcement measures. However, it is unlikely
that the CSDP is going to be used for the latter two tasks.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored how CSDP peacebuilding actions are  understood and governed
through the multilevel processes of policy- and decision-making that involves both member
states, represented in the Council preparatory bodies, and the EEAS. CSDP peacebuilding
activities are designed by policymakers of the Council preparatory bodies and the EEAS. As a
result, peacebuilding under the CSDP is an outcome of a combined intergovernmental and
supranational policy-making. On the one hand, it projects the preferences of member states
which seek to shape the CSDP according to their interests. On the other hand, it is a product
of complex bureaucratic processes within the EU institutions. Despite the fact that the EU
adopted peacebuilding as an international normative framework, its own practice and political
and policy-making processes have enabled the EU to pursue peacebuilding activities in an
autonomous manner. The autonomous character of CSDP policy-making and the expansion of
CSDP instruments into new areas have changed the conceptualisation of peacebuilding. 
Peacebuilding  is  understood  by  policymakers  in  four  interrelated  modalities:  as
stabilisation efforts, as part of the comprehensive approach, as a tool to enhance the EU’s
common priorities (such as the EU’s own security) and as a result of member states’ national
preferences.  The findings  of  this  chapter  present  EU peacebuilding  as  a  result  of  policy-
making processes that are guided by a consensus-oriented approach. Although member states
seek to pursue their own preferences, they do not tend to cross red lines; they wish to reach an
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agreement  on  common  objectives  and  actions  for  the  sake  of  their  common  policy.
Peacebuilding represents a policy on which the member states can agree - a part of the EU’s
evolving strategic culture. It expresses the political will of the 28 – their ability to agree on the
need to tackle violent conflicts. While the EU possess the full-range of tools to tackle all the
stages of the conflict cycle, post-conflict peacebuilding (in addition to conflict prevention)
comprises a set of activities on which the member state can agree. Member states generally
agree on the content and normative underpinnings of peacebuilding and its understanding as
post-conflict stabilisation and as part of the comprehensive approach. Major differences lie in
the area of geopolitical priorities as countries tend to focus on particular regions. 
The EU set  up structures  and instruments  for  international  crisis  management  and
peacebuilding. Nevertheless, there are limitations of the instruments themselves defined by
political,  policy-making  and  operational  concerns,  constraints  and  capability-expectations
gaps. The autonomous character of CSDP policy-making and practice has generated the major
limitations of this instrument; in theory the CSDP is designed to carry out the full range of
crisis  management  tasks.  In  practice,  it  mainly  focuses  on  specific  areas  of  post-conflict
peacebuilding.  Peacebuilding  missions  and  operations  are  often  pragmatic  and  rational
choices  since  they  are  easier  to  agree  on  and  politically  less  controversial  compared  to
operations which use combat forces. Engagements to stop an ongoing conflict with the use of
force and military peacekeeping operations with the mandate to protect civilians are options
that are difficult to agree on. 
The EU’s approach to peacebuilding is affected by different sources of tension. First,
there is a general tension between two normative frameworks: ‘hard power’ approaches and
‘soft  power’ approaches  embedded in  the  CSDP.  But,  the  general  assumptions  that  some
states, such as France, push for hard and military approaches, whereas other countries, such as
Austria,  prefer  non-military  approaches,  proves  fallacious  here.  As  the  case  of  Austria’s
change of preference shows, the approaches of member states are contextual.  Second, intra-
institutional tensions within the EEAS continue to be part of the everyday work of the EU.
Yet, they seem to have little negative impact on the actual policy-making. Different actors
have different priorities. Yet, the analysis of policy assumptions carried out in this research
suggests that a consensus on peacebuilding is evolving incrementally among various actors,
thus framing the conceptual maps of policymakers in the CSDP structures. These tensions
highlight  the  limitations  of  the  intergovernmental  system  in  CSDP policy-making.  It  is
therefore  important  to  look  at  the  level  of  operations  to  understand  how  peacebuilding
designed through complex policy-making sustains in particular scenarios and how member
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states and the EU pursue peacebuilding in different cases. 
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5  Peacebuilding through CSDP Actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The case of BiH illustrates the operational dynamics of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding
within the CSDP. This case marked the transformation from the first- to second-generation
peacekeeping and from peacekeeping to  peacebuilding,  accompanied  by a  transfer  of  the
leadership from the US to the EU. BiH provided a laboratory for the EU’s CSDP and a place
for the realisation of its first autonomous CSDP mission. While the EU failed to resolve the
open conflict in BiH, it became the leading actor in post-conflict peacebuilding. The EU’s
military operation and civilian mission in BiH have served as instruments of peacebuilding
aimed at building state institutions according to the state-centred peacebuilding model. The
two CSDP actions in BiH have demonstrated not only the EU’s normative commitment to
international  peacebuilding;  they  have  also  been  part  of  the  accession  process  which
strengthened the influence of the EU in peacebuilding in the country. BiH therefore shows the
contested politics and policy-making of the EU’s peacebuilding approach that spans between
the promotion of norms and member states’ preferences. Peacebuilding activities carried out
through the two CSDP actions depict the autonomy and dependence as well as strengths and
constraints of the CSDP. The chapter starts with a brief overview of the conflict and post-
conflict developments in BiH. It then moves to analysing peacebuilding activities in the two
CSDP actions while exploring how they reflect the EU’s capability as a foreign policy actor.
The chapter traces the normative foundation of the missions and the role of the EU member
states  and structures  in  their  design  and delivery.  The last  part  discusses  the  relationship
between the EU’s peacebuilding approach and the membership perspective.
Overview of the conflict and the response by the international community
The war in BiH74 was the bloodiest in the post-Cold War European history, and with the first
case of genocide in Europe after WWII. Caught in Yugoslavia’s dissolution, BiH’s three large
ethnic  communities  disagreed  about  the  republic’s  future.  While  Bosniaks  aspired  for
independence, Serbs sought to remain in Serb-dominated rump-Yugoslavia and Croats wanted
to be part of Croatia. Minor clashes soon erupted into large-scale fighting. The conflict raised
discussions  about  new  drivers  of  intra-state  wars,  in  particular  the  role  of  ethnicity  and
religion. The armed conflict involved three parties demarcated alongside ethno-religious lines:
Muslim Bosniaks, Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats.75 Although the conflict  was about
74 Together with Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia, BiH was one of the six constituent
federal republics that formed the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia.
75 The collapse of communism brought Yugoslavia’s religions new freedoms, resulting in a religious revival
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power and territorial issues, ethno-religious and nationalist identities, exploited by political
leaders, became dominant drivers of the conflict (Kmec and Ganiel forthcoming;  Kivimäki,
Kramer and Pasch 2012; Silvestri and Mayall 2015). Group identity formed the cornerstone of
the political discourse and the mobilisation of popular support for war (Kaldor 2013).
For the EU, this was not a distant conflict; it was an acrimonious conflict on the EU’s
doorstep. The EU attempted to resolve the crisis through diplomacy, mediation and political
pressure,  which were,  however,  rejected by  Miloševič (Gow 1997).  Yet,  the Bosnian war
demonstrated the EU’s weakness to prevent and stop the violence. The Yugoslavia’s conflicts
occurred at the time when the EU was still transforming from an economic association to a
union and developing its international actorness through its CFSP (Mühlmann 2008). The EU
member  states’ inability  to  agree  on  means  and  the  absence  of  a  common  instrument
contributed  to  the  EU’s  failure  to  get  a  grip  on  the  situation.  Although  the  European
Community recognised Bosnia as an independent state in 1992, member states disagreed over
strategies and options, including the use of military force, to tackle the crisis. This European
discord highlighted the perception of a weak EU and a strong US with the latter as the only
actor capable of decisively intervening to end the violence in the Western Balkans (Glaurdic
2011;  Keil  and  Perry  2016;  Simms  2002).  Yet  even  in  1991,  the  US  had  indicated  its
willingness to see the Community taking the lead on the Yugoslav crisis (Almond 1994). 
At the beginning of the breakup of Yugoslavia, the European Community supported
the  preservation  of  the  unity and territorial  integrity of  Yugoslavia.  Tonra  noted  that  any
independence  by Slovenia  and  Croatia  was  not  acceptable  for  the  Community’s  member
states. As Serbian military actions intensified, Germany began discussing the recognition of
Croatian and Slovenian independence, which was, however, viewed with a dismay in Paris
and elsewhere (Tonra 2001, 223-224). The member states sent the Troika76 on an emergency
mission to Yugoslavia to secure a cease-fire (Commission 1991a) which was agreed between
Yugoslav forces and Slovenia in July 1991. The Community also asked the WEU to draw up a
plan  for  a  peace  process  in  BiH  (Commission  1991b).  In  the  same  year,  the  European
Community established a Monitor Mission (ECMM) in Western Balkans to monitor political
and security developments.77 Nevertheless, these instruments failed in the case of BiH as the
Bosnian Serb Army and Milosevic’s regime pursued their interests by violent means (Glaurdic
2011). 
which was accompanied by ethnic and nationalist attitudes (Bennett 1997; Mekić 2017: 33-37; Ramet 1996). 
76 Until 2009, the ‘Troika’ represented the EU in external relations within the scope of the CFSP. It referred to a
group composed of the Foreign Affairs Minister of the member state holding the Presidency of the Council of
Ministers, the SG/HR and the European Commissioner for External Relations. 
77 In 2001, the mission transitioned to the EUMM and closed in BiH in 2007 (EU Council Secretariat 2007c). 
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Nor was the UN able to resolve the conflict - through diplomatic or coercive attempts,
including mediation, political pressure, arms embargo, mandate for a no-fly zone enforced by
NATO and the  United Nations  Protection Force operation (UNPROFOR).78 It  was indeed
UNPROFOR, in particular the Dutch battalion, which was blamed for failing to prevent the
ethnic  cleansing  in  Srebrenica.  Supported  mainly  by  European  troops, UNPROFOR was
tasked with the delivery of humanitarian relief and monitoring no-fly zones and safe areas.
However, it was not mandated to use the force for civilian protection (UN 1996). Although
General Philippe Morillon initially acted to defend civilians, UNPROFOR failed to avoid the
disaster  (Battistelli  2015,  36-37).  UNPROFOR revealed  the  limits  of  the  first-generation
peacekeeping  to  either  achieve  peace  or  protect  civilians.  Following  the  failure  of  this
peacekeeping operation, NATO launched its  Operation Deliberate Force against the Bosnian
Serb Army. The air campaign was key to convincing the Serbs to take part in negotiations that
resulted in the  General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also
know as Dayton Accords, signed by the presidents of  the  Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Croatia and BiH, which ended the Bosnian war.79 
The Dayton Accords set a number of internationally assisted post-conflict stabilisation
and peacebuilding objectives, including the provision of a safe and secure environment, the
establishment  of  a  unified  and democratic  BiH,  the  creation  of  vital  state  structures,  the
rebuilding of the economy, and the return of displaced persons and refugees to their homes.
Dayton created a new constitutional order for BiH with two entities: the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (FBiH) comprising mostly Bosniaks and Croats, and the Republika Srpska
(RS) with overwhelmingly Serbian population  (The General Framework Agreement 1995).
This reorganisation created a de-centralised state with each entity governing its own territory.
Scholars have noted that this reorganisation has never been fully accepted by the political
elites of BiH and has continued to be the main source of political division. While Bosniaks
have longed for a centralised state, RS has preferred to maintain the two entities and even
hopes for separation from BiH, eventually joining Serbia. Bosnian Croats have viewed this
reorganisation as discriminatory, seeking either the abolition of the two-entities system or the
creation of a third entity corresponding to the war-time Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna.
Besides, the Brčko District remains an unresolved issues as a self-governing administrative
78 UNPROFOR operated from 1992 until  1995. In  1993,  the UNSC  established the  International  Criminal
Tribunal  for  the former Yugoslavia  (ICTY) and mandated NATO to enforce  a no-fly zone over Bosnia-
Herzegovina (ICJ 2007). 
79 The Dayton Peace Agreement was  initialled at the Dayton air force base in Ohio in November 1995 and
singed in Paris in December 1995. Scholars and Practitioners concluded that the Dayton was in essence an
“imposed” peace, mandated by the US with the parties who consented to the agreement having little say over
the content of the agreement (Chandler 2005a; Holbrooke 1998).  
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unit of BiH and a condominium of both the FBiH and RS (Keil and Kudlenko 2015, 480; see
also Sisk 2001, 788; UNDP 2007, 49).
Based on the Dayton Accords, NATO established the operation Implementation Force
(IFOR)  in  1995,  tasked  with  separating  warring  armies,  collecting  weapons,  destroying
artillery,  creating conditions for elections,  managing the return of refugees and protecting
civilians.80 Unlike  UNPROFOR,  this  operation  was  of  a  mixed  peace-enforcement  and
peacekeeping  nature  with  an  executive  mandate.  IFOR was  replaced  by the  Stabilisation
Force  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (SFOR)  between  1996  and  2005,  which  continued  in
ensuring security and order. In addition to military personnel, SFOR also included civilian
staff and a 600-strong Multinational Specialised Unit (MSU) – an armed police unit with
executive  mandate,  made  up  primarily  of  Italian  carabinieri  and  Austrian,  Hungarian,
Slovenian  and  Romanian  policemen.81 IFOR  and  SFOR  represented  second-generation
peacekeeping operations with an executive mandate, including the protection of civilians, and
civilian elements of conflict management. They focused on the immediate consequences of
the war - the elimination of direct violence - whereas the tasks of addressing structural issues
and reconstruction waited to be carried out by the UN and subsequently by the EU. 
In addition to these activities,  the UN launched its  own mission -  United Nations
Mission in BiH (UNMIBH) - in 1995, which lasted until December 2002, to contribute to the
establishment of the rule of law. The mission was tasked with assisting in the reform and
restructuring of the local police, assessing the judicial system, and auditing the performance
of the police and others involved in the maintenance of law and order (UN “United Nations
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina”). UNMIBH included the UN International Police Task
Force (IPTF) - a police mission which  monitored, observed and inspected law enforcement
activities,  including  associated  judicial  organisations  and  proceedings.  It  trained  law
enforcement personnel and police forces, supported the authorities in BiH in the construction
of  law enforcement  agencies,  provided  equipment,  advised  law  enforcement  agencies  on
democratic  policing  principles  and  human  rights,  and  investigated  and  assisted  with
investigations of human rights abuses by law enforcement personnel (The General Framework
Agreement, Annex 11, Art. III; UN Security Council 1995; 1996).82 
80 At its high, IFOR had around 80,000 soldiers. 
81 SFOR was deployed with 31,000 soldiers. This number was reduced to 7,000 by 2003 (NATO 2004a).
82 The IPTF had about 2,000 staff. The mission carried out registration and vetting of police officers with a
view to eliminating those unqualified and guilty of war crimes. It downsized the number of BiH policemen
from 60,000 to 16,000, and included staff from minority backgrounds. At a later stage, the mission assisted
with the establishment of police academies, the State Border Service (SBS) and the State and Information
and Protection Agency (SIPA). Despite this progress, further reforms were needed to transform the police to a
democratic and ethnically unbiased service (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006; Mühlmann 2008).
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The design, coordination and implementation of internationally assisted peacebuilding
in BiH has been facilitated through  the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in BiH,
represented  by  the  High  Representative  for  BiH,  the  highest  political  authority  and  the
country’s chief executive officer responsible for overseeing the implementation of civilian and
political aspects of Dayton. The OHR reports to the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), an
ad  hoc international  body  charged  with  implementing  the  Dayton  Agreement  (General
Framework  Agreement  1995;  OHR  “General  Information”).83 The  High  Representative
became the embodiment of supreme power in the country, being granted the so-called ‘Bonn
authority’ to impose and invalidate legislation as well as to appoint and dismiss any Bosnian
officials obstructing  the  implementation  of  the  Dayton  (OHR  “Peace  Implementation
Council”). The international community has acted as an ultimate decision-maker via its High
Representative (Pohl 2014, 48; Chandler 2000, 65). Through the OHR, BiH has become a
model  of  post-Cold  War  international  administration  of  post-war  territories.  The  OHR,
equipped with absolute powers, represented a new form “trusteeship” (Caplan 2002, 2005;
Chandler 2000, 2005b). This provision has made it impossible for the country to govern itself
without  the  direct  oversight  of  the  High  Representative  and  foreign  officials. As  Caplan
commented:
“[n]ever before has a mission had to make and enforce local laws, exercise total
fiscal management of a territory, appoint and remove public officials, create a
central bank, establish and maintain customs services, regulate the local media,
adjudicate  rival  property  claims,  run  schools,  regulate  local  businesses  and
reconstruct and operate all public utilities” (Caplan 2002, 9). 
The OHR has no equivalent in other post-Cold War post-conflict scenarios. Even Kosovo
possesses more independence in the governance of its own matters, despite the arrangements
of the international supervision of Kosovo through the International Civilian Office and the
EU’s EULEX mission, which were granted powers over legislative and executive actions. The
OHR became the key channel for the implementation of international peacebuilding policies.
BiH has been a template of the post-Cold War internationally administered state-building and
peacebuilding (Caplan 2002; Chandler 2005a, 2005b). The OHR was the key institution for
the EU in assuming the leadership role in post-conflict peacebuilding.
83 The  PIC  comprises  55  states  and  other  organisations.  It  clarifies  the  responsibilities  of  the  High
Representative in the implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton Agreement. The Steering Board is the
executive arm of the PIC with the US, Canada, Russia,  Germany,  the UK, France, Italy,  Japan,  the EU
Presidency,  the  European  Commission  and  the  OIC  represented  by  Turkey  as  members  (OHR  “Peace
Implementation Council”). The establishment of the PIC was a compromise between the EU and the US. As
the  US  refused  a  UN  involvement,  Europeans  proposed  the  PIC  with  an  aim  of  providing  not  only
international  legitimacy in the absence of the UN but,  more importantly,  ensuring their  inclusion in the
process (Chandler 2005a).
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Peacebuilding - the golden opportunity for an EU-led involvement in BiH
While  the  EU  remained  largely  excluded  from  peace-enforcement  and  peacekeeping
operations in BiH, it  grasped the opportunity to engage in the post-conflict  peacebuilding
stage. After NATO and UN operations established conditions for security, the main European
powers began focusing on post-conflict reconstruction. To ensure the sustainability of security
and peace, it was cardinal to establish functioning political and state institutions and rebuild
the  infrastructure.  While  it  was  uncomplicated  to  reconstruct  the  infrastructure  with  EU
financial aid, establishing effective central state institutions and a political system that would
bring Bosniak, Serb and Croat leaders together seemed more difficult to achieve (Keil and
Perry  2015,  464).  The  EU  used  two  main  avenues  in  pursuing  peacebuilding  in  BiH.
According to Pohl, the international actors were ‘pushing’ for state- and nation-building by
means of the Bonn powers via the OHR, which in fact meant imposing ready-made solutions
on  BiH,  on  the  one  hand.  On  the  other  hand,  potential  membership  in  Euro-Atlantic
institutions was supposed to serve as a ‘pull’ factor for Bosnians to actively support state-
building and to inspire them for domestic reforms (Pohl 2014, 49). 
Nevertheless, the EU was not the only actor in peacebuilding in BiH. The EU had to
negotiate its position with the US which played the pivotal role in bringing the fighting to the
end and assuring the Dayton Agreement. The US also took the leading role in the immediate
post-agreement implementation phase; it held key positions and contributed with the largest
national contingent to IFOR/ SFOR troops. But, Europeans soon realised that they could not
rely on the US support forever (Gow 1997, 320; Pohl 2014, 49). EU countries also wanted the
leading role in the peacebuilding process in BiH. They successfully lobbied for the job of the
High Representative  to  go  to  a  European (Daalder  2000,  157).  From 2000 onwards,  the
oversight of the administration of post-conflict BiH transferred from the US to the EU. The
EU moved from its previously subordinate to leading role within the PIC. With the transfer of
powers  under  the  OHR to the  EU,  the  Union determined almost  every aspect  of  policy-
making in BiH (Chandler 2005a). Between 2002 and 2011, the HR was ‘double-hatted’ as
EUSR for  BiH. Lord  Ashdown became the  first  EUSR in  BiH while  also  assuming  the
position  of  the  High  Representative  in  2002. The  creation  of  Ashdown’s  ‘double-hatted’
position as both EU and PIC representative symbolised the transition to an EU’s ownership in
the post-conflict peacebuilding of BiH (Chandler 2005a; see also Council of the EU 2002a).84
The EU’s peacebuilding policy towards BiH has been driven by mixed motives – both
84 The “double hatting” between the EUSR and the OHR was discontinued in 2011, after the creation of the
EEAS when the post of the EUSR was fused with the head of the EU delegation. Yet, the post of the High
Representative has continued to be occupied by a representative from an EU state.
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self-centred and altruistic. The EU has a vested interest in the stability of BiH and the Western
Balkan, supported by the historical ties and moral obligations. The stability of the region has
direct security implications for the EU itself. Referring directly to the Balkan conflicts, the
ESS stated  that  neighbouring  countries  which  “are  engaged  in  violent  conflict  […]  pose
problems  for  Europe”  and  highlighted  the  need  for  building  a  “ring  of  well-governed
countries to the East of the European Union” (Council of the EU 2003c; 7-8). Failing states
after the breakup of Yugoslavia posed serious security concerns for the EU as they generated
the flow of refugees,  drug and weapons trafficking,  and a  potential  ground for  terrorism.
These concerns have guided the EU’s involvement in peacemaking and peacebuilding in BiH
as to promote the security of the EU (Merlingen 2013, 146). Moreover, by building a viable
Bosnian state, EU governments attempted to compensate for their appearance as incompetent
to  deal  with  a  crisis  on  their  doorstep  (Pohl  2014,  49).  The  EU wanted  to  improve  its
reputation  and  credibility  as  a  security  actor  in  BiH as  well  as  its  international  identity
(Merlingen 2013, 146-7). Last but not least, the EU’s actions in BiH have been driven by the
EU’s solidarity with the Balkans - with the victims of genocide and refugees - and moral
commitment to the promotion of European norms, including peace and the rule of law (Ibid.). 
These  mixed motives  are  reflected  in  the  CSDP actions  in  BiH which  formed an
important element of the transition towards the EU’s ownership in BiH. Scholars have argued
that  the  previously unsatisfactory EU involvement  and the  failure  of  European battalions
under the UN operation provided the main reason for the CSDP engagement (Pohl 2014;
Mühlmann  2008).  This  motive  also  became  part  of  the  EU’s  branding  strategy,  with  an
objective “to show to EU publics and the world that the EU has finally got its act together and
that, therefore, it has to be taken seriously as an international security provider” (Merlingen
2013, 147). By launching a CSDP mission in BiH, the EU sought to establish itself  as a
credible security actor, to improve the EU’s damaged self-image and to prove that its foreign
policy is as ethical as effective (ICG 2004, 1; Emerson and Gross 2007b, 146; Pohl 2014, 65).
The EU missions in the Balkans were equally a rational response to security threats that the
EU perceived in the destabilised Western Balkans,  motivated by the objective to promote
security of the EU citizens  (Merlingen 2013, 146).  According to Pohl, the US intention to
withdraw from BiH, was another reason, in addition to the growing ambitions of the EU, for
Bosnia to appear on the agenda of the CSDP. The Iraq invasion led the US to shift its focus,
troops and resources away from the Balkans (Pohl 2014, 49, 65).85 
85 The US was not enthusiastic about an EU operation in BiH initially since the EU plan was not pre-agreed and
since the EU did not want to run its mission through NATO. This ambiguity was also related to the US fears
that  CSDP represented a French plot  to  organise European resistance to the US leadership in European
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The Balkans  offered  a  prime opportunity to  make the  CSDP operational.  Such an
involvement was seen by the European powers as doable due to 
“a  relatively  stable  security  environment,  geographic  proximity,  extensive
knowledge  of  and  (military)  experience  in  the  region,  and  therefore  less
uncertainty with respect to potential risks. Since NATO was present in [the]
theatre,  time  horizons  for  planning  could  moreover  be  generous  when
compared to true crisis management” (Pohl 2014, 67).
The EU entered the theatre of BiH in the post-conflict phase at a point when the security
situation was already stable and benign and the peacebuilding process initiated. The timing of
the CSDP involvement in the crisis in BiH reflects the EU’s limited capability in international
conflict management. This capability applies to all the three aspects of Hill’s capabilities of a
foreign policy actors. Before the end of the Bosian war, the EU was unable to agree on a
common military action, which seemed necessary; it lacked instruments such as the CSDP;
and it was not willing to provide resources. It indeed agreed on some measures, in particular
diplomatic actions and sanctions; however, none of these were effective against  Miloševič’s
regime. Once the  situation  became relatively stable,  the  EU was  capable  of  agreeing  on
stabilisation and peacebuilding operations, possessing a policy for this purpose (i.e. CSDP)
and providing required resources. 
The CSDP military operation and civilian mission launched in BiH have been the
avenues for the delivery of internationally administered peacebuilding in the country. They
have focused on military and police aspects of peacebuilding – two elements of peacebuilding
in  addition  to  political,  economic  and judicial  sectors  which  the  international  community
identified as priorities in the Dayton Agreement. The establishment of peace, security and rule
of law in BiH required the creation of functioning state institutions, especially the judiciary,
police and military sectors. Reforms of the military and police sectors were needed since both
military and police forces had acted as repressive instruments of ethnic warfare during the war
(Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006, 57).
These  elements  have  also  been  identified  by  international  peacebuilders  as
fundamental cornerstones of post-conflict reconstruction to avoid the cases of failed states.
BiH has become the paradigmatic example of a post-Cold War state-building that required not
a reconstruction but building of new state institutions, a new state, from scratch. BiH has
security affairs (Pohl 2014, 51). Indeed, France was keen to use BiH to demonstrate the EU’s independent
actorness and to show the EU’s brand-new ESDP (Howorth 2014; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006, 60). Yet,
Pohl found little evidence for the assumption that the EU’s decision to launch its own operation was intended
to balance the US. Germans and British saw a CSDP action in BiH as a chance to help the US rather than to
push the US out (Pohl 2014, 51, 70).
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become a laboratory for international state-builders, notably the EU, seeking to establish state
structures capable of managing ethnic relations and democratic governance. It has provided a
testing ground for the EU to apply its new CSDP and to test the strength of the transformative
promise of EU membership (Keil and Perry 2015, 463). These actions have followed the logic
of the peacebuilding model that focuses on building functioning state institutions. 
By  2003,  when  the  EU  launched  its  CSDP,  significant  progress  not  only  in
peacekeeping  but  also  in  peacebuilding  has  been  achieved.  Keeping  peace  between  the
conflict  parties  was  no  longer  the  main  task.  Instead,  new  security  issues,  particularly
criminality, youth crime and corruption, were the main problems (Solana 2002). The state of
BiH was corrupt, unable to run its matters on its own – its institutional incapacity was a major
obstacle to peace, fostering economic and social instability, which make a return to an open
conflict more likely (Edwards and Tošić 2008, 209). While the EU has engaged, in essence, in
all  the spheres  of state-building in  BiH, including the constitutional,  judiciary,  social  and
economic reforms, the CSDP has focused on the SSR, in particular the police and military
reform. The two CSDP actions have been part of a comprehensive peacebuilding package that
the EU has delivered in BiH. 
EUPM: Civilian peacebuilding through a police reform
The EU’s autonomous approach to peacebuilding within the CSDP is best demonstrated on
the example of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in BiH, the first ever CSDP
mission. The EUPM replaced the previous UN IPTF. The idea of the EU taking over the UN
mission took shape in 2001. The EUPM was established in March 2002 (Council of the EU
2002b).86 The mission was launched in January 2003 and terminated in June 2012. Since the
European Commission Delegation and the EUMM were already present in BiH, the planners
of the mission could rely on their  advice.  Yet,  it  took almost  nine months  to launch this
mission. The problem was with member states’ hesitation and slow pace in providing required
personnel  and  equipment  and  civilian  experts.  The  EU  planners  lacked  expertise  and
experience  with  planning  such  a  mission,  which  required  the  development  of  new
procurement and programme policies (interview 3; Mühlmann 2008). The prolonged planning
of  this  mission  reflects  that  the  CSDP  was  not  the  most  suitable  instrument  for  the
management  of  an  open  conflict  or  an  immediate  post-conflict  stabilisation.  Protracted
86 The mission was established after the PIC accepted the offer by the EU, after BiH invited the EU to launch
its own mission, and after the UNSC welcomed the PIC decision to transfer the responsibility over police
reform to the EU (UN Security Council 2002).
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planning is better suited to post-conflict peacebuilding tasks. 
It  was  the  police aspect  which made this  mission a  tool  of  the  EU’s  autonomous
peacebuilding approach. The EUPM was not only new as a first CSDP mission but also still a
novelty as an exclusively police mission with training and advisory functions. Stand-alone
police missions were rare in international peacekeeping and peacebuilding before the launch
of the CSDP.87 Traditionally, the mandate of police components was limited to monitoring and
reporting. Only since the late 1990s, have advisory, mentoring and training functions been
added. The EUPM included not only police but also other civilian personnel, which reflects a
strong peacebuilding dimension of  this  mission  and the  fact  that  such a  deployment  was
possible due to stable and secure conditions. The focus on the police sector in the EUPM
corresponded to the ideas of the UN Brahimi reform process which emphasised the inclusion
of civilian components, including police, in peace missions. 
Nevertheless, compared to a 2,000-personnel strong IPTF, the EUPM was a mission
with a moderate personnel strength.88 Also, this exclusive focus on police was not fully in
harmony with the UN concept  of multidimensional  and integrated missions.  The UN had
advised the EU about the importance of linking police with the rule of law sector, in particular
prosecutor  services,  investigative  judges,  judiciary  and  prison  administration.  The  EU
excluded these areas since the rule of law sector and other peacebuilding activities were the
responsibility of the OHR. Further, the CSDP was established to focus exclusively on four
priority areas of civilian crisis management at that time. In addition, an integrated mission
would have been too demanding for the start of the CSDP (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006,
61). With the newly established CSDP, the EU had a full autonomy in launching its own
mission and according to its own vision.
The mandate of the EUPM corresponded to the logic of liberal peacebuilding focused
on building functioning state institutions capable of exercising the rule of law and internal
security tasks. The mission was tasked with establishing sustainable, professional and multi-
ethnic policing arrangements,  which was one of the objectives  of the Dayton Agreement.
Unlike the IPTF, however, it lacked executive powers of law enforcement. The first mandate
of  the  mission  concentrated  on  the  institution-  and  capacity-building,  mainly  through
mentoring  police  forces  on  best  practices,  monitoring  and  inspecting  their  conduct,  and
87 Although police officers have been deployed in UN peace operations since the 1960s, policing became an
integral part of UN peacekeeping only with the adoption of the Brahimi reform. The first formed police unit
was deployed to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in 1999. 
88 The initial strength of the EUPM was 478 international policemen and 296 national staff. At its peak, it had
556 police officers and 333 national staff. At the time of its closure, the mission had 34 international staff and
47 national staff. The common budget of the mission was over € 32 million (EEAS 2012). 
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providing them with strategic and policy advice (Council of the EU 2002b). The aim of the
mission  was  to  create  a  modern  police  force  “trained,  equipped  and  able  to  assume full
responsibility  and  to  independently  uphold  law enforcement  at  the  level  of  international
standards (EEAS 2012, 1). The mission equipped police officers with competencies and skills
to high professional and EU standards. It enhanced the effectiveness and accountability of
police forces. It modernised the sector, including the technical, logistical and IT aspects. It
developed policies, guidelines, a new educational system and teaching curricula for police
training, and other elements required for a modern police. It restructured the country’s police
and criminal investigation sector (Merlingen 2009; 2013; Mühlmann 2008). 
The  mandate  intermittently  extended  into  tasks  of  fighting  organised  crime,
corruption, misconduct and political interference in policing matters. It sought to develop the
financial viability, operational capacity and accountability of the police; the capacity of the
police and the criminal justice system in the fight against organised crime and corruption; a
link between the police and prosecutor sectors; and the criminal investigative capacities of
BiH (Council of the EU 2005c; 2007b; 2009b; 2010b). After the war, police forces in BiH had
remained under the influence of politicians who saw the police as a partisan instrument of
power projection. The law enforcement agencies of RS were reluctant to cooperate with the
ICTY with regard to war criminals.  A dysfunctional organisational  culture,  ethno-political
interference and the absence of unified policing governance created a ground for organised
crime. The country became the main route and base for drug, human and arms trafficking
(Mühlmann 2008, 45). 
The mission also touched upon the issues of fourth-generation peacebuilding (see p.
24 of this thesis); it addressed the problem of ethnic and political division while having the
task to build a centralised and consolidated police system (Council of the EU 2009b). With
the  construction of  the  two-entities  system by Dayton,  policing  arrangements  became the
competency of each entity, resulting into an ethnically divided and fragmented police sector.
While  RS  had  one  centralised,  regionally  subdivided  police  body,  the  fragmented  FBiH
established eleven independent  police agencies  and the Brčko District  had its  own police
force. The federal level had only two police units – judicial and financial police. These 15 law
enforcement  agencies  were  different  in  size  and  operated  under  different  rules  and
management models (Mühlmann 2008, 44-45). The creation of a countrywide unified system
with common standards and procedures,  which required fundamental reforms, became the
central task of the EUPM. The mission sought to achieve coherence and cooperation among
the 15 police agencies as well  as between law enforcement agencies and the judiciary.  It
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aimed at creating joint strategic and operational capacity of the police system. 
The  state-centred  peacebuilding  nature  of  the  EUPM  is  noticeable  in  the  task  of
building state-level institutions. The EUPM continued with the transformation of the SIPA
into the State Investigation and Protection Agency and the formation of the SBS, which were
initiated  by the  IPTF.  The mission  also  contributed  to  the  introduction  of  a  new unified
legislation, the programming of the policy-making and executive work, the enhancement of
the  competencies  and  expertise  of  the  staff,  and  the  consolidation  of  inter-institutional
relations.  The  mission  advised  and  supported  the  Ministry  of  Security  and  the  Bosnian
Interpol  office,  including  in  the  drafting  of  new  laws  (Mühlmann  2008,  50).  From this
perspective, the mission was significantly involved in state-building and state administration
despite the fact that it did not have executive mandate. The provisions of the SAP, especially
the conditionality of funding, allowed the EUPM to influence the legislative and executive
parts of the establishment of central state institutions. 
To  implement  the  objectives  of  the  mandate,  the  EUPM  identified  four  strategic
priority areas: institution- and capacity-building; combating organised crime and corruption;
developing  financial  viability  and  sustainability;  and  building  police  independence  and
accountability. Based on these priority areas, the mission developed seven reform capacity-
building  programmes  divided  into  about  120  projects.  These  programmes  included:  the
development of the SIPA and the SBS; modernisation and strengthening of the capacity of the
crime police; police education; internal affairs;  police administration; criminal justice;  and
public order policing (For details on different programmes and projects, see Merlingen 2013;
Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006; Mühlmann 2008, 48-49). 
What was important was that the objectives of the EUPM had a strong EU-dimension.
The mission did not only aim at building a functioning police system but, more precisely,
establishing  policing  arrangements  compatible  with  the  European  practice.  The  mission
supported  not  only  the  implementation  of  the  Dayton  Agreement  but  also  reform  and
institution-building  activities  under  the  EU’s Community  Assistance  for  Reconstruction,
Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) regulations89 and the Stabilisation and Association
Agreement (SAA). Projects were designed according to the standards and best practices of the
EU. However, due to the absence of guidelines for European best practices, the standards
were those derived from national practices and the personal experience of mission staff in
addition to the requirements of the Commission as outlined in the SAA (Mühlmann 2008, 49).
The EU-dimension meant an intensified focus on reforms, essentially the creation of new
89 CARDS was the EU’s main instrument of financial assistance to the Western Balkans; it was replaced by the
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) in 2007 (European Commission 2006b; EUR-Lex 2007).
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structures and the adoption of new laws in the area of the rule of law and the internal security
according to the EU system. The police reform became a requirement of the SAA. It was
supported by the OHR who established the Police Restructuring Commission (PRC) tasked
with devising a plan for creating a coherent police sector.90 In the reform package, the EU
proposed the creation of units that would cross entity boundaries. This proposal was initially
opposed by BiH, especially the leaders of RS who sought to maintain the control over their
own police arrangements. Under the pressure of the conditionality-driven SAA, the parties in
BiH consented  in  the  end  to  the  proposed  changes  (Edwards  and  Tošić 2008,  215-216).
Although the EUPM was sidelined by the OHR in the PRC and failed to mobilise the right
expertise for this task, it still played a key role in facilitating the reform. It contributed to the
deliberation of the PRC through EUPM staff serving in the PRC Secretariat in the areas of
technical support, legal advice and liaison with police unions (Mühlmann 2008, 52). 
The mission was an example of a coordinated approach. It worked closely with the
Commission, which funded many of its 120 projects, while being directed by the Council
(Merlingen 2013, 148). The Head of Mission reported to the Union’s SG/HR through the
EUSR/OHR. This arrangement allowed for a ‘unified chain of command’ on the part of the
EU, making the EU action comprehensive and coordinated (Council of the EU 2002b; 2005c).
This approach enabled the EU to be perceived as a united actor. The coordination was not
always perfect. At times, the EUPM struggled with being accepted by the staff of the OHR
and  with  avoiding  duplication  of  competing  projects  by  other  actors,  including  the  EU
military operation (Mühlmann 2008, 53, 57). Nevertheless, the unified chain of command
contributed  to  an  efficient  delivery  of  actions  in  cooperation  with  other  peacebuilding
instruments of the EU. The mission was not perceived as a separate actor but as a central
element of the EU’s foreign policy towards BiH. This approach enhanced the coordination
among the EU member states which acted in a very unified way (interview 18). It reflected
the new policy by the UN which introduced integrated peace missions with a joint chain of
command. However, this way of coordination inaugurated by the EUPM did not become a
rule.  For  instance,  the  EU  actions  in  Mali  lack  a  unified  chain  of  command,  giving  an
impression of multiple EU actors competing for attention.  
Local  ownership  was  a  crucial  element  of  the  EUPM.  Projects  were  designed  in
consultation  with  local  police  officers.  The  mission  established  steering  boards  which
provided an opportunity for local police officers to discuss the reform programmes. Although
the mission’s headquarters was in Sarajevo, the mission also had regional offices in Banja
90 The  PRC consisted of EU and BiH political representatives and police chiefs, and the head of the EUPM
(Mühlmann 2008, 52).
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Luka,  Mostar  and  Tuzla.  Mission  staff  were  co-located  with  their  local  counterparts  and
respective agencies across the country (EEAS 2012). The deployment across the country to
local areas showed the EU’s domination in the process and its determination to reform the
police throughout the entire country. This approach was crucial for ensuring local ownership
and the  inclusion  of  local  actors  in  the  process.  This  approach  is  different  from civilian
missions in Mali, Niger, Libya or Afghanistan where the deployment throughout the country
was  not  possible  due  to  security  and  logistical  reasons.  The  relatively  benign  security
conditions and the favourable logistical arrangements enabled the country-wide deployment
in BiH. An official noted that housing was available even in remote urban centres and the
supplies of required resources were manageable due to the existing infrastructure (interview
20). This approach demonstrated the limits of the EU’s civilian peacebuilding; the civilian
CSDP is more suitable for post-conflict peacebuilding activities in environments with a stable
security and a functioning infrastructure. 
This EUPM was an example of the EU’s peacebuilding action which demonstrated
both the EU’s normative commitment to international peacebuilding and the EU’s geopolitical
preferences. This mission reflected the ability of the EU member states to agree on a mission
and to provide resources  and personnel for its  realisation in  a post-conflict  peacebuilding
phase.  The  exclusively  police-oriented  focus  of  the  mission  corresponded  to  the  newly
evolving UN normative framework of peacebuilding (see chapter two). At the same time, the
autonomous  character  of  the  CSDP allowed  the  EU  to  design  and  operate  its  mission
according  to  its  own  procedures  and  preferences;  the  objective  was  to  build  not  only  a
functioning police sector but one that would be consistent with the EU standards. The EUPM
therefore enhanced the prospects for an EU’s autonomous approach to peacebuilding within
the CSDP.
EUFOR Althea: Transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding
The European Union Force (EUFOR) Althea is the second CSDP action in BiH which reveals
the operational dynamics of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding through the CSDP. Launched
in December 2004 and continuing until  today,  this  military operation deployed in a post-
conflict  mode  has  demonstrated  both  the  EU’s  autonomous  capacity  for  carrying  out
stabilisation and peacebuilding tasks  with the use of  a military instrument  as  well  as the
constraints of the CSDP. The idea to deploy a military operation in BiH was driven by a mix
of overlapping preferences of the EU which are similar to the motives of the overall EU’s
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engagement in BiH (see above). Domestic and international pressure had crucial impact on
the decision. Having faced accusations of the failure to prevent the crisis in Srebrenica, the
EU had considerable incentives to build instruments for collective crisis management. Pohl
inferred that, through military action, the EU was keen to demonstrate its responsibility for
security  in  its  own  backyard  and  its  credibility  as  an  international  security  provider
independent from the UN and NATO, including the US. At the same time, Washington wanted
the EU to take over responsibility in Bosnia since it became overstretched with its military
engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Promoting liberal values by pulling the country into the
“community  of  liberal  states”  was  another  reason  (Pohl  2014,  70-71).  Similarly,  Juncos
asserted that the EU wanted to test its newly established crisis management capabilities, and
this  in  a  relatively  secure  environment.  These  efforts  were  linked  to  the  EU’s  desire  to
strengthen its global role. The decision to launch a military operation was also driven by a
shared responsibility towards the future of Bosnia, with the prospect of EU membership. After
the  European  fiasco  in  UNPROFOR,  Althea  epitomised  the  EU’s  desire  to  rebuild  its
credibility in the region and in the world. Juncos concluded that the deployment of Althea was
justified by the pursuit of collective rather than national interests (Juncos 2011, 96).
EU member states had different reasons for the involvement in Bosnia.  There was
disagreement between the European capitals over the modes of post-conflict activities even
after the end of the war (Malcom 2002, 246; Gow 1997, 166-174). Germany’s and Italy’s
initial  enthusiasm can be explained by geographic proximity and history.  France  was not
enthusiastic, but it remained engaged because it knew that Bosnia was the place where the
CSDP could not be allowed to fail (Pohl 2014, 59). The operation was launched almost nine
years after the end of the war. Similarly as in the case of the EUPM, Althea was deployed
once the conditions on the ground were secured. Informal interviews with officers who were
deployed in the operation in its first years confirm that the situation was viewed as stable and
peaceful.  There was little probability of the recurrence of violence. Officers admitted that
already at the end of the NATO mission, it was evident that criminality rather than inter-ethnic
tensions were the main security concern. After their deployment, EU soldiers did not have to
keep the war parties apart,  but had to fight criminal networks.  Also,  the local conditions,
including the lodging, technical arrangements and a relatively good infrastructure, which the
military troops enjoyed, were far from difficult. Many officials were housed in rented houses
rather than in military barracks, which is typical for military operations (informal interviews
F; G). The secure and stable environment was an important reason for the EU’s decision to
launch Althea with which the EU was assured it could avoid a failure. 
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The  planning  of  the  operation  started  immediately  after  the  2002  Copenhagen
European Council  indicated its  willingness  to  deploy a  military operation in  Bosnia.  The
Council  invited  the  SG/HR  to  convene  consultations  with  Bosnian  authorities,  the
OHR/EUSR, NATO and the  UN (Council  of  the  EU 2003f,  8).  The two years  period  of
planning was caused mainly due to the disagreement between France and Britain with regard
to EU-NATO arrangements in the mission and the need to satisfy the US demands (Juncos
2011,  96;  Meyer  2006,  135).  To  soothe  US  concerns  about  European  autonomy,  it  was
understood  that  the  EU  mission  would  rely  on  NATO  command,  capabilities  and  assets
through the Berlin Plus framework.91 Since Washington saw the Berlin Plus framework as
insufficient, an agreement was reached allowing NATO to maintain a small headquarters with
around 200 staff (Pohl 2014, 55).92
The planning of the EU operation was also hampered by internal EU issues. Member
states disagreed on the role of the MSU, the EU-staffed paramilitary police unit of SFOR,
after the closure of the NATO Operation. In particular, the Nordic countries, Spain and France
considered transferring the MSU to the EUPM as a logical step as, after nine years after the
war, the main emphasis had shifted to the building of civil institutions. However, other states,
such as Italy, were keen to pursue policing under the command of the military operation for
purely pragmatic reasons; they already deployed their officers to the MSU under SFOR. They
succeeded in retaining the MSU under the military command as other states agreed on the
integration of the MSU into the EU military operation (Bertin 2008, 63-4; Juncos 2011, 92).
Shortly before  the handover,  the MSU was transformed into  an Integrated Police Unit,  a
paramilitary police contingent with similar tasks to those of the MSU (NATO 2004b). The
unit then gradually integrated into EUFOR Althea.  
Despite the autonomous character of the CSDP, the UNSC has been another actor key
to both the launch and the mandate of Althea. The operation was launched and has operated
under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter.93 This means that the operation has to be authorised
91 The EU has later argued that the Berlin Plus framework applies only to military questions that are directly
related to the EU’s use of NATO’s assets, such as operations conducted through NATO’s headquarters (Pohl
2014, 52-53). The EU heads of state and government declared that “the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements and the
implementation thereof will  apply only to those EU member states which are either  NATO members or
parties to the ‘Partnership for Peace’, and which have consequently concluded bilateral security arrangements
with NATO” (Council of the EU 2003f, 13).
92 NATO  HQ  Sarajevo  has  contributed  to  peacebuilding  efforts  while  working  in  close  cooperation  with
EUFOR Althea. It has supported defence reform, counter-terrorism, intelligence gathering and the detention
of persons indicted for war crimes. The defence reform has aimed at creating a  single defence sector and
military force in BiH. It has assisted in building transparent and ethnically inclusive Armed Forces of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (AFBiH) and in ensuring their democratic and civilian surveillance. The defence reform has
been seen not only as a key element of national security but also as a pre-requisite for the integration of the
country into the EU and NATO (NATO Headquarters Sarajevo; Defence Reform Commission 2005). 
93 EUFOR was authorised by UNSC Resolution 1575 (2004) on 22 November 2004 as a legal successor of
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by the UNSC. This provision has remained in place as the operation has continued to be
mandated with the maintenance of a safe and secure environment for which the use of force is
possible, although it has not been activated in recent years. The operation maintains this status
despite  the  fact  that  it  has  been  reconfigured  four  times,  safe  environment  has  been
established, and the military tasks shifted from peacekeeping to post-conflict institution- and
capacity-building (EEAS 2016e). The UNSC welcomed the EU’s intention to deploy its own
mission, including a military component, in BiH (UN Security 2004b). After the Council of
the  EU adopted  a  Joint  Action  establishing  a  military operation  in  BiH under  the  name
‘ALTHEA’ in June 2004 (Council of the EU 2004e), the UNSC authorised the operation in
November (UN Security Council 2004a). 
The technical planning of the deployment was very smooth as EU military planners
benefited  from NATO’s experience,  assets  and capabilities  already present  on the ground
(Merlingen 2013, 149). The handover from SFOR took place then on 4 December 2004 with
an  aim  of  re-orienting  the  country  from ‘the  road  to  Dayton’ to  ‘the  road  to  Brussels’
(Chandler  2005a;  Pohl  2014,  56-57).  This  change  of  the  scope  from  peacekeeping  to
peacebuilding had already been formulated by NATO Secretary General in 2002 as he noted
that  the presence of  SFOR “has  helped create  the  necessary pre-conditions  for  important
nation-building  activities”  (NATO  2002),  which  stands  here  for  peacebuilding.  In  other
words, he argued that SFOR accomplished its peacekeeping tasks, therefore creating the room
for peacebuilding activities. After the flags were swapped, the operation’s structure and force
composition remained largely the same as before. EUFOR Althea replaced SFOR and was
modelled on it, relying initially on NATO assets, technical support and headquarters. It also
had the similar operational design and tasks (Juncos 2011). The US was the only significant
contributor that left the operation.94 Nevertheless, from the onset, the EU member states were
determined  to  make  their  own  operation  different  from that  of  NATO.  The  autonomous
character of the CSDP, including in the decision-making, planning and command phases, has
allowed the EU to achieve this distinctiveness. General David Leakey, the Commander of
EUFOR Althea,  played a  key role  in  carving out  an  EU distinct  profile  of  the operation
(Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2006, 57). EUFOR Althea has so far been the largest military
operation of the EU, initially deploying 7,000 troops. However, this number is significantly
small compared to the initial strength of SFOR, demonstrating that the major peacekeeping
SFOR. UNSC Resolution 2315 (2016c) is the latest resolution that renewed the authorisation for Althea.
94 Some 80 per cent of the 7,000 SFOR personnel from EU member states were taken directly over by Althea.
Canada, Turkey, Norway, Romania, Bulgaria and other EU countries (NATO members), and six other non-
NATO countries  stayed.  Of  NATO members,  only the US,  Iceland and Denmark have not  participated.
Cyprus and Malta have been the only EU member states which have not deployed in BiH (Pohl 2014, 58).
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tasks  have  been  accomplished.  The  shift  in  the  mandate  was  the  main  aspect  which
distinguished  EUFOR Althea  and  the  EU’s  approach  to  this  post-conflict  situation  from
NATO: the NATO operation carried out peacekeeping tasks, whereas the EU operation shifted
towards peacebuilding. 
Indeed, the EU operation acted initially as a peacekeeping operation. Modelled on the
mandate of SFOR, it was mandated to guarantee the compliance with the Dayton Agreement,
notably to contribute to the maintenance of a safe and secure environment and to provide
deterrence of possible spoilers of the agreement. The main tasks were to provide a strong
military presence, maintain security and implement the peace agreement. In particular, the
operation  engaged  in  the  collection  of  weapons,  the  disruption  of  underground  military
facilities,  the  management  of  weapons  storage  sites  and  airspace  (control  over  lower
airspace),  mine-clearance  and  the  control  of  military  movement.  EUFOR  continued  in
providing support to the ICTY in the search of persons indicted for war crimes, while leaving
the  responsibility  for  the  cooperation  with  the  ICTY to  the  BiH authorities.  In  addition,
Liaison and Observation Teams were located in hot spots providing an early-warning system
(Council  of the EU 2004e; EU Council  Secretariat 2009). Althea’s initial tasks were both
executive  and  non-executive,  though  essentially  non-military  in  their  nature.  The  only
executive  task  of  EUFOR  Althea  was  related  to  fighting  organised  crime  through  anti-
organised crime operations. In this task, Althea complemented the institution- and capacity-
building role of the EUPM. 
As the capitals realised that the work of the operation focused mainly on non-military
tasks,  they judged the security environment  as safe and stable.  As a result,  the operation
shifted from peacekeeping to peacebuilding tasks. The mandate of the operation expanded
from the maintenance of a safe and secure environment to providing support to the Ministry
of Defence and Armed Forces and capacity-building to the  AFBiH. The operation assisted
especially  with  the  national  defence  reform  which  established  an  ethnically  unified  and
democratically  accountable  defence  sector.  The  capacity-building  function  has  included
specialised  training  on  aspects  such  as  fight  against  terrorism,  medical  evacuation  and
weapons training.  Other functions involved prosecuting individuals accused of war crimes
and  resource  operations.  Similarly  as  the  EUPM,  EUFOR Althea  has  developed  a  local
approach; it established liaison observation teams, small groups of soldiers, which were co-
located to local communities with an aim of building relationships with locals (Juncos 2011;
Merlingen 2013, 149-150). 
The shift  from peacekeeping to  peacebuilding  is  especially noticeable  through the
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reconfiguration and reduction of the personnel in the operation. The EU downsized the force
to 1,600 in 2007 and to approximately 600 in 2012 (EEAS 2016e). This restructuring was
mostly due to unilateral decision to withdraw by the UK and later France and Finland based
on their view that the military tasks in Bosnia were completed. Peacekeeping tasks, for which
a robust force is needed, were accomplished. Instead, peacebuilding tasks became the priority.
Domestic interests of EU member states also played a role – the French defence minister
needed to prove that he was closing down something for “domestic consumption”, while the
UK was preoccupied in other countries for which it needed its forces (Pohl 2014, 60-62).  
The 2012 reconfiguration fully changed the focus of Althea to the capacity-building
and training of the AFBiH. Despite the fact that it retained its obligations to support the BiH
authorities in maintaining safety and security (UN Security Council 2012d), the aim shifted to
peacebuilding. According to Juncos, one of the reasons for the proliferation of the operation’s
activities into peacebuilding tasks was the fact that the establishment of a secure environment
made resources left available to expand activities to other domains, especially fighting illegal
activities, such as weapons smuggling, drug trafficking and illegal lodging. These activities
generated some criticism amongst EUPM and other EU officials; EUFOR activities in the
area of policing, such as closing borders, controlling cars and arresting people, conflicted with
the mandate of the EUPM (Juncos 2011, 94). 
The extension into peacebuilding tasks was driven not only by the needs on the ground
but also by the EU’s desire to make Althea different – from both NATO and the UN. As
Juncos commented, while the operation mimicked SFOR in terms of its tasks, the EU also
wished to make EUFOR ‘different’ by adding new tasks (Juncos 2011, 92). These activities
have followed the logic of peacebuilding focused on building liberal state institutions. Pohl
has  commented  that,  “whereas  the  installation  of  operation  Althea  did  not  follow  a
specifically liberal impetus, it formed part of a wider effort (albeit not one restricted to the
EU) that  can  be  characterised  as  liberal  and normatively inspired”  (Pohl  2014,  70).  The
inclusion of peacebuilding tasks into the mandate of the operation has increased prospects of a
successful establishment of sustainable peace and order in the country. 
Althea  has  been  influenced  by  the  complexity  arising  from  different  EU  actors
involved on the ground and different activities carried out. The Council Joint Action which
established  Althea  required  the  operation  “to  achieve  core  tasks  in  the  OHR’s  Mission
Implementation Plan and the SAP” (Council of the EU 2004e, Art. 1(1)). The Joint Action
also noted that “[t]his operation shall be part of the overall ESDP mission in BiH” (Ibid.).
From this perspective, the EU envisioned Althea as part of a unified EU approach. However,
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Annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement provides that the operation does not have to answer to the
OHR but only to its own chain of command. In the case of NATO operations, this was the
North Atlantic Council; in the case of the EU, it was the Council of the EU - Council of
Ministers. With this provision, Althea has been granted a considerable freedom of action. For
these reasons, Althea was less connected to other EU actors on the ground. This hampered the
cooperation with the EUPM and the EUSR with which Althea had to coordinate activities
related to the fight against  organised crime. The cooperation improved gradually with the
adoption of Common Operational Guidelines for both the EUPM and Althea (Bertin 2008).
Coordination between EUFOR and the EUPM in the area of the fight against the organised
crime became crucial. In theory, the mandates of the two missions did not clash. While the
mandate of the EUPM focused on long-term capacity-building of the police forces, Althea
involved short-term deterrence. The EUPM had a non-executive mandate – it only monitored,
mentored and inspected, whereas Althea had an executive mandate with enforcement tools
(Juncos 2011, 94).
The operation has also demonstrated the constraints of the CSDP decision-making. In
particular, Althea has become a source of disagreement among member states which have
different opinions on a possible closure of the operation. Germany, France and the UK have
regularly  called  for  an  end  of  the  operation  while  highlighting  that  operation’s  goals,
including stability, security and peace, have been achieved. The UK has sought to divert the
attention and resources of its European partners to conflicts in the Middle East and English-
speaking African countries. These calls intensified with the EU’s involvement in Mali where
France  and  Germany  have  taken  leading  roles  in  terms  of  personnel  and  resources
contributions.  They have  argued  that  Althea  has  been  going  for  too  long,  whereas  other
countries require the EU’s attention (interviews 31 and 41). However, Eastern Europeans and
Austria have opposed the closure of Althea on the grounds that the country is not yet able to
manage its security matters on its own. They fear that, although very unlikely, violence could
occur again if the EU withdrew its military presence (interviews 31, 32, 33 and 41). These are
indeed justified concerns as ethno-religious and political divisions remain and the country has
not  yet  achieved the full  level  of  societal  reconciliation  (Kmec and Ganiel  forthcoming).
Other European countries have also continued to perceive the political transition in Bosnia
towards Euro-Atlantic integration as risky. For instance, Greece has regarded the stability of
the Balkans as more important than deploying to Afghanistan (Pohl 2014, 63).
In  addition  to  these  reasons,  concerns  over  the  relocation  of  their  personnel  and
resources to missions and operations in Africa also play a decisive role in the hesitation by
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Eastern  Europeans  and  Austrians  to  close  the  operation.  These  countries  fear  that  when
leaving the Balkans, they could be asked to contribute more to operations in Africa, most of
which are French-dominated (interviews 27, 31, 33 and 41). Eastern Europeans and Austrians
have remained the main troop contributing countries in Althea. Since 2009, the operations’
commanders have only been Austrians. The reasons of these countries are self-centred; they
see  BiH as  a  place  where  they  can  demonstrate  their  commitment  to  the  CSDP.  In  the
Balkans, they can deploy their troops in a stable, secure and familiar environment. In contrast,
deployments  in  Africa  or  the  Middle  East  are  characterised  by  high  security  risks  and
unfamiliar environments. Each year, when member states such as France and Germany seek
to  achieve the  closure  of  Althea,  they agree on the  extension of  the  operation,  to  please
Eastern Europeans and Austria, only after these members promise to provide their troops and
resources  to  other  missions,  particularly  in  Africa  (interview  31,  33).  This  disagreement
demonstrates  that  the  EU’s  approach  to  peacebuilding  is  driven  not  only  by  normative
considerations but also by member states’ preferences. In other words, CSDP peacebuilding
actions are not only results of a normative peacebuilding framework but also a part of EU
foreign policy which is characterised by a complex process of bargaining among member
states’ preferences.
These perspectives shed light on the EU’s capacity to agree on actions and to engage
militarily.  Not  all  EU member states  are  capable of  peace-enforcement  and peacekeeping
engagements in unstable environments. The existence of an operation is a subject of political
negotiation between the preferences of member states. In addition, Althea reflects the EU’s
capability  to  act  militarily  only  once  the  situation  is  stabilised  and  secure  conditions
established. In other words, it portrays the constraints of the EU’s military combat capability
through  the  CSDP.  Instead,  Althea  demonstrates  that  the  CSDP has  a  more  far-reaching
potential  to  contribute  to  the  establishment  of  positive  peace  through  its  post-conflict
peacekeeping  and  peacebuilding  tools,  especially  advisory  and  capacity-building  support.
Through  its  civilian  tasks,  Althea  has  kept  peace,  improved  public  security  and  built  a
professional and unified  AFBiH.  At the same time, this perspective does not diminish the
importance of combat operations in open conflicts to prevent fighting and mass killings, such
as those witnessed in Bosnia,  or peacekeeping operations with executive mandates in  the
immediate aftermath of a war to protect civilians. As this case has demonstrated, the EU has a
vital role as a military and peacekeeping actor in such scenarios, especially if these crises
unfold in the EU’s neighbourhood. As a result,  the EU needs to develop capabilities  and
provide resources for such engagements. 
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Peacebuilding through EU membership-building
The normative and foreign policy dimensions of the EU’s peacebuilding approach within the
two CSDP actions in BiH are best demonstrable through the EU membership perspective. The
EU missions in BiH have been carried out as part of a potential accession of the country to the
EU. BiH was offered the prospects of EU membership long before the deployment of the
CSDP actions. In 1997, the EU adopted the SAP - a regional approach to the Western Balkans,
which included BiH and which focused on economic and political aspects of the development
of the region.95 Through the SAP, the EU has offered Western Balkans countries a mixture of
trade concessions, economic and financial assistance and contractual relationships with a view
to preparing them for a potential accession to the EU. The European Council in Feira in 2000
brought about  the first  prospect of EU membership for these countries.  At its  meeting in
Thessaloniki in 2003, the Council officially confirmed the potential candidacy of BiH for EU
accession.  Since  2003,  the  European Council  has  regularly stated  that  “the  future  of  the
Western  Balkans  lies  in  the  European  Union”  (Council  of  the  EU 2003e,  11;  2003g,  1;
European Parliament 2011). The integration of new countries into the EU has been a powerful
foreign policy tool that has enabled the EU to extend its zone of peace across the European
continent. The prospect of a membership is seen as an instrument in promoting incentive for
reforms, thus contributing to the stabilisation and peacebuilding in the country. This provision
has been fundamental for the success of both CSDP mission which concentrated on reforms.
When presenting the decision to launch the first CSDP mission in BiH at the UNSC
meeting, Solana made a clear link between the CSDP and a potential EU membership. In
particular,  he stated that the EU “has provided BiH and the wider region the prospect of
eventual  integration  with  the  EU”  (Solana  2002,  2).  The  EU  membership  perspective,
coinciding with the launch of the CSDP, marked the transition from the Dayton process to an
EU-led process: “[w]hile the Dayton/Paris Accords were designed to guide the country away
from war, the prospect of an eventual Stabilisation and Association Agreement offers a clear
route towards a European future” (Ibid.).  The SAA between the EU and BiH, which sets
common  political  and  economic  objectives,  served  as  a  basis  for  the  accession  process.
However, negotiations on the SAA, which started in 2005, were held back by a disagreement
over  the  police  reform carried  out  by the  EUPM, in  particular  over  the  standards  being
transmitted and solutions proposed.96 While the EU insisted on the decentralisation of the
95 The SAP is  a  policy framework for  the EU’s relationships with Western Balkan countries,  in particular
Albania, BiH, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. It is linked to a membership perspective. Before
joining the EU, Croatia was also part  of the SAP. Through the SAP, the Western Balkan countries have
undertaken efforts to meet the political and economic requirements to be considered for EU membership. 
96 Before the opening of the negotiations, BiH had to fulfil 16 reform requirements set out by the European
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police sector away from the two entities of BiH by creating a centralised state-level ministry
responsible for the police sector, RS wished to keep its police forces under their own control. 
The SAA was initialled by BiH in December 2007 after the successful negotiations by
the High Representative for BiH, Miroslav Lajčák, who convinced the representatives of BiH
to  make a  commitment  to  implement  the police reform. Following the adoption  of  these
reforms, the SAA was signed in June 2008, following the adoption of the police reforms.
Further political, economic and constitutional reforms were promised by the so called Prud
Agreement, which was seen as a base for “the ability of the State to meet the requirements of
the EU integration process” (OHR / EUSR 2008). It took until 2011, with France, the last EU
state, to ratify the SAA. However, the SAA was then frozen because BiH did not comply with
its obligations and promises on reforms conditional to the Agreement. The SAA entered into
force finally in June 2015 after it had been approved by the Council of the EU in March. In
February 2016, BiH applied for EU membership. 
The  EU  membership  perspective  and  EU  funding,  based  on  compliance  and
conditionality, played a significant role in achieving the objectives of the two CSDP actions.
As  Edwards  and  Tošić  noted,  the  EU  used  persuasion  and  norm promotion  through  the
provision or denial of rewards on the one hand and conditionality and coercion on the other
hand as the main means of the EU’s post-conflict engagement in BiH (Edwards and  Tošić
2008).  EU  conditionality  has  replaced  international  trusteeship  in  BiH.  Conditionality,
assertively communicated by the ‘double-hatted’ OHR/EUSR, was linked to the perspective
of  EU  membership.  This  conditionality-driven  membership  perspective  has  led  to  the
adoption  of  major  political,  administrative  and economic  reforms  without  straightforward
international imposition (Recchia 2007). 
However, the interconnection of the accession-inspired process and the Dayton-driven
post-conflict  stabilisation  is  problematic.  According  to  Edwards  and  Tošić,  this
interconnection created confusion as it put significant demands on the part of the population
of BiH by requiring a double transition: a transition from communism to liberal market-based
democracy and a post-conflict stabilisation process which required a transition from conflict-
driven thinking to a peaceful coexistence within the state. The integration process guided by
the Copenhagen criteria necessitated the adoption of significant reforms, democratic norms,
liberal economy and the entire acquis communautaire, including an administrative capacity to
implement reforms and make domestic rules compatible with those of the EU. This heavy
load of demands faced the opposition of political elites and local population in BiH (Edwards
Commission’s Feasibility Study, which was part of the SAP, and which came after BiH completed 18 other
priority reform steps outlined in the Commission’s ‘Road Map’ (European Commission 2003c). 
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and Tošić 2008, 205). 
The  membership  dimension,  through  conditionality,  has  given  the  EU  significant
powers and leverage over the peacebuilding process. The OHR has often resorted to coercive
measures.  Through the OHR as well  as through the accession process,  the EU has had a
considerable bargaining power over BiH. The EU has acted as the dominant power and from a
position  of  influence  with  the  use  of  political  conditionality,  thus  hollowing-out  local
democratic  capacity and ownership (Chandler  2005a;  Edwards and  Tošić 2008).  But,  this
conditionality and pressure also faced local and national resistance: “the greater the pressures
for change, the more reluctance has been displayed in embracing it; that has then engendered
the  greater  need  for  enforcement  mechanisms,  which  in  turn  has  often  inhibited  policy
compliance and acceptance of the desired norms” (Edwards and Tošić 2008, 205). Edwards
and  Tošić have argued that this  reluctance on the part of the leaders in BiH to implement
legislation reflects the difficulty of continuous monitoring. They have claimed that “if the
process of non-compliance simply results in action by the OHR in order to keep processes
going, then the normative significance of the reforms begins to lose its impact and adaptation
becomes regarded with little more than indifference” (Ibid., 218-9). Coercive measures have
led to the rejection of ownership by local actors and thus to a dependency syndrome. Policies,
such as those on police reform, have been prescribed to be accepted by BiH, leaving no room
for the involvement of decision- and policymakers from BiH (Ibid., 206-8).
Scholars and practitioners agree that the emergence of the EU as the main international
peacebuilding actor in BiH since 2003 has led to significant changes in the country. Recchia
observed that the EU’s increased peacebuilding role in BiH, carried out especially through the
CSDP,  has  accelerated  progress  towards  making  Bosnia’s  common state  institutions  self-
sustaining and self-functioning (Recchia 2007). Similarly, Edwards and Tošić assert that the
EU has  brought  about  changes  in  the  values  and  standards  aimed at  building  peace  and
stability. The EU has attempted both to tackle the root causes of the conflict and to bring BiH
into line with the conditions required for EU membership. To achieve these objectives, the EU
used the means of persuasion and coercion. On the one hand, the imposition of the state-
building measures, which are necessary for functioning and democratic governance, in the
face of opposition from elected leaders, undermines the credibility of the EU in pursuing these
same values. There are limits to the powers of coercive “inappropriate” measures. On the
other  hand,  it  remains  improbable  whether  corruption  and  criminality  would  have  been
combated in the interests of adapting to the Copenhagen criteria and future EU membership in
the absence of Bonn powers (Edwards and Tošić 2008, 219).  
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Despite the fact that peace has been established, a return to violence seems unrealistic
and the country is making efforts towards European integration, several systematic challenges
remain. According to Keil and Perry, while the country has undergone a number of critical
reforms under the international pressure, political elites often continue to exercise power over
the  state  for  their  own  individual,  financial  and  political  ambitions. BiH  “is  neither  a
functioning state nor a democratic one” (Keil  and Perry 2015, 464). Keil  and Perry have
argued that the dysfunctionality of the state of BiH is related to the conditionality aspects
linked  to  the  SAP and  the  EU  accession  process.  With  this  provisions,  the  democratic
promotion has been elusive. The EU has prioritised keeping and building liberal peace over
democracy-building. The country has limited competencies at national level since it hugely
depends on the will of the EU (Keil and Perry 2015). Also, Tocci has observed that Western
Balkans countries show certain level of scepticism towards the EU’s capability. Mistrust is
also linked to the perceptions of the EU’s incapability largely due to EU’s legacy of passivity
during the unfolding Balkan tragedy in the 1990s and its ‘Balkan fatigue’ since the 2004
enlargement (Tocci 2007, 163). A previous High Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling
was doubtful about Brussels’ ability to transform Bosnia into a democratic constitutional state
in the near future (Flottau 2006). His successor Lajčák, who was supposed to be the last High
Representative, stated that BiH did not meet the conditions and objectives for the transition,
which meant that the OHR continued with its mandate (Delegation of the EU to BiH 2008).
Nevertheless, Edwards  and  Tošić  remind  us  that  any  success  of  international
institutions in peacebuilding is dependent not only on the ability of international institutions
themselves, the EU in this case, to bring about a change in the values and norms. The local
circumstances and the will of people and politicians of the target state are equally important.
It matters whether the state “is failing, frail, rogue-ish, or post-conflict – and the obduracy or
responsiveness of its authorities, the strength and capacities of its domestic institutions, its
economy, its geo-strategic positions and its conceptions of itself” (Edwards and Tošić 2008,
202). Making  the  peacebuilding  activities  workable  requires  a  constructive  cooperation
between the three Bosnian factions and a development of more democratic arrangements at
the national level which would move away from the situation where every policy area is
divided between the representatives of each ethnic group. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has provided insights into the operational dynamics of peacebuilding carried out
within two CSDP actions in BiH. The case of BiH offered the EU with a first operational
experience under  the CSDP. The EU used both civilian and military instruments of crisis
management in BiH. These two deployments demonstrated that the EU was serious about its
responsibility for building peace in its neighbourhood and about its commitment to play a
greater role in the maintenance of international peace and security. At the same time, negative
peace had already been established, in terms of both the absence of direct violence and the
threat of violence. The potential for violence was in terms of a police action but not a military
one. The two CSDP actions were launched in the post-conflict phase when the situation was
stabilised and secure. Yet, positive peace had to be built. 
The two EU missions in BiH have focused on building positive peace by engaging in
peacebuilding tasks. The  EUPM sought to establish democratic, centralised and sustainable
policing arrangements in BiH. It developed a joint strategic and operational capacity of law
enforcement agencies. Although continuing to be mandated with peacekeeping tasks, EUFOR
Althea has engaged primarily in peacebuilding activities, in particular the capacity-building of
the AFBiH.  These  tasks  proved not  easy to  convene,  however.  The EUPM had indeed  a
harmonised decision- and policy-making process. Member states were able to agree on the
objectives of the mission and provide required resources and personnel. Linking the chain of
command to the EUSR who, at the same time, was the High Representative for BiH allowed
for a thoroughly comprehensive approach. Yet, this process took longer than initially expected
and was only successful due to the EU’s commitment and a unified coordination with other
EU actors on the ground. In contrast, Althea has been accompanied by a number of struggles,
in particular the disagreement over the modes, content and duration of the operation. The
special  relationship  with  NATO  and  the  requirement  of  UNSC  approval  have  made  the
operation more complex. The cooperation with the EUSR/ EU Delegation and the EUPM was
also not smooth. Althea, as the largest and longest ongoing operation, has been perhaps the
most strategic CSDP action in terms of the EU’s commitment to peacebuilding. 
The two cases of CSDP actions in BiH present the EU’s approach to peacebuilding as
a result of both foreign policy-making shaped by member states’ preferences and international
standards of state-centred peacebuilding.  Although both CSDP actions have been seen as a
demonstration of the EU’s common action and political will, member states have maintained
different positions over the political and operational objectives of the missions. Seeking to
reconcile  European  and  US  positions,  the  UK  took  the  leading  role  in  the  post-conflict
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rebuilding in BiH in the initial phase. Germany and France saw the CSDP actions in BiH as
an opportunity to enhance the EU’s credibility. In later years, Eastern Europeans and Austria
have assumed the leadership in BiH while supporting the prolongation of Althea in order to
avoid the deployment of their troops in more insecure regions. 
The EU’s engagement in BiH through the CSDP therefore confirms the argument that
the EU’s CSDP is better suited for post-conflict peacebuilding rather than actions aimed at the
management of an open conflict that require prompt reaction. CSDP actions are also better
suited to deliver peacebuilding tasks due to a prolonged planning of the mission/operation and
the lack of personnel at the immediate disposal for the CSDP. NATO and the UN were better
equipped to deliver peace-enforcement and peacekeeping tasks in BiH. Protracted planning,
such as that found in both CSDP actions in BiH, is better suited to post-conflict peacebuilding
tasks. Nevertheless, Bosnia is, at the same time, a reminder that the EU needs to develop an
autonomous capacity for engagements in  open conflicts  and all  other  stages  of a conflict
cycle, which may also necessitate a military deployment. 
The case of BiH emphasises the importance of strategic, long-term and comprehensive
approach to make peacebuilding within CSDP missions and operations successful. BiH has
been on the priority list  of strategic  interests  of  the EU and EU member states.  The EU
pursued its actions in BiH with both altruistic and self-centred motives. The duration periods
of  the EUPM (nine and half  years) and EUFOR Althea (over  13 years)  demonstrate  that
peacebuilding  is  a  long-term  enterprise  and  that  the  CSDP  actions  with  peacebuilding
objectives  are  long-term  rather  than  short-term  instruments.  The  short-term  time-frame
envisioned for both CSDP actions in BiH was underestimated.  The variety of tools that the
EU has used to build peace in this country highlights the character of the EU’s peacebuilding
approach within the CSDP. The comprehensive approach that the EU has pursued in BiH has
contributed to successful achievements in both missions. This approach shows how important
the  EU-dimension  has  been  in  this  process;  peacebuilding  through  membership  has
encouraged important reforms. Peacebuilding, when interlinked with the membership process,
takes a different character – it seeks to construct a system that complies with the EU state
model. Nevertheless, BiH is an example of a dominant EU’s intervention in which most of the
peacebuilding policies have been directed by the EU rather than decided by the local national
actors. BiH has no self-sustaining political authority, since the OHR is the supreme legislative
and executive power. While this intervention was crucial in preventing direct violence, it has
struggled with building societal peace and national ownership.
Finally, the dimension of EU membership in the two CSDP actions is also linked to the
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EU’s overall approach to the Western Balkans. The success of peacebuilding projects in BiH
was crucial not only for BiH and the EU themselves but also for the stability and peace in the
region.  Peacebuilding  in  BiH  has  been  part  of  peacebuilding  efforts  in  Kosovo  and
Macedonia.  Despite  its  limitations  and  more  progress  to  be  done,  the  EU’s  approach  to
peacebuilding within the CSDP actions in BiH has been successful in achieving the creation
of stable and functioning institutions of the state, in particular the police and military sectors.
Due  to  the  EU-membership  dimension,  the  EU’s  peacebuilding  approach used  in  BiH is
different from that in countries, such as Mali, which are not prospective EU members.
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6  Peacebuilding through CSDP Actions in Mali
As Mali emerged from a series of conflicts and terrorist occupation, the EU’s intervention
epitomised the dilemmas of an external actor in international stabilisation and peacebuilding
efforts.  The EU’s decision to deploy CSDP instruments to carry out peacebuilding tasks in
Mali  was  influenced  not  only  by  a  normative  commitment  but  also  by  French  strategic
interests,  the  opportunity  to  demonstrate  the  EU’s  actorness  and  the  EU’s  own  security
concerns. While the situation on the ground required an urgent response, the EU opted for
peacebuilding tools. In Mali, the EU has deployed one military training operation and one
civilian mission. With their focus on the reform of state institutions, both missions fall within
the liberal peacebuilding framework. At the same time, the expansion of CSDP actions into
the tasks of migration and border management highlights that CSDP peacebuilding does not
have to be merely about building peace; it can also meet other areas that reflect the EU’s self-
centred interests. This broadening of the tasks highlights the extent to which the CSDP is
shaped  by the  EU’s  own  preferences  and  autonomy which  allow  the  EU  to  redirect  its
peacebuilding tools to serve its own visions. After an overview of the conflict, the chapter
traces the dynamics of the EU’s peacebuilding approach in Mali through an analysis of the
EU’s reaction to the crisis in Mali, the two CSDP missions and the EU’s regional strategy.
Attempting  to  understand how  these  actions  demonstrate  the  EU’s  capabilities  of  foreign
policy, the analysis explores the extent to which the international norm of peacebuilding and
EU member states’ preferences, policy-making and resources shape the design and delivery of
the EU peacebuilding missions in Mali.
Overview of the conflict and the response by the international community
In 2012 - 2013, Mali experienced three interlinked conflicts: 1) the constitutional crisis in
which  a  democratically  elected  president  was  overthrown by a  military coup,  leading  to
political  instability;  2)  the  threat  to  the  unity  of  the  state  driven  by  self-determination
movements, mainly Tuareg97 rebellions, seeking autonomy for northern Mali which led to
armed conflicts  between groups in  the north and the  authorities  in  the  south;  and 3)  the
97 Tuareg, or Kel Tamasheq (the Tamasheq speaking people), are a nomadic people. Mali has a diverse ethnic
and linguistic demography. Bambara  are the largest ethnic group. Together with Sininke, Khassonke and
Malinke, they are part of Mandé people (around 40 per cent of the 15 million large population). Mandé are
followed by Fula, (17 per cent), Voltaic (12 per cent), Tuareg (ten per cent), Songhai (six per cent) and other
ethnic groups. 90 per cent of the population lives in the south and is sedentary, whereas people in the north,
mainly Tuareg, are largely nomadic. While French is the official language, Mali has 12 national languages
with  Bambara  the  most  spoken  language.  More  than  40  other  languages  are  spoken  by  ethnic  groups
(Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung 2013; Fisas 2015, 28; Hofbauer and Münch 2016).
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religiously motivated terrorist occupation in the north. Conflicts between Tuaregs and other
groups  in  the  Sahel  date  back to  pre-colonial  times.  During  the  colonial  period,  Tuaregs
sought autonomy from their French rulers. Various rebel groups in the north continued the
struggle after Mali’s independence in 1960 while waging rebellions against the government in
Bamako.  Numerous  attempts  to  resolve  the  Tuareg  question  failed.  These  conflicts  were
accompanied  by constitutional  crises,  coups  d’état and  coup  attempts,  which  provided  a
thriving ground for rebels (France Diplomatie 2016a; Fisas 2015, 28-29; Morgan 2012). 
In  January  2012,  another  Tuareg  rebellion  broke  out  in  northern  Mali  when  the
Tuareg-led National Liberation Movement for the Azawad (MNLA) took up arms against the
government,  seeking  autonomy for  northern  Mali.98 After  failed  attempts  to  suppress  the
rebellion, the government recalled its military from the north. Accusing the President of his
inability to  stop the Tuareg rebellion in the north,  the military launched a  coup d’état in
March 2012. US-trained Captain Amadou Sanogo who led the coup established a military
junta and a transitional government (Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung 2013, 16).
Benefiting from a power vacuum of the central government due to a coup d’état, national self-
determination  movements  took  control  of  major  population  centres  in  northern  Mali,
including Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. In April 2012, the MNLA proclaimed an independent
Azawad (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2012; Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung 2013, 15).
However, this secular Tuareg movement saw its power rapidly declining due to the rise of
jihadist armed groups, in particular Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine,
the Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA), and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in Western
Africa (MUJAO, also abbreviated as MUJWA).99 Terrorists took over control and drove the
MNLA out of its positions of power very quickly, imposing their terrorist rule based on an
extremist interpretation of Islam.100 
The local population opposed this occupation and the strict Sharia law, allowing for a
support for an international intervention.101 As early as April 2012, ECOWAS decided to send
98 Although Azawad is a cross-border region which also includes parts of Algeria and Niger, the MNLA sought
autonomy only in northern Mali (CBC News 2013). Other militias, such as the Arab Movement for Azawad
(MAA), were also formed. These groups included veterans of former rebellions and soldiers who left Libya
after Gaddafis’ fall (Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung 2013, 15; Fisas 2015, 28).
99 Ansar Dine and the MIA appeared as formations seeking the proclamation of the Sharia law in the region in
2012. The AQIM operated under the name Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat prior to 2009. MUJAO
broke off from the AQIM in 2011 (Fisas 2015).
100Ansar Dine conquered Timbuktu and expelled the secular MNLA already in April 2012. While Ansar Dine
aimed at imposing Sharia law only in Mali, MUJAO and the AQMI sought to establish an Islamic state over a
larger part of North-West Africa (Fisas 2015, 30). The imposition of Sharia law in northern Mali by terrorists
led to a massive deterioration of the human rights situation and to a mass humanitarian and refugee crisis. 
101Mali’s long history of laïcité and moderate Islam has made it difficult for Islamists to gain a stronghold in the
country. Although 90% of its population is Muslim, predominantly Sunni, Mali is essentially a laic country.
Terrorists realised that they could not win the hearts and minds of people by imposing an extremist version of
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3,000  soldiers  to  stabilise  the  situation.  However,  the  Malian  military junta  rejected  any
intervention  (Bundesministerium für  Landesverteidigung  2013,  15).  ECOWAS  initiated  a
mediation process and sanctions against Mali which resulted in a Framework Agreement with
Captain Sanogo. This agreement set a transitional roadmap for a political dialogue with an
aim  of  restoring  constitutional  order  and  national  unity,  including  through  inclusive
presidential  and legislative elections (UN Security Council  2012c,  para.  1).  In July 2012,
UNSC Resolution  2056 expressed support  for  ECOWAS and AU peacemaking efforts.  It
stressed the territorial integrity of Mali by demanding the cessation of hostilities by rebels and
by  calling  upon  rebel  groups,  including  the  MNLA and  Ansar  Dine,  to  renounce  all
affiliations incompatible with the rule of law and Malian territorial integrity as well as to cut
off ties with terrorists, notably the AQIM and MUJAO (UN Security Council 2012a). 
As the situation in the north continued to worsen, the Malian transitional authorities
agreed to military support from ECOWAS. The UNSC in its Resolution 2071 established a
UN Special Envoy for the Sahel102 and  declared its readiness to respond to Mali’s call for
international military support by  taking note of  ECOWAS’ request for a UNSC resolution
authorising its stabilisation force in Mali. The UNSC asked the Secretary-General to provide
military and security planners to assist ECOWAS-AU plans for this operation. It called upon
UN member states, regional and international actors to provide support to these preparations,
“including through military training, provision of equipment and other forms of assistance in
efforts to combat terrorist and affiliated extremist groups” (UN Security Council 2012b, para.
8). The Resolution expressed concerns over the consequences of instability in northern Mali
on the region and beyond, the continuing deterioration of the humanitarian crisis and the rise
of terrorist activities (UN Security Council 2012b). 
Resolution 2071 also called upon UN member states and regional organisations to
provide support to the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF)103 through coordinated
assistance, expertise, training and capacity-building support, as well as with equipment and
other forms of assistance in efforts to combat terrorists as to restore the country’s authority
over its territory (UN Security Council 2012b, para. 8, 9). The need for training and capacity-
building of the MDSF was stressed by the inability of the Malian Armed Forces (MaAF) to
tackle  the  rebellions  and  the  terrorist  occupation  in  the  north.  These  crises  revealed  the
fragility of the Malian state, namely the structural weakness of its security sector - the military
Sharia law. In a letter found in 2003, the leader of the AQIM cautioned his supporters not to impose Sharia
too brutally, given the resistance from the population (Al-Qaida Manifesto; Callimachi 2013).
102Romano Prodi, former Italian Prime Minister, was appointed to this position. 
103MDSF include armed forces and internal security forces (Police, Gendarmerie and national Guards).
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and police forces. Despite previous military training and support by the USA, Germany and
France,104 the MaAF suffered from structural deficits, such as broken chains of command,
unbalanced ethnic composition of staff, insufficient training, lack of practical application, lack
of equipment, corruption and nepotism. Soldiers were often left in harsh conditions in the
north without  sufficient  resources,  dependent  on supplies  from locals  (interview 47).  The
UN’s call for training support for the MDSF occurred when the EU already started exploring
options for a possible training mission to Mali to train the MDSF. This reference became
crucial for the justification of the CSDP actions in Mali. 
The adoption of this resolution increased the prospects for an international  military
intervention in support of the MaAF to fight the terrorists in the north. The likelihood of an
intervention  was  further  strengthened  by  the  internal  tensions  among  the  leaders  of  the
military junta. The transitional authorities did not act according to the Framework Agreement
of April 2012.  In December 2012, Captain Sanogo imprisoned Prime Minister Diarra who,
when resigning, dissolved the government. Django Sissoko became the new Prime Minister.
The continuing political vacuum played into hands of terrorists who carried out attacks and
took hostages with an aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions. In the meantime,
ECOWAS  was  preparing  a  deployment  of  its  soldiers  (Bundesministerium  für
Landesverteidigung 2013, 16). 
On 20 December 2012, UNSC Resolution 2085 demanded that the Malian transitional
authorities  were  consistent  with  the  Framework  Agreement  and  “put  in  place  a  credible
framework for negotiations with all parties in the north of Mali who have cut off all ties to
terrorist organizations” (UN Security Council 2012c, para. 3). The resolution authorised the
African-led International  Support Mission to Mali  (AFISMA) organised by ECOWAS. Its
task was to support “the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north of its territory
under the control of terrorist, extremist and armed groups and in reducing the threat posed by
terrorist  organizations,  including  AQIM,  MUJWA and  associated  extremist  groups”  (UN
Security  Council  2012c,  para.  9).  The  mission  was  also  tasked  with  helping  the  Malian
authorities in transition to stabilisation activities, protection of civilians and the return of IDPs
and refugees. The resolution stressed that the consolidation and redeployment of the MDSF
throughout the Mali’s territory was vital to ensure the country’s security and the protection of
its people. For these purposes, the UNSC urged
104The USA and Germany provided training and capacity-building for the  MDSF in Mali prior to the 2012
conflict.  While the USA focused on combat  training,  Germany provided pioneer  training.  Some higher-
ranked Malians received military and police training directly in France, the USA and Germany (interview 50;
see also Jalloh 2015).
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“Member  States,  regional  and  international  organizations  to  provide
coordinated  assistance,  expertise,  training,  including  on  human  rights  and
international  humanitarian  law,  and capacity-building  support  to  the Malian
Defence and Security Forces, [...] in order to restore the authority of the State
of  Mali  over  its  entire  national  territory,  to  uphold  the unity and territorial
integrity of Mali and to reduce the threat posed by terrorist organizations” (UN
Security Council 2012c, para. 7).  
In this resolution, the UNSC also took note of the international community’s commitment to
the rebuilding of the capacities of the MDSF, in particular “the planned deployment by the
European Union of a military mission to Mali to provide military training and advice to the
Malian  Defence  and Security  Forces”  (Ibid.,  para.  8).  Already at  this  stage,  the  EU was
expected to deliver training mission only,  with the task of fighting terrorists  being left  to
ECOWAS.
However,  in  early January 2013,  the terrorist  were quickly advancing towards  the
south. On 9 January, the terrorist groups captured Konna and marched towards Mopti and
Sevare which are the  gateways to the south. Sevare has also a major  military base and an
airport. Fearing that the seizure of these centres would have opened the terrorists the way to
the  capital and  due  to  the  slow  progress  in  the  deployment  of  AFISMA,  the  Malian
government requested help form the French government for immediate military support on 10
January 2013 (France24 2013; Diallo 2013). The day after, France launched Operation Serval
with the help of African troops. Within less than a month, this  military operation helped to
dismantle the terrorist rule and regained partial control of the north, even though terrorist cells
have continued to exist (Hofbauer and Münch 2016; 244-245). First AFISMA troops were
deployed  in  the  middle  of  January  2013.  In  April  2013,  the  UNSC  authorised  the
establishment of United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
(MINUSMA), tasked with peacekeeping and stabilisation of the country, with a continuing
presence  of  the  French  troops  (UN  Security  Council  2013).  MINUSMA took  over  the
responsibility from AFISMA in July, incorporating most of its 6,300 African troops. 
The French-led intervention, and the consequent African and UN missions opened a
path to  peace negotiations.  In June 2013, the MNLA, the High Council  for  the Unity of
Azawad (HCUA) and the interim government in Bamako signed the Ouagadougou Interim
Peace Agreement brokered by Burkina Faso. The MAA and the Songhai militia Coordination
des mouvements et Front Patriotique de résistance (CM-FPR) also adhered to the agreement
(Fisas  2015,  33). Further  peace  talks  were  facilitated  by  Algeria,  with  the  UN,  the  AU,
ECOWAS, the OIC, the EU and other states as co-mediators, in Algiers. This mediation led to
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the ‘Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali’ signed by the Malian government and
rebel groups represented by the Platform and two groups of the Coordination of Movements
of Azawad (CMA) on 15 May 2015. The remaining CMA groups signed the agreement on 20
June 2015 (Accord pour la paix 2015; Nyirabikali 2015).105 
The EU’s reaction: Peacebuilding rather than peace-enforcement or peacekeeping
Mali is a case where the EU deployed its CSDP actions in a peacebuilding mode with a focus
on the reform of state institutions. These CSDP peacebuilding activities have been carried out
alongside  peacekeeping  and  combat  operations  conducted  by  other  actors.  The  CSDP
deployments in Mali demonstrate both the normative commitment of the EU to support the
peacebuilding efforts in the conflict-driven country as well as political, policy-making and
operational constraints of the EU’s CSDP capability. 
The  EU  closely  followed  the  developments  in  Mali.  In July  2012,  the  Council
Conclusions on Mali/Sahel recognised that, while the EU should continue to work within the
framework of  its  Strategy for Security and Development in  the Sahel,106 the deteriorating
situation in Mali required a review of the actions the EU should undertake to support the
restoration of the rule of law in Mali. The FAC requested the HR/VP and the Commission to
make concrete proposals for an EU action to respond to the changing situation. This included
the EU’s support for the planned ECOWAS mission and their mediation efforts. The FAC also
requested  the  HR/VP  to  prepare  options,  including  within  the  CSDP,  with  a  view  to
contributing, upon the agreement of the Malian authorities and in coordination with the UN,
the AU and ECOWAS, “to the restructuring of  Mali’s  security and defence forces,  under
civilian control in line with the Sahel Strategy” (Council  of the EU 2012b, para.  9).  The
Conclusions set up a roadmap for a possible CSDP mission in Mali. 
The decision to launch an EU training mission in Mali was favoured by a number of
factors. Rouppert argued that a training mission was deemed promising taking into account
the successful results from a similar mission EUTM Somalia, low financial and human costs
for the mission, and the fact that the Malian authorities requested training support (Rouppert
2015, 238). Other factors, such as the deteriorating humanitarian, human rights and refugee
crisis in the north, brought to public attention by the media, also urged the EU to take action.
105The CMA included the MNLA, the HCUA, the MAA, splinter  groups of the  Coalition du peuple pour
l’Azawad (CPA) and the CM-FPR. The Platform is comprised of the CM-FPR, the  Groupe d’Autodéfense
Touareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA), and groups separated of the CPA and the MAA (Nyirabikali 2015). 
106Known as the EU Sahel Strategy, adopted in 2011 (Council of the EU 2011b; EEAS 2011a). 
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EU member  states  understood  that  the  collapse  of  Mali  would  have  resulted  in  a  chain
reaction with unpredictable consequences for Europe, in particular the migratory flows and
the rise of terrorism (interviews 40; 42; 44). France was the key initiator of a CSDP action and
strategically the key actor in Mali with strong interests in the country. Mali and France have
enjoyed close relationships not only for historical and cultural reasons but also because of the
large Malian diaspora in France (France Diplomatie 2016a). According to a representative of
a smaller Western European country in the PSC, it is very characteristic for some states such
as France, Italy and Poland to initiate missions, whereas
“other  countries  would not  initiate  missions  on their  own [...].  They would
follow suit. As it was the case with France in Mali; there, we were strategically
different player than France which was unilaterally engaged with a particular
country  and  then  tried  to  draw the  EU along.  This  is  clearly  not  how we
operate.  We  like  to  work  with  partners.  We  can  be  an  active  partner  in
discussion.  But for [our country]  to unilaterally forge ahead and push for a
mission, this has not happened so far and is very unlikely” (interview 28). 
Rouppert  noted  that  the  French Minister  of  Defence,  Jean-Yves  Le Drian,  built  a  strong
political basis for an EU mission while visiting and searching support from European partners
(Rouppert 2015, 238). 
Further, at this stage, an EU military combat operation in support of the Malian forces
was not seen as a priority. The Malian government and the UN had agreed on the military
support by ECOWAS. The restructuring of the MaAF was seen as the primary objective of the
attempt to reconquer the north since the MaAF was expected to lead the offensive against the
terrorist regime with support of AFISMA’s support (Ibid., 237). UNSC Resolutions 2071 and
2085 called upon other regional organisations to provide support to the planned ECOWAS
operation and to the MaAF in the form of training and advice. The UNSC request coincided
with a decision to launch a CSDP mission to support the fight against organised crime and
terrorism in the Sahel region:  EUCAP Sahel Niger mission in  July 2012.107 Although the
mission  was  focused  on  Niger,  the  EU  envisioned  its  possible  extension  to  Mali  and
Mauritania. For these reasons, liaison officers for that mission were sent to Nouakchott and
Bamako. The mission was deployed as part  of the EU Sahel Strategy in a reaction to an
increased terrorist activity and the consequences of the conflict in Libya, which heightened
insecurity in  the Sahel  (Council  of  the EU 2012d).  These factors  enabled the affirmative
107The mission strengthens Niger’s capacity in fighting terrorism and organised crime by providing training and
advice to the Niger’s security authorities on improving their control of the territory and the implementation of
their security strategy, supporting the regional cooperation in the fight against terrorism and organised crime,
and assisting in developing rule of law-based penal processes (Council of the EU 2012d).
149
decision of the EU member states in favour of a mission in Mali.
Responding to the call by Resolution 2071 to provide training support to the MDSF
and to the requests by the Malian government for such a support from the EU, the EU started
with the preparation of its training mission.108 In October 2012, the FAC requested that work
on the planning of a possible CSDP mission is pursued “as a matter of urgency”. The first
draft of the CMC was prepared in October (Council of the EU 2012c). However, between
October  and  December,  France  conducted  its  own  operational  planning.  It  sent  a  field
investigation  team  to  evaluate  the  MaAF  as  to  determine  conditions  for  a  possible
deployment. The French own planning accelerated the EU’s preparations as France provided
relevant  information on the situation of the ground (Rouppert  2015, 239).  Member states
welcomed this French initiative emphasising that France possesses better knowledge about the
country  and  that  the  mission  was  supposed  to  be  French-led  (interview  39).  Already  in
December 2012, the planning of the mission had progressed to the stage that the EU was
ready to deploy trainers  in the first  quarter  of 2013. On 10 December 2012, the Council
approved a CMC on a possible military CSDP training mission in Mali while stressing that
the mission in Mali would be part of the Union’s comprehensive approach as elaborated in the
EU Sahel Strategy. The plan was to train four battalions of up to 3,000 soldiers tasked with
combat, force protection, supply and support as to prepare them for an immediate deployment
in the fight against the terrorists in the north (Council of the EU 2012c). Despite the ongoing
crisis in the north, the security situation in the south was calm and stable. Even the CMC
referred exclusively to the conflict in the north of Mali (Ibid.). These conditions encouraged
EU member states to agree on this mission and provide their personnel for it.
The preparations of the mission were, however, interrupted by an advancement of the
terrorists towards the south of Mali. The EU also lacked a credible partner on the Malian side
due  to  the  political  fight  in  the  transitional  government  (Bundesministerium  für
Landesverteidigung 2013, 16; Rouppert 2015, 237). When the Malian government requested
help form France for an immediate military support, France would have wished an EU-led
combat operation.  Yet, interviews revealed that France was also aware that other member
states would only hardly agree on such an operation and at  such a short  notice.  The EU
member states were able to agree on a training mission only due to their hesitation, based on
concerns over security and resources, to deploy their troops to a combat operation (interviews
28; 42). The EU therefore did not intervene to contain the open conflict, but waited for other
actors to manage it while planning a CSDP action in the relatively secure south. 
108The Malian transitional  government  requested the assistance of the EU on 18 September 2012. The EU
responded to this request on 17 October proposing a CSDP mission (Council of the EU 2012c). 
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The  EU’s  decision  to  plan  a  training  mission  during  the  time  when  a  crisis
management operation was needed reveals the constraints of the CSDP – the limits of the
EU’s  capability  to  agree  on  a  combat  CSDP  action  in  an  open  conflict.  As  Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni noted, although many EU members offered their strong vocal support to France
in  its  military  action  in  Mali,  “none  were  willing  to  join  France  in  combat”  (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni 2013). The military mission itself was a small gesture, built heavily on French
personnel, and “came rather too late, as the bulk of Malian government troops were by then
headed  into  combat  alongside  the  French  soldiers”  (Ibid.).  The  request  of  the  Malian
government for military assistance and the fact that this help was needed to fight the terrorists
in the north would have made such an intervention different from those led by the US in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Interviews suggest that those EU member states which hesitated to launch a
joint military combat operation perceived an African- or French-led military involvement in
Mali as a more credible option, leaving the training of the MaAF to the EU. They took into
account  the  possibility  of  adverse  attitudes  by  the  native  population  towards  an  EU-led
military action in an African country, the lack of experience in fighting terrorists as well as
security concerns over a deployment in the north. They saw the EU’s strength in providing
military training to the Malian army rather than fighting the terrorists directly (interview 28;
42).  This  case,  similarly as  the case of  Libya,  demonstrates  that,  although the CSDP has
provided the EU with an autonomous capacity,  this  capacity has been constrained by the
capability-expectations gaps, in particular the lack of political will, the fear of harming the
EU’s image, lack of operational capability and security concerns.
Due to a rapid defeat of the terrorists in the north and a speedy re-establishment of the
order by the French-led Operation Serval, and due to the relatively stable conditions in the
south, the EU was able to proceed with its plans for a training mission. Already on 16 January
2013,  only five  days  after  the  deployment  of  Serval,  the  FAC authorised  the  opening of
negotiations with Mali for an agreement for a mission (Council of the EU 2013a). On 17
January 2013, the FAC formally established European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in
Mali (Council of the EU 2013c). The Council appointed Brigadier General François Lecointre
from  France  as  EU  mission  commander  and  invited  him  “to  speed  up  the  plans  and
preparations so that the EUTM can be launched by mid-February at the latest” (Council of the
EU 2013b, para. 3).109 On 18 February 2013, within a month, the FAC launched EUTM Mali
with a mandate for 15 months within the framework of UNSC resolutions 2071 and 2085
(2012) and upon the request of the Malian government (Council of the EU 2013d; 2013e). 
109The concept of operations was submitted to member states on 15 January 2013 and approved by the PSC on
28 January. The mission plan was approved by the EUMC on 18 February 2013. 
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This speedy progress suggests that the EU is capable of rapid deployments if there is a
political will. EU member states were strongly determined to deploy this training mission as
soon as possible. This rapid deployment was possible due to the willingness of member states
to deploy this mission and due to the speedy policy-making process in Brussels, including the
French  preparations.  General  Lacointre  initiated  contacts  with  the  Malian  military
commanders even before the official launch of the operation (Rouppert 2015, 239-244). Also,
the EU wanted to demonstrate its rapid reaction potential. Interviews revealed that, since the
French-led military operation in northern Mali was progressing, EU member states sensed the
opportunity to engage in a post-conflict stabilisation phase through the EUTM in the south.
They believed that the post-conflict stabilisation and rebuilding of Mali will be a fast and
short  process:  “there  was a  strong belief  that  Mali  will  be  neither  Afghanistan  nor  Iraq”
(interview  51).  The  EU  did  not  see  itself  in  a  peacekeeping  role;  instead,  it  wished  to
contribute in a peacebuilding capacity. The Council Conclusions from 17 January stressed that
the  EU  supported  the  rapid  deployment  of  AFISMA and  reiterated  its  commitment  to
providing financial assistance for this mission through the African Peace Facility. The Council
requested the HR/VP to accelerate preparations for the provision of financial and logistical
support “as a matter of urgency” (Council of the EU 2013b, para 2). These references suggest
that the EU preferred to engage in the post-conflict phase while supporting other organisations
in peacekeeping tasks. 
The peacebuilding rather than crisis management character of the operation is strongly
apparent in its medium-size strength. 550 personnel, including 200 instructors, support staff,
force protection and medevac  personnel  is  a  relatively small  number compared to  troops
deployed  in  Serval and  MINUSMA.  23  member  states  and  four  non-EU  states  have
contributed  with  their  personnel  (EEAS  2016a,  13).  The  mission  has  been  located  in  a
relatively  secure  environment.  The  headquarters  of  the  operation  is  in  Bamako  and  the
training has taken place in Koulikoro, 60 km north-east of Bamako. The capital and other
areas  in  the  south  were  declared  a  “safe  zone”.  The  mission  was  indeed  deployed  in  a
situation of an ongoing crisis and subsequent peacekeeping in the north. Yet, the south of the
country, not seriously affected by the conflict, has been regarded as stable. The Malian armed
forces  and  military  objects  as  well  as  MINUSMA have  been  regular  targets  of  terrorist
attacks, especially in the north (France Diplomatie “Events”). Since 2016, individual terrorist
attacks targeting hotels and resorts in the capital have raised the concerns about the security
situation  in  the  south.  The EUTM has  become a  target  of  terrorists  only recently. 110 The
110On 18 June 2017, a Portuguese serviceman of EUTM Mali was killed in an attack on a leisure centre located
in the suburbs of Bamako (EUTM PAO 2017). In March 2016, the mission’s HQ in Bamako was attacked by
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security of the personnel has been the priority for the member states (see chapter three). These
developments  highlight  that  the  EU’s  capability  to  demonstrate  its  commitment  to
peacebuilding is dependent on the security of the environment. 
EUTM Mali: Peacebuilding through a military reform and training
EUTM Mali is an example of a peacebuilding mission with a strong normative commitment;
it is a military mission with the objective of contributing to the restoration of lasting peace in
Mali  through  capacity-  and  institution-building  (EEAS 2016d,  1).  At  the  same time,  the
operation reflects the constraints of the EU’s foreign policy-making within the CSDP. The
EUTM was planned during the time of the terrorist occupation in the north with the aim to
train  the  MaAF to  enhance  their  capability  of  fighting  terrorists.  Once  Operation  Serval
defeated the terrorists, an explicitly combat-oriented training was no longer needed (Rouppert
2015, 237). As a result, the mission changed its focus to the reform and reorganisation of the
MaAF. The mission is tasked with training, educating, advising, reforming and reorganising
the MaAF. It attempts to improve the military capability of the MaAF as to enable them to
conduct  their  own  operations,  which  ultimately  aims  at  restoring  the  Malian  territorial
integrity  under  civilian  authority  and  reducing  the  threat  posed  by terrorist  groups.  The
operation seeks to strengthen conditions for political control by legitimate civilian authorities
of the MaAF (Council of the EU 2013c, Art. 1). The mission aims at the reorganisation and
reform of the military structures. The mandate follows the logic of a peacebuilding framework
that emphasises the cardinal role of functioning state structures for lasting peace and stability. 
The main activity of EUTM Mali has involved (a) training for military personnel of
the MaAF, and (b) training and advice on the reorganisation of the structures of the MaAF,
including  the  areas  such  as  command,  control,  logistics,  human  resources,  international
humanitarian  law,  basic  military  principles,  the  protection  of  civilians  and  human  rights
(Ibid.). These objectives reflect the liberal nature of these efforts according to the Weberian
state model. The training involved practical demonstrations related to combat activities, such
as the use of weapons and vehicles, fighting, and distinguishing between combatants and non-
combatants. The curricula included training on de-mining, technical assistance and pioneer
assistance. In addition, the training was concerned with human rights, gender and legal issues.
Rouppert has claimed that the Malian army was modelled on the French army. The entire
planning  and  managing  programme  was  done  by  the  French  personnel  who  also  wrote
a gunman (Diallo and Diarra 2016).
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training modules and curricula. This was accepted by other member states which recognised
the  special  role  of  France  in  Mali  (Rouppert  2016,  244).  Similarly,  the  reform  and
reorganisation of the military structures and the necessary legal adjustments, as part of the
advisory  function  of  the  mission,  has  followed  the  French  system.  French  advisers  have
directly advised the ministry and authorities. EUTM Mali has provided advice to the Ministry
of Defence, MaAF authorities and military headquarters in the military region garrisons at
strategic and regional level in support of the structural reforms encompassed in the Malian
Defence Programming Law (EEAS 2016a, 13; 2016d). 
When it comes to actual training tasks, member states have provided training in their
own area of expertise. In this sense, the French trainers have explicitly focused on fighting
and combat activities, while personnel from other countries have been better in providing
training in technical and pioneer support. For instance, the German Parliament decided that its
personnel  should  carry out  exclusively planning and technical  supervision  at  the level  of
mission management, medical assistance to the mission, and pioneer and medical training for
Malian soldiers (Deutscher Bundestag 2013, 1). Yet, as countries, such as Germany, gradually
assumed more responsibilities in the mission, they have become more interested in shaping
the nature of the activities of the operation. This has led to a disagreement between France
and Germany over the restructuring of the institutions. Germany has emphasised pioneer and
technical  matters,  while  the  French  have  focused  on weapons  and  combat  training.  This
tension has also translated into the political  level -  the reform of political  power-sharing,
which includes the reorganisation of the MaAF. Germany has pushed for a more devolved
system,  whereas  France  has  focused  on  building  a  centralised  system  of  governance
(interview 49).  This  disagreement  originates  in  German  and  French  different  systems  of
governance. This case shows that, although EU member states agree on the need for post-
conflict  engagement,  their  visions  of  particular  actions  can  differ.  At  the  same time,  the
differences between German and French activities can be seen as a division of labour: France
is better suited to provide training in combat actions, whereas Germany is stronger in pioneer
and  technical  support.  In  the  case  of  Mali,  Germany and  France  have  developed  strong
cooperation.  Both countries organised several joint ministerial  visits.  In 2016, French and
German foreign ministers also delivered a joint message of support for the peace process in
the country and for the efforts of the UN and EU missions (France Diplomatie 2016b).
Similarly as in the case of BiH, the training mission was launched as a short-term
action.  However,  it  extended  into  a  long-term  peacebuilding  activity.  After  the  first  15
months,  the mission was extended until  May 2016 (Council  of the EU 2014b).  With this
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extension, the operation expanded to another training facility in the north of Segou, which is
four hours drive away from Bamako. This facility was previously used by a German-run
training mission which provided training on technical and rescue issues for the MaAF before
the  outbreak of  the crisis.  The inclusion  of  this  training facility into  the  EUTM was not
straightforward. During the visit of the German delegation to investigate the possibility of a
German  operation,  German  officials  expressed  their  intention  to  operate  Germany’s  own
training in parallel to the EU operation. They highlighted that Germany already trained the
MaAF in this facility and that their equipments were still stationed there.111 The possibility of
a bi-lateral  operation could have also enhanced the image of Germany as an independent
actor.  The  operation  would  have  been  under  a  German  and  not  EU flag.  However,  this
proposal was not realised since the German government did not want to risk undermining the
Franco-German  partnership,  even  if  it  saw  the  advantages  of  a  German-only  mission  in
enhancing  its  international  image  (informal  interviews).  This  case  demonstrates  how
‘labelling’ and visibility are important factors for member states when they consider their
contributions for CSDP actions. Member states seek to push for their own actions and policies
that would enhance their own visibility at the expenses of a common EU action. 
The long-term peacebuilding approach in this CSDP operation has prevailed. In March
2016, the EU further extended the mandate of the EUTM until May 2018. This extension
included two new aspects. First, the operation expanded its activities to train personnel in the
Niger Loop, including in Gao and Timbuktu. In 2016, the member states were also discussing
the expansion of the mandate into mentoring as to allow the deployment of soldiers in training
as protection force in the building project of a paved road from Mopti to Timbuktu (interview
39).112 This  extension  raises  security  concerns  as  the  northern  areas  are  potential  to  the
terrorist  threat.  Deployments  in  remote  regions  with  poor  infrastructure  may most  likely
increase  the  costs  of  the  operation  for  security,  technical,  evacuation  and  medical
arrangements. It may be challenging for the EU to not only provide security for its staff in
such remote areas, but also to ensure regular supplies. While it is planned that the EUTM staff
will not be involved in executive tasks, the deployment of trainees in protection activities
could  shift  the  scope  of  the  mission  from  capacity-building  to  a  “harder”  engagement
(interview 10). 
Second,  the  mandate  of  the  mission  has  been  revised  and  expanded.  The  task  of
training has shifted to “train the trainer” and “monitor the trainer” approach while training the
111Military  technical  equipments  provided  by  Germany  remained  on  the  site  during  the  crisis  (informal
interview E; interview 52).
112Currently, there is only unpaved road. The construction was suspended in 2011 because of the terrorist threat.
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leaders of the MaAF and those who are responsible for training the MaAF. This training has
been conducted in regional military headquarters garrisons, Malian military schools and the
EUTM Training  Centre  in  Koulikoro.  The  mission  provides  leadership  education  for  the
junior and middle leadership to enhance the leadership skills of the MaAF. It helps to develop
a military education system by integrating EUTM Mali instructors into the officer and non-
commissioned officer schools. 
In addition to training and strategic advice, the mission’s mandate extended into two
other tasks: DDR and support for the Group of the five Sahel countries (G5 Sahel) process.113
The first new task is to contribute, in coordination with MINUSMA, to the DDR process
framed by the Peace Agreement, through the provision of training in order to facilitate the
reconstitution of inclusive MaAF (Council of the EU 2016f, para. 1). DDR programmes have
been mainly done by MINUSMA. They can primarily be conducted in the north where rebels
were operating. They bring the EU closer to its commitment to peacebuilding. Yet, although
the rebel  groups accepted to  move forward,  the progress is  slow and the reintegration of
former combatants from rebel groups, which are estimated at 18,000 in the new MDSF will
be a test case for the EU (informal interview H). 
The support for the G5 Sahel process includes the creation of a deeper cooperation in
the area of defence, security, migration, terrorism and development among G5 Sahel, within
the  activities  of  EUTM  Mali  in  support  of  the  MaAF.  The  EUTM  contributes  to  the
coordination and interoperability among the national armed forces of G5 Sahel (Council of
the EU 2016f, para. 1). The group is modelled on the EU cooperation in the area of security
and defence.  It  is  based on the idea that  such a cooperation will  not only strengthen the
resilience of the region against terrorism but also lead to further cooperation among these
countries, peaceful relations and resolution of internal ethnic divisions, including the demands
by Tuareg groups who live across the region. 
The  extension  in  March  2016  was  also  shaped  by  the  Paris  terrorist  attacks  in
November 2015. Following these attacks, France invoked Article 42(7) of the TEU, the first
ever  activation  of  the  mutual  assistance  clause,  requesting  aid  and  assistance  from other
member  states.  EU member  states  contributed  to  this  French  request  by increasing  their
contributions  to  the  EU and  UN actions  in  Mali  (European  Parliament  2015).  The  2016
extension of the EUTM reflected these developments. Brigadier General Eric Harvent, from
Belgium, was appointed the commander of the operation.114 With Belgium taking over the
113G5 Sahel (Le Groupe des Cinq du Sahel)  was created in December 2014 to strengthen regional security
cooperation among the five countries of the Sahel region: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. 
114He was was replaced by Brigadier General Peter Devogelaere, also Belgian national, in December 2016.
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leadership of the EUTM, the Belgian government deployed an extra 30 soldiers to the mission
and  increased  its  military presence  in  MINUSMA to  175 personnel.  Similarly,  Germany,
Spain  and  other  EU countries  increased  their  personnel  contributions  to  the  EUTM  and
MINUSMA (European Parliament 2015; Koops and Tercovich 2016). 
By October 2016, EUTM Mali trained eight Malian Battlegroups, each consisting of
650 to 700 personnel, mainly soldiers (EEAS 2016a, 13). Soldiers trained in the EUTM have
been already sent to the north to contribute to stabilisation and restoration of the state integrity
in  cooperation  with  MINUSMA.  Yet,  the  ethnic  divisions  continue  to  hinder  the
peacebuilding  process.  To  increase  the  ethnic  composition  of  the  MaAF,  the  EUTM has
expanded its training activities into urban centres in the north, including Gao and Timbuktu.
Despite the extension of the mission’s mandate and the will to train further battalions, the
decision of the Malian government in spring 2016 to recruit 5,000 new soldiers for the MaAF
and around 2,000 new police, gendarmes and national guards came as a surprise to the EU.
This decision posed a new challenge in the SSR process as it increased demands for training,
equipment and space left for ex-combatants reintegrated to government forces. The EUTM, as
well as EUCAP, had to adapt to these new demands to assist with training of new officers
(informal interview I). This hesitation of the EU to agree to further training highlights the
limits  of the EU in terms of  willingness and capabilities.  The mission served in  the first
instance as a demonstration of the EU’s reaction to the conflict. The actual objective of the
capacity-building is oriented towards force generation, meaning that the EU seeks to train a
specific number of officers. 
Since the Sahel action plan foresees its activities until 2020 and since the Malian army
is not yet fully prepared to tackle the terrorist threat on its own, another extension of the
operation is highly probable. The two extensions of the EUTM suggest a long-term character
of the activities carried out under by this CSDP operation in Mali. The prolongation of the
mission’s  activities  brings  further  challenges  in  terms  of  costs  and human resources.  The
common costs of the first mandate were € 12.3 million (Council of the EU 2013c, Art. 10).
The costs for the second mandate are estimated at € 27.7 million, while the costs for the third
mandate are estimated at € 33.4 million (Council of the EU 2016f). These costs exclude costs
that  member  states  bear  for  their  own  personnel.  The  increase  in  costs  was  due  to  the
regionalisation of the mission and the extension of the mandate which required enhanced
security, technical, medical and evacuation arrangements (interview 47). At the same time, the
total sum is still relatively low compared to other non-CSDP projects.  
The relatively secure environment of the mission and its low profile compared to the
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UN mission increase the chances for the continuation of the mission. The EUTM, as well as
the  civilian  mission,  enjoy  less  public  visibility  compared  to  MINUSMA  which  has
repeatedly been a target of terrorist attacks.115 MINUSMA has also been a subject of criticism
by Malian authorities and public. In April 2016, a demonstration against international forces
broke into the airport compound in Kidal, operated by MINUSMA, ransacking and setting
fire to security facilities. The protests mark a deterioration of relations between foreign forces
and the  local  community in  Kidal,  which  are  sympathetic  of  rebel  movements  (informal
interview H). In contrast,  EU staff  reside mainly in  their  training facilities or in the HQ,
whereas UN peacekeepers are deployed to public areas to monitor the situation and ensure
order.  This  comparison  also  demonstrates  the  peacebuilding  rather  than  actual  crisis
management nature of the EUTM. The mandate stated explicitly that the operation shall not
be involved in combat operations and mentoring. Mentoring in real situations, for example at
check points on main roads between respective constituencies, has been considered by the
EUCM and  the  PSC.  However,  these  suggestions  have  not  been  realised  due  to  security
reasons  and  the  fact  that  this  has  been  seen  as  a  task  of  MINUSMA (interview 43).  In
addition,  mentoring  and  combat  actions,  as  well  as  training  in  support  of  the  AFISMA
mission,  were  rejected  by  the  German  Parliament  (informal  interview  K;  Deutscher
Bundestag 2013, 1). From this perspective, the EU is a crucial actor in the stabilisation and
peacebuilding process in Mali, while it could be argued that MINUSMA and France are the
main actors responsible for security and combat operations, including the civilian protection. 
EUCAP Sahel Mali: Civilian peacebuilding through a police reform
The  interrelationship  between  the  EU’s  normative  commitment  to  peacebuilding  and  its
pragmatic approach that reflects the self-centred nature of the EU’s foreign policy-making is
also apparent in the civilian mission in Mali. Soon after the launch of the EUTM the need for
a civilian mission to tackle internal security problems became evident. Already in May 2013,
the Council reiterated its readiness to discuss CSDP options “for urgent support for the Malian
authorities in the area of internal security and justice, including the fight against terrorism and
organised crime” (Council of the EU 2014a, preamble). Both, Mali and the EU wanted a
civilian mission. While France and Germany were the main initiators of the mission, some
115MINUSMA has been a subject of more than twenty terrorist attacks. For instance, in 2014, 28 MINUSMA
peacekeepers were killed, which is the highest number of fatalities in a single peacekeeping operation in a
given year  since the UN Operation in  Somalia in  1994  (informal  interviews  H and J).  The EUTM has
suffered two terrorist attacks with one deadly casualty since 2016.
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member states were less supportive of a second mission; they saw the danger of relocating EU
resources to the French sphere of interest at the expenses of other CSDP actions, especially
those  in  Europe (interviews  26 and 33).  Considerations  that  Malian  security  issues  were
directly  linked  to  the  EU’s  security  and  migration  problems,  and  the  understanding  that
France and Germany would take the lead in the mission, the member states agreed to favour
the  decision  to  launch  a  civilian  mission.  While  the  EU  was  initially  considering  its
contribution to the reform of both SSR and justice sectors, the choice was narrowed to the
SSR due to the EU’s limited capacities. This selective approach was also influenced by the
rise of migration and smuggling activities in the Sahel which the EU saw as a priority and a
threat to its own security. 
After  Mali’s  official  request  for  an  EU mission  in  support  of  the  Malian  Internal
Security Forces (ISF), the Council decided to establish a civilian CSDP mission in Mali -
European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Sahel Mali in April 2014 (Council of
the  EU 2014a).  The mission  was  launched  nine  months  later,  in  January 2015,  and was
endowed with a budget until  January 2016  (Council  of the EU 2015b).  The funding was
extended until January 2017 (Council of the EU 2016g). Following the Strategic Review of
the  mission  in  2016,  the  PSC recommended that  the  mandate  of  EUCAP Sahel  Mali  be
adapted and extended for a period of two years (Council of the EU 2017a). Compared to the
EUTM, the preparation period for the launch of EUCAP took longer. The planning of civilian
missions is usually longer than that of military operations. Civilian missions follow a complex
procedure with the planning and recruitment of personnel. While military mission can rely on
soldiers who are ready to be deployed at short notice, civilian staff have to be first recruited.
In Mali, the recruitment was further complicated by language issues; states had difficulties in
finding civilian personnel competent in French. Security concerns and unfamiliarity with the
environment also played its role in hindering a speedy recruitment of civilian personnel. 
EUCAP Sahel Mali is framed as a further contribution, in addition to the EUTM, to
the EU’s efforts to the restoration of the authority and legitimacy of the Malian state by means
of an effective redeployment of its administration. It allows the Malian authorities to restore
and maintain constitutional and democratic order and the conditions for lasting peace in the
country, as embedded in the 2015 Peace Agreement. EUCAP provides assistance and advice
to  the  ISF,  in  particular  the  Police,  the  Gendarmerie  and  the  National  Guard  in  the
implementation of the SSR with a view to:
– Improving their operational efficiency
– Re-establishing their respective hierarchical chains
159
– Reinforcing the role of judicial and administrative authorities with regard to
the management and supervision of their missions
– Facilitating their redeployment to the north of the country (Council of the EU
2014a, Art. 1, 2).
The implementation of these objectives is done through training and strategic advice. 
Compared to other civilian missions, such as those in BiH or Kosovo, EUCAP Sahel
Mali is relatively modest in terms of personnel given the large scale of the objectives of the
mission and the size of the country. The authorised strength of the mission is 140 staff, mainly
civilian police officers. This relatively small number reflects the operational limitations of the
CSDP. At the same time, the budget of the mission has been significantly increased since its
deployment, affirming the constraints of many member states of the rising costs of CSDP
deployments in dangerous and logistically complicated scenarios such as Mali (see chapter
four). The mission common costs were € 5.5 million between April 2014 to January 2015 – in
the preparation phase.  The expenditure increased to  € 11.4 million from January 2015 to
January 2016 and to € 19.7 million in the following year. The extended mission budget for the
next two years was boosted to 29.8 million (EEAS 2016a, 12; Council of the EU 2017a). This
means that the entire mission during the period of 4 years is expected to costs almost € 74.5
million. The costs for this medium-size mission are justified by the high costs for lodging,
security, evacuation, medical and technical arrangements. The headquarters are in Bamako,
though some activities are carried out in other areas. Despite a number of terrorist incidents in
the last two years, security risks or terrorist threat are still low compared to other countries.
One officer  who was in the mission in  Afghanistan said that  the security environment  is
significantly better than that in Afghanistan (informal interview L). In fact, the personnel can
move relatively freely in certain areas of the capital. Yet, the logistical, lodging, evacuation,
force protection and medical arrangements increase the costs of civilian missions. 
Similarly as the EUTM, the police mission is an example of the EU’s contribution to
stability  and  sustainable  peace  in  Mali  and  the  region.  It  depicts  the  EU’s  approach  to
peacebuilding based on the understanding that a country can be capable of self-governing its
security and sustain peace if it possesses required capabilities and skills. Peacebuilding in this
mission is carried out through three main activities: advice, training and projects. The advice
element  of  the  mission  focuses  on  advising  ISF  and  relevant  departments  in  the
implementation of  SSR in Mali.  The EUCAP advisers  assist  their  Malian counterparts  to
improve their national strategy for human resources, to modernise management practices and
control of their services, and to effectively recruit new staff within the ISF. The advice is
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mainly conducted at the level of the Ministry of Security, the Ministry of Defence and the
level of the commanders of the forces. The aim of the EUCAP expertise and advice is to
develop effective  policies  and infrastructure,  including the creation  of  a  human resources
database; an employment policy and staff management database; a baseline for staffing; a
skills-based  staff  recruitment  policy;  operational  management  methods  to  help  restore
hierarchical  links; audit  and inspection units  within the general forces inspectorate;  and a
master  plan  for  training,  overhaul  initial  training  (structures  and  content)  and  relaunch
continuing training (EEAS 2016c). The reform of the entire system of the ISF fits the logic of
a state-centred peacebuilding doctrine according to which the EU supports the creation of
functioning state institutions responsible for the internal security domain. Such restructuring
also requires certain legal changes which further strengthen the state-building project. 
Peacebuilding is strongly reflected in the training component, the second element of
the activity of EUCAP Sahel Mali. The mission provides training for all the three components
of the ISF. In 2015, the mission trained about 600 officers from all the three forces. The
ultimate goal of the mission is to train a third of the staff of the ISF. The training covers
subjects  such  as  management  and  command,  professional  ethics,  human  rights,  gender
equality,  intelligence  techniques,  professional  intervention,  criminal  policing,  counter-
terrorism and public order. The training is primarily addressed at senior and intermediate staff.
Each member of staff also receives individual training lasting 100 hours over four weeks. In
order to promote local ownership, the mission also trains trainers who, in turn, can pass on the
training outcomes to  future trainees.  Similarly as advice at  the ministry and commanders
levels, training follows the logic of liberal peacebuilding by training the members of the ISF
according to European standards. 
In addition,  the EU’s  approach to  peacebuilding is  characterised by small  projects
which seek to support the sustainability and which accompany training and advice activities.
For instance, EUCAP donated sport and office equipments for and financed the renovation of
offices and training facilities of the  National Guard (EEAS 2016b). Such projects seek to
ensure the continuity of training for the National Guard after the end of the EU mission. These
activities  are  dependent  on  financial  resources  provided  by EU member  states,  however.
Interviews suggest that the case of Mali strengthened the call for the realisation of the CBSD
(see p. 100 of this thesis) as the financial support and provision of equipment are seen as
conditional to the successfulness of the EU both CSDP actions. The implementation of the
CBSD would allow for an enhanced bridging between the activities of the CSDP missions and
the implementation of reforms and training. With the latest extension of EUCAP Sahel Mali,
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what was planned as a short-term engagement has become a long-term commitment.  The
extension of  the mandate highlights  that  short-term missions can only hardly achieve the
sustainability of peace and order. The situation in Mali is complex. While the south of the
country and the urban centres in the north are under control, the threat of terrorism continues
to undermine the stability of the country. Within the first two years of its mandate, the mission
fulfilled its set of tasks of training police forces and reforming the security sector. Yet, this has
not been sufficient. Bridging the CSDP with the CBSD will be necessary for the effectiveness
of the EU’s actions in Mali. 
Despite the strong normative commitment to peacebuilding, the mission is also a tool
of the EU’s foreign policy serving the EU’s interests. Indeed, these are no longer of economic
nature.  For instance,  France is  no longer  Mali’s  largest  foreign investor.  Instead,  non-EU
countries have taken the lead in economic investments in Mali (France Diplomatie 2016a).
The EU’s interests in Mali concern the EU’s own security, in particular preventing illegal
migration from Africa. The new mandate of the mission has intensified the cooperation with
Frontex by giving the EEAS access to the Frontex EU classified information and documents
generated for the purposes of EUCAP Sahel Mali. The mandate called for the establishment of
arrangements between the HR/VP and Frontex.116 This nexus of Frontex and CSDP is not only
an example of a realisation of the comprehensive approach to crises but also of a shift in the
focus in priorities. The post-conflict peacebuilding and stabilisation activities in this CSDP
mission have become a subject of the EU’s security and protection of its external borders.
Illegal migration has been the dominant theme of the agenda of several high-level visits of
European leaders (heads of government, ministers and EU Commissioners) to the countries of
the Sahel  region as well  as the visits  by high-level representatives from the Sahel region
countries in European capitals and EU institutions in 2016. The visits have been coordinated
with European partners. The discussions have focused on projects and initiatives addressing
trafficking and smuggling, and on root causes and the creation of economic alternatives in the
regions most affected by irregular migration. The EU has extended its advice and support to
new  areas  such  as  the  development  of  biometric  population  registry,  reintegration  for
returnees,  awareness  raising  campaigns  on  the  risks  of  irregular  migration.  The  EU  has
offered the countries support of Europol and Frontex. For instance, the EU decided to deploy
Frontex liaison officers to Sahel countries in summer 2017 (Council of the EU 2016b). 
These activities have already showed their results. Both missions have made progress
in tackling illegal migration in the Sahel region. The flow of irregular migrants transiting the
116Due to different legal arrangements for the EEAS/CSDP and FRONTEX, the two institutions do not have
access to each others’ internal documents.
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countries of the Sahel was reduced in 2016. With the support of the EU, the governments in
Niger, Mali and other countries conducted effective actions against smuggling during which
they seized equipments and arrested smugglers.  In Niger,  more than 4,000 migrants  were
redirected to the IOM for repatriation to their home countries. However, potential abuses and
the assurance of the protection of refugees and asylum seekers remain a challenge for the EU.
While migration to Europe has always been securitised, with the extension of the mandates of
CSDP  missions  in  the  Sahel,  the  CSDP  has  been  utilised  for  these  purposes.  These
developments indicate that the EU’s approach to peacebuilding is shaped by the EU’s own
concerns, namely the attempt to halt the flow of refugees and migrants from Africa and to
protect the EU’s borders.  
Small CSDP missions as part of a broader strategy
The case of the two EU actions in Mali supports the argument that peacebuilding through
CSDP missions and operations should be carried out within a broader strategy. Unlike BiH,
Mali is indeed a non-European country without the prospect of EU membership. As such, the
EU’s leverage on the stability as well as the EU’s role in peacebuilding in the country might
be seen as limited. Nevertheless, as Tocci claimed, this does not necessarily have to mean that
accession is an indispensable requirement for an EU’s involvement in conflict management
(Tocci 2007, 159-175). She pointed to the cases of Israel-Palestine conflict and conflicts in
Georgia, where the EU has been able to offer valuable benefits different to the goal of EU
membership. In these cases, financial and humanitarian aid has secured the EU a place in the
peace  process,  which  shows  how  EU  benefits  need  not  be  membership-related  to  be
influential.  Although these countries  are excluded from the remit of EU enlargement,  EU
assistance has contributed to shaping the domestic environment in a manner that could foster
reform  and  conflict  resolution.  Financial  assistance  delivered  conditionally  triggered
important  reforms  in  the  constitutional,  fiscal  and  judicial  domains  (Ibid.).  From  this
perspective,  Mali  represents  a  scenario  in  which the EU could  play an  important  role  in
contributing to lasting peace despite the fact that Mali is not a prospective EU-member. The
country’s location in the EU’s broader neighbourhood and its historical ties to France provide
sufficient reasons for an EU’s involvement. The EU has indeed become a key player in the
country while using a regional approach to the multiple crises in the Sahel.
CSDP activities in Mali are part of the EU’s wider peacebuilding engagement; they are
part  of  the  EU  Sahel  Strategy.  The  strategy  is  a  practical  realisation  of  the  EU’s
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comprehensive approach. It is based on the assumptions that development and security are
linked and mutually reinforcing as well as that a solution to the complex crisis afflicting the
Sahel  demands  a  regional  response  (EEAS  2016d,  1).117 The  strategy mirrors  the  UN
comprehensive  and integrated  approach  to  crises  in  the  Sahel  region,  coordinated  by the
Special Envoy for the Sahel (UN Security Council 2012b, para. 10). In a similar way, the EU
established a position of its own EUSR for the Sahel.118 The EUSR for the Sahel is mandated
to coordinate  and foster  a  regional  approach and to  ensure political  backing of  the EU’s
activities in the region. The EU and its member states have actively supported the political
process which involved high-level mediation as well as nation-wide reconciliation projects.
The role of the EUSR for the Sahel in the peace talks and the implementation of the peace
agreement has been crucial for the success of the CSDP actions in Mali. The Sahel region has
become the EU’s broader neighbourhood in which the EU can promote stability as to prevent
crises. The restoration of lasting peace in Mali is an essential condition for the stability in the
Sahel, which ultimately contributes to the security in Europe (EEAS 2016d). This strategy
underlines that the Union has a long-standing, and self-centred, interest in reducing insecurity
and improving development in the Sahel. 
The new conflict in 2012 led to a revision of the EU Sahel Strategy: Regional Action
Plan 2015-2020 (Council of the EU 2015c). This plan defines a common strategic vision for
the Sahel. It focuses on four key domains: a) preventing radicalisation, b) creating appropriate
conditions for youth, c) migration and mobility, and d) integrated border management (IBM)
which also includes fight against illicit trafficking and transnational criminality. Although this
action plan intensively focuses on the stabilisation of the Sahel region, its real objective is the
control of borders as to prevent migration and smuggling. Mali, like Niger, has been a major
transit country for irregular migrants from western and southern parts of Africa. Assisted by
traffickers,  migrants  and refugees  seek to  cross  the borders  with  Mauritania,  Algeria  and
Niger on their way towards the north coast of Africa. Malian northern borders are virtually
impossible to control. Council Conclusions of 22 November 2013 called for a development of
CSDP as to provide support to border management in order to help third states and regions
better manage their  borders.  The FAC requested the finalisation of the concept for CSDP
117The financial  aid is  a  profound element  of  the EU Sahel  Strategy.  The EU is  the largest  contributor  to
development in the Sahel. The EU allocated over € 1.5 billion to Mali, Mauritania and Niger for development
between 2007-2013. The Sahel Strategy has additional financial resources of € 167 million for projects on
development and security. The EU and EU member states have financed CSDP missions and operations in
Mali and Niger. In addition, the donor conference for Mali in Brussels in 2013 committed aid worth € 3.2
billion, including € 523 million from the European Commission (EEAS 2016d, 2). 
118Michel Reveyrand-de Menthon was appointed as the EUSR for the Sahel in March 2013. He was replaced by
Angel Losada in November 2015.
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support  to  the  IBM,  recognising  its  possible  application  to  ongoing  and  future  CSDP
activities. The Council acknowledged the need to support Sahel-Saharan border management,
building on the concept for CSDP support to the IBM in the context of the African peace and
security architecture, as well as the EU Sahel Strategy (Council of the EU 2013g, 10). 
The intense focus on tackling the migration flows and controlling borders in the Sahel,
with the use of the CSDP, is expressed in several Council Conclusions (Council of the EU
2013f; 2014c). The use of term ‘stabilisation’ itself by EU officials and representatives in the
Council  committees  with  regard  to  EU  activities  in  Mali,  including  the  CSDP actions,
demonstrates  that  the  EU  prioritises  the  establishment  of  order  and  security  rather  than
positive peace.  The  EU’s turn to border and migration management through the CSDP is
supported by the UN which already in 2012 stressed the need for regional and international
organisations as well as bilateral partners to tackle transnational organised crime, including
illicit activities and trafficking, in Mali (UN Security Council 2012b). Indeed, trafficking and
terrorist  threats  provide  the  EU with a  strong justification  for  the  extension  of  its  CSDP
activities into migration and border control tasks. Having failed to meet the problem with
previous  tools,  the EU has  taken on new tasks  to address  the issues  of post-conflict  and
conflict-driven societies.  Yet,  the question remains  to  what  extent  this  shift  comes  at  the
expense of stabilisation and peacebuilding aspects. 
Furthermore,  the  EU  has  also  created  new  policy  instruments  and  tools  which
generally fall under the CSDP but are not administered by it. These new instruments support
CSDP activities, but merge tasks of peacebuilding, migration and border control, and fight
against terrorism. The EU Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) for stability and for addressing the
root causes of irregular migration in Africa adopted at the Valletta Summit in November 2015
is one of these instruments. The EUTF is part of the EU comprehensive approach in tackling
crises  in  the  Sahel.119 It  has  four  strategic  objectives:  1)  creating  greater  economic  and
employment  opportunities,  2)  strengthening  the  resilience  of  communities  and  the  most
vulnerable groups, including refugees and displaced people, 3) the improvement of migration
management in countries of origin, transit and destination, and 4) improved governance and
conflict prevention, including the reduction of irregular migration. Ten different programmes
were approved in February 2016 and 20 other programmes in April 2016. The EU’s non-
CSDP peacebuilding and stabilisation activities in Mali  have also extended their  focus to
migration  management.  For  instance,  the  EU  has  launched  Programme  d’Appui  au
Renforcement de la Sécurité (PARSEC) – a programme of support for enhancing the security
119It covers nine countries in the Sahel and Lake Chad region: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, the Gambia,
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. 
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and the management of borders in the regions of Gao and Mopti. PARSEC seeks to improve
the control of the territory by assisting with the development of a management system of
border areas, the flows of transport and persons as well  as cross-border cooperation as to
prevent  irregular  migration,  smuggling  of  migrants  and  human  trafficking  (European
Commission 2016b). 
Projects  with  funding  of more  than  €12  million  from  the  EU’s  IcSP are  another
example of the merger of migration/ border control and the CSDP. This merger has allowed
the private sector to assume tasks under the CSDP. Among the four projects, the most recent is
exclusively dedicated to the SSR (crisis management) in Mali.  It is conducted by  Civipol
Conseil,  a  consulting  and  engineering  company  of  the  French  Ministry  of  the  Interior
providing expertise  in  homeland security,  civil  registers,  civil  protection  and governance.
With the funding of five million Euro for the period between January 2017 and July 2018, the
programme aims to contribute to training and reform of the SSR (Peace Direct). Although the
project  resembles  the  civilian  CSDP mission,  it  has  taken over  the  task  of  tackling  the
migration  management,  initially  foreseen to  be  implemented  by EUCAP.  Civipol  Conseil
provides technical support to the management of the information centre and management of
the  migration.  It  covers  programmes  on  the  integration  of  migrants  and  strengthens  the
capacity  of  analysis  and  operational  strategic  planning  of  the  Centre  for  Migration
Information and Management  (CIGEM  -  Centre d'Information et  Gestion des Migrations)
which is based in Bamako. The Centre was created in 2008 through an agreement between the
EU  and  the  Government  of  Mali.  The  overwhelming  attention  paid  by  the  EU  to  the
management of migration signals that the EU’s considerations for a sustained contribution to
peacebuilding in Mali have been driven by the need to ensure a permanent stabilisation of the
country so that migratory movements do not take place at all. 
Unlike  BiH,  the  case  of  Mali  shows  a  significant  degree  of  multilateralism  and
practical cooperation and complementarity. The EU’s autonomy in the CSDP has been limited
in  this  case  since  the  EU is  not  the  only actor  in  Mali.  By and  large,  the  UN with  its
MINUSMA mission is the most significant player. In addition,  ECOWAS and the AU are
crucial African actors. Countries such as the USA, Canada and China are also involved in
Mali’s stabilisation. The Council Decisions establishing the EUTM and EUCAP emphasise
that the missions ought to be conducted in close coordination with other actors involved in the
support to the MaAF, in particular the UN, the AU, ECOWAS, the USA and Canada (Council
of  the  EU  2013c,  Art.  1,  7;  2016a).  The  CSDP mission  and  operation  are  indeed  the
autonomous actions of the EU. Yet, the EU does not only recognise the role of other actors,
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but it is also dependent on their support. For instance, some activities and travel by the EUTM
and EUCAP would not have been possible without the logistical support and force protection
provided by MINUSMA. The two CSDP actions are complementing the work of MINUSMA.
The EU has also increased its personnel and equipment contributions to MINUSMA to such
an extent that it was described by scholars as a European return to UN peacekeeping (see
Koops and Tercovich 2016). Nevertheless, the contributions by the EU states still represent a
relatively small share of the entire strength of more than 13,000 military personnel, almost
1,900  police  personnel  and  more  than  1,180  civilians  of  MINUSMA.  In  addition,  most
personnel  from  EU  member  states  is  stationed  on  compounds,  as  force  protection  for
important  sites,  such as  airports,  and as technical  support  rather  than directly engaged in
combat operations or civilian protection. Since violence has occurred only occasionally in the
form  of  small  insurgencies  and  small-scale  terrorist  attacks,  the  security  risks  for  EU
personnel in the UN mission are low. 
EU countries  present  in  Mali  have  also  pursued  their  own projects.  For  example,
Germany  has  contributed  to  the  strengthening  of  the  rule  of  law  in  northern  Mali  by
improving access to legal services, by supporting the constitutional reform through advice and
training, and by promoting cultural and social cohesion. Germany has financially supported
the activities of the Ministry for Reconciliation as well as the  Truth, Justice, Reconciliation
Commission, established after the conflict. In addition, Germany has advised and financed
training courses for West African police as well as the training of trainers at the School of
Peacekeeping (Ecole de Maintien de la Paix),  a training facility in Bamako  in support of
peace, in particular of the ECOWAS Standby Force for its three components - military, police
and civilian -  in preparation of their  deployment in peace missions.  This  activity aims at
strengthening the self-relying capability of ECOWAS forces. Other member states, such as
Denmark  or  Italy,  support  similar  projects.  While  such  activities  ultimately contribute  to
peacebuilding and stabilisation efforts  in  the country,  they also demonstrate  the lack of a
united approach of the EU. Instead of delivering these activities under the roof of the EU,
member states wish to control their actions. This multiple engagements of EU actors show
that the visibility of member states is given priority over a common action despite the fact that
member states attempt to act through a common approach. 
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Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that the EU lacked the political will to involve itself in the
Malian conflict in a crisis management capacity. Instead, it planned a peacebuilding action, in
particular a training mission, from the onset of the crisis while leaving the room for other
actors to enter the open conflict in a crisis management capacity. The military operation and
the civilian mission are results of the EU’s capability to agree on peacebuilding actions in this
particular situation, respectively the EU’s inability to pursue operations with combat forces
and peace-enforcement instruments. The EU’s involvement in Mali through these two CSDP
actions shows that CSDP instruments are better suited to carry out peacebuilding tasks. Under
current provisions, CSDP deployments such as those in Mali are dependent on the member
states’ political will, protracted planning, and logistical and security arrangements.
Both CSDP missions in Mali have demonstrated the EU’s normative commitment to
peacebuilding. Training and reform of the MaAF and the ISF as well as advice to the Malian
authorities have been designed according to the blueprint of a state-centred peacebuilding
model with an aim of building functioning state institutions. Nevertheless, the EU’s approach
to peacebuilding does not only aim at the stabilisation of the country. By deploying its CSDP
actions, the EU pursues its own objectives, in particular the protection of European borders
and security at home. The Sahel region has become a wider EU neighbourhood. Criminal and
terrorist  activities as well  as the flow of migrants and refugees in this  region have direct
consequences for the security of the EU. The EU assumes its responsibility in the stabilisation
and reconstruction of peace in Mali with an aim of contributing to the protection of its own
borders and security. With the expansion of the activities of EUCAP to tackle migration flows,
the EU has prioritised stabilisation efforts over the building of positive peace. The EU has not
only extended its focus to migration and border control activities, its new security concerns,
but has also activated new policy instruments to pursue these activities. The EU links the
prevention  of  migration  flows  to  peacebuilding  (i.e.  efforts  to  build  functioning  state
institutions) based on the understanding that a dysfunctional and fragile state leads to such
flows and to a worsening of the security situation. 
The CSDP actions in Mali are indeed expressions of the EU’s autonomy. At the same
time, unlike the EU missions in BiH, CSDP actions in Mali show a degree of multilateralism
and practical  cooperation.  The  EU’s  activities  have  been dependent  on  the  technical  and
political  support  of  other  actors.  They have  also  complemented  the  activities  of  the  UN,
ECOWAS,  the  AU  and  other  states.  The  EU  missions  have  focused  on  peacebuilding,
avoiding combat  and peacekeeping tasks.  However,  recent  developments  suggest  that  the
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terrorist  threat  in  Mali  will  continue  to  pose  a  challenge  to  the  country’s  stability.  The
situation where terrorist threats continue after the end of the violence, such as in Mali, require
the EU to reconsider its approach even in the area of peacebuilding if it wants to maintain its
role  as  an  international  actor.  These  new  security  developments  have  blurred  the  lines
between post-conflict and conflict phases, and between peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and
peacebuilding. Peacebuilding activities in such situations can be carried out only alongside
combat actions against terrorists, which can ensure security. EU missions and other activities,
in particular MINUSMA, may be in place for a longer run as initially foreseen. The growing
number of terrorist attacks provide strong arguments against deploying large missions to such
theatres.  What is  needed in such scenarios is a readiness to deploy rapid counter-terrorist
forces. The EU might be asked to amend its activities in the light of these demands, meaning
that it either would need to be prepared to step in a combat operation or redesign its training
activities for the MaAF as to make them self-capable of fighting terrorists. Counter-terrorism
should  include  broader  development  activities  aimed  at  education,  awareness  raising  and
prevention. The EU has already adjusted to the challenge of continuing ethnic divisions and
the unresolved Tuareg question by expanding the area of action to urban centres in the north.
Sustainability after the end of the mission is another challenge that the EU needs to address.
The realisation of the CBSD concept will provide an important step forward in increasing the
effect and successfulness of the CSDP actions. 
The case of Mali supports the belief that CSDP activities should be situated within a
geographically and horizontally broader strategy. Whether other peacebuilding, stabilisation
and development  measures  are  activated after  or  in  parallel  to  CSDP actions  depends on
particular circumstances. In Mali, the relatively stable environment in the south, which has
not  been  directly  affected  by  the  conflict,  has  allowed  for  the  continuation  of  other
peacebuilding activities, including the political process and development alongside the CSDP
actions. The case demonstrates that the EU’s peacebuilding approach cannot be applied to
particular crises as a static concept and doctrine. It has to be context-specific and strategic as
to create stable conditions by the time the activities of the mission cease. 
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7  Conclusion: CSDP – Towards and Beyond Peacebuilding
CSDP  missions  and  operations  represent  a  significant  contribution  to  international
peacebuilding efforts. Most CSDP actions have been deployed to post-conflict situations to
deliver peacebuilding tasks. Through these actions, the EU has helped to stabilise, reform and
build judiciary,  administrative and security institutions of several countries emerging from
violent conflicts. CSDP actions follow the logic of peacebuilding that focuses on the reform
and  building  of  Weberian  state  institutions  with  a  view  to  strengthening  a country’s
institutional  capacity  for  self-sustaining  peace.  This  approach  has  become  the  dominant
peacebuilding model pursued by states and intergovernmental organisations.  As a form of
international assistance to post-conflict societies, this model builds on the understanding that
functioning state institutions can prevent the recurrence of violence and ensure durable peace. 
The purpose of this dissertation has been to provide an insight into the EU’s approach
to peacebuilding through CSDP missions and operations so as to understand the extent to
which the  CSDP reflects a normative and practical commitment of the EU to international
peacebuilding. The thesis has argued that peacebuilding has become a norm and a practice in
the CSDP. Peacebuilding has become the main sphere of action for the CSDP reflecting the
EU’s  commitment  to  tackling  the  structural  causes  of  war  in  post-conflict  societies.  EU
peacebuilding  missions  make  the  CSDP a  distinctive  instrument  in  international  conflict
management. They use ‘soft’ military and civilian tools, such as capacity-building, training,
legal support and political advice, to pursue reforms and restructuring of key state institutions.
This approach stands in contrast to militarised actions of the US and NATO. According to
Smith, what makes the EU’s conflict prevention efforts so unique is that they are mostly based
on the EU’s own history and experience. Compared to NATO, the EU uses primarily civilian
power and a comprehensive toolbox of instruments (Smith 2008, 202). 
The analysis of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding in the CSDP has been conducted
through an examination  of  three  aspects:  conceptual  understandings  of  peacebuilding,  the
decision- and policy-making processes that generate CSDP peacebuilding actions, and two
case studies where CSDP peacebuilding missions and operations have been deployed. Chapter
one identified the framework of international norms and the theories of foreign policy analysis
as best suited to explore the nature of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding through the CSDP.
The  thesis drew  on  these  frameworks  to  investigate  why  most  CSDP actions  carry  out
peacebuilding  tasks  and  how  this  peacebuilding  is  conceptualised,  designed  and
operationalised.  Chapter  two attempted  to  understand  the  extent  to  which  the
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conceptualisation of EU peacebuilding has been influenced by the international normative
peacebuilding framework through the UN. The thesis then addressed the questions of how the
EU has developed its own approach to peacebuilding within the CSDP. The analysis of CSDP
decision- and policy-making showed how EU peacebuilding activities are designed as foreign
policy actions  that  reflect  the  preferences  of  member  states.  Finally,  by looking into  the
dynamics of the CSDP actions in BiH and Mali, the dissertation outlined how peacebuilding
under the CSDP has been operationalised. This concluding chapter summarises and discusses
the main findings of this research, deduces the implications for theories and policies, and
outlines prospects for further academic research.
Shift towards peacebuilding
Most CSDP actions carry out peacebuilding tasks despite the fact that the CSDP enables the
EU to deliver the full range of tasks of crisis management, including combat operations. The
shift  towards  peacebuilding  in  the  CSDP had already occurred  with  the  extension  of  the
original, militarily oriented Petersberg Tasks into civilian tasks of crisis management. The
tendency to  deploy missions  and operations  with  peacebuilding  mandates  to  post-conflict
scenarios has prevailed.  The first  sub-question of this  thesis  has explored the relationship
between the CSDP and the international norm of peacebuilding. The dissertation identified
two groups of factors that explain this shift towards peacebuilding within the CSDP. 
First, the introduction of the CSDP and its subsequent focus on peacebuilding have
been part of the adjustment of the international community to new security challenges after
the  end  of  the  Cold  War.  These  new  security  challenges  highlighted  the  need  for  new
strategies that  could ensure not only the absence of violence but also ‘positive’ peace by
addressing  the  root  causes  of  conflicts.  Peacebuilding  emerged  as  a  new practice  of  the
international  assistance to  post-conflict  societies to  enhance their  capacity to  build peace.
Many of these conflicts occurred at the EU’s doorstep. While being increasingly called upon
to tackle these conflicts, the EU embraced peacebuilding as one of its foreign policy priorities.
Chapters two and three have revealed that, in formulating its peacebuilding approach,
the EU has been influenced by the UN’s normative shift towards peacebuilding. The UN’s
traditional  approaches  to  peace  and  security,  namely  peacekeeping  mandated  to  monitor
ceasefire agreements, did not work in civil wars where violence was constantly re-erupting.
The  UN  has  therefore  carried  out  a  reform of  its  peacekeeping  which  resulted  into  the
extension of peacekeeping operations into peacebuilding tasks and the establishment of the
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PBC. It has adopted peacebuilding as a new norm and a practice in its approaches to conflicts.
The EU embraced the UN’s framing of peacebuilding, namely as a form of assistance
to  post-conflict  countries  focused  on  the  reform  and  building  of  state  institutions.  The
introduction of peacebuilding at the UN coincided with the launch of the CSDP which was
seen as a contribution to international peacebuilding efforts; in addition to the UN missions,
the CSDP represented a new institutional framework through which peacebuilding could be
delivered. Although the CSDP evolved out of the WEU and resembled NATO’s practice in its
origins, the extension into the peacebuilding scope has moved this EU’s conflict management
instrument closer to the UN. The formulation of the objectives, purposes and tools of the
CSDP has conformed to the reform of the UN peace missions. As members of the UN, the EU
countries played a key role in this reform process, and subsequently in the institutionalisation
of peacebuilding as a new practice at the UN, marked by the establishment of the PBC in
2005. 
Since then, the EU has continued in presenting its CSDP actions as contributions to
UN efforts  to  maintain  international  peace  and  security.  EU countries  have  continued  in
playing their key role in the design and promotion of new peacebuilding policies at the UN,
including in the introduction of integrated and multidimensional peace missions. The EU has
also undertaken important policy and institutional changes within its own structures, such as
the establishment of the EEAS, which have enhanced its common approach to peacebuilding.
The orientation of the EU towards peacebuilding has impacted on the context in which the
member states formulate foreign policies and interests. It has enhanced their understanding of
the importance of peacebuilding as an instrument to prevent the recurrence of violence and
the  necessity  of  a  common  approach  and  joint  actions  to  increase  the  successfulness  of
peacebuilding. As a result, this normative orientation shaped the image and self-perception of
the EU as an international peacebuilding actor, as formulated in EU and UN documents.
As chapter three has shown, the CSDP equipped the EU with its own instrument with
which it could deploy autonomous missions and operations. This autonomy has encouraged
the  EU  to  develop  its  own  approach  to  peacebuilding.  While  the  UN  has  continued  in
reforming its operations, resulting into the development of integrated and multidimensional
missions,  the EU has  shifted to  specialised missions  with narrow mandates.  The UN has
developed  its  peacebuilding  framework  further  by  embracing  an  understanding  of
peacebuilding  as  an  activity  that  is  often  carried  out  simultaneously  alongside  other
instruments. In contrast, the EU has continued in the practice that conditions peacebuilding by
a political solution and a secure environment. While EU countries agree that the conduct of
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combat actions and peacekeeping is often necessary during the peacebuilding phase, they,
except of a few, have been less willing to pursue such actions through the CSDP. This stance
challenges  the  EU’s  credibility  as  an  international  actor.  Although  recent  policy  and
institutional changes in the CSDP, such as the launch of PESCO, have enhanced the level of
ambition of the EU, it remains open to what extent such changes can prompt the EU to be
more proactive.
Second, chapter four and the case studies revealed that political and pragmatic reasons
have been behind the EU member states’ preference for peacebuilding over operations in open
conflicts or peacekeeping deployments. Although the strategic cultures of the EU member
states on defence and security have converged to an important extent, the EU is not yet fully
united  on  possible  justifications  for  deployments  of  combat  operations.  Many  EU  states
vociferously oppose  peace-enforcement  for  humanitarian  purposes  on  ethical  grounds.
Differences between member states’ geopolitical preferences contribute to this dissonance;
states  may oppose combat  operations  because they do not  see  such deployments  as  their
national  priority.  The  cases  of  Libya  and  Mali  where  the  EU  was  unable  to  reach  an
agreement on a full-scale combat operation showed that this attitude will not alter soon. 
The  thesis  has  established  that peacebuilding  with  the  focus  on  the  stabilisation,
reform and  rebuilding  of  state  institutions  remains  one  of  the  few areas  that  reflect  the
member  states’ common vision  on peace  operations.  Since  member states  are  not  always
capable of agreeing on combat or peacekeeping operations, peacebuilding often remains the
only option for the EU – if it wants to make any feasible contribution and to be seen as a
credible international actor. Agreeing on post-conflict peacebuilding tasks is easier than on
operations that require a deployment of military forces to an open conflict. Peacebuilding is
the  area  on  which  the  EU  member  states  are  able  to  agree,  therefore  reflecting  the
convergence of the member states’ foreign and defence policies. Indeed, these actions are
often symbolic gestures and come too late; CSDP missions generally enter the scene after the
conflict is over and in environments with relatively secure conditions. Nevertheless, they form
a part of the entire package of conflict management and are essential for the establishment of
sustainable peace.
As chapter four and the case studies have pointed out, this shift towards peacebuilding
in  the  CSDP is  a  result  of  pragmatic  reservations  and  limits  of  the  EU  member  states’
capabilities. Most member states see themselves as actors without adequate capacities, such as
sufficient  and  qualified  personnel,  sufficient  resources,  and required  military and civilian
assets, to engage in combat and peacekeeping operations. Some states are not willing to send
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their  personnel  to  countries  that  are  unfamiliar  to  them.  Such  deployments  require  the
personnel  to  acquire  additional  competencies,  including  language,  management  and
intercultural  skills,  which  military  and  civilian  personnel  often  lack.  States  are  not  only
hesitant to send but also to find personnel, especially civilian staff, who are willing to move to
countries with unstable security conditions and with malfunctioning infrastructure. Missions
in  such  countries  are  demanding  in  terms  of  financial  resources,  force  protection  and
medevac. Deploying personnel to secure environments runs low risks of human casualties and
keeps financial and human costs low. Peacebuilding actions are therefore a reasonable option
preferred  over  combat  operations  as  they  enable  the  contributing  country  to  avoid
overspending, casualties and failure, and with this connected domestic public humiliation.
The preference  for  peacebuilding  over  combat  and peacekeeping operations  in  the
CSDP has also been based on the understanding of the division of labour; member states have
seen  NATO,  other  regional  organisations  (e.g.  ECOWAS)  or  ad  hoc coalitions  to  be
responsible  for  peace-enforcement  actions,  and  the  UN  as  a  peacekeeping  actor.  This
understanding of the division of labour raises the question of whether the EU would do more
in combat operations if there were no NATO (or ECOWAS and France) or UN. The cases of
Libya  and  Mali  were  indeed  examples  where  Europeans  took  the  lead  in  initiating  and
commanding peace-enforcement actions. Yet, it was not the EU. As Biscop has argued: “[t]he
interventions in Libya in 2011 and in Mali in 2013 already were European, though not EU,
initiatives” (Biscop 2015a, 5). Some member states, such as Germany, have contributed to
these interventions by providing logistical and technical support. Nevertheless, member states
oppose combat actions through the CSDP in conflicts that do not threaten the EU as a whole.
This applies not only to countries which did not participate in the French-led operation in
Mali; as chapter four has shown, if Eastern-Europeans requested for a military action with
combat forces in Ukraine, France would oppose it under current circumstances.
The characteristics of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding within the CSDP
These  two  facets  of  the  shift  towards  peacebuilding  define  what  the  EU’s  approach  to
peacebuilding stands for. The EU’s conceptualisation of peacebuilding has a two-fold nature:
EU  peacebuilding  carried  out  within  CSDP  missions  and  operations  is  a  normative
commitment and an action of foreign policy.  The research therefore confirms the hypothesis
which has been at the centre of this study, namely that CSDP missions and operations reflect
the  EU’s  normative  and  practical  commitment  to  international  peacebuilding  efforts.  EU
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peacebuilding  within  the  CSDP  has  become  a  norm,  embedded  in  the  framework  of
international peacebuilding. At the same time, CSDP peacebuilding missions are a result of
the  EU’s  autonomous  foreign  policy.  The  two  aspects  are  mutually  reinforcing.  This
combination of the normative commitment and the foreign policy contributes to a unique
character of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding within its CSDP missions and operations.
Indeed, in some situations, the EU’s normative commitment becomes silenced by political and
operational limitations, as discussed in chapter four. Nevertheless, these limitations do not
disconfirm the normative dimension of the EU’s commitment to peacebuilding as such. While
the  foreign  policy  dimension  of  the  CSDP  affects  the  EU’s  normative  commitment  to
international  peacebuilding,  either  by enabling or  restricting CSDP actions,  the normative
dimension  impacts  on  the  realisation  of  the  CSDP  by  reminding  the  EU  about  its
commitment. The extent to which one or another dimension becomes stronger depends on the
contextual circumstances of a given case.
The EU’s normative commitment to international peacebuilding through the CSDP
The  normative  perspective  portrays  the  EU’s  approach  to  peacebuilding  as  the  EU’s
commitment to international peacebuilding. Based on various EU documents and statements,
the EU understands peacebuilding in normative terms as a commitment to international peace
efforts. In accordance with the international peacebuilding framework, CSDP peacebuilding
missions pursue their objectives according to the state-centred peacebuilding model. Missions
and operations reform and build functioning state services, such as police, justice and military
sectors,  according to  the blueprint  of  the  liberal  state  system.  By seeking to  develop  the
country’s institutional capacity for self-sustaining peace and stability, they promote specific
values and norms. Missions and operations perform more than just reforms, capacity-building
and  institution-building;  through  these  activities,  they  attempt  to  contribute  to  a  more
democratic and accountable state. 
CSDP peacebuilding missions are part of the family of international peace missions
carried out by international organisations.  While the idea of the CSDP evolved mainly in
relation to NATO, the EU’s approach to peacebuilding has been underpinned by the UN’s
understanding of peacebuilding, which also focuses on the rebuilding of state institutions. The
EU presents its CSDP actions as a contribution to the UN efforts to maintain international
peace and security. Yet, the UN approach is broader and all-encompassing with UN missions
mandated to deliver a wide range of tasks. In contrast, each EU mission or operation with a
peacebuilding mandate focuses on one particular area – one of the six priorities of the civilian
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crisis management and capacity- and institution-building in the case of military operations.
While a typical UN mission includes the DDR, the SSR, military and police training, civil
administration, and other tasks, a typical EU mission would perform only one of the tasks. 
This  narrow focus does not  mean that  the EU’s understanding of  peacebuilding is
incompatible with international norms. EU missions and operations follow the logic of the
international peacebuilding framework, as discussed above. The difference is that they focus
on specific areas as a result of political and operational considerations. According to some
officials,  this  limited  focus  and  the  prioritisation  of  certain  key  areas  increase  the
successfulness of achieving the effective functionality of a particular sector. The EU supports
this claim by the completion of successful missions and operations. For example, the EUPM
mission in BiH has helped to build a functioning police sector. The CSDP actions in FYROM
were fundamental to the establishment of peace and stability in the country. 
While the EU deploys its CSDP peacebuilding actions in post-conflict situations that
have been stabilised to some extent, the UN has shifted from the original understanding of
peacebuilding as an activity that follows after peacekeeping to one that is  often deployed
simultaneously with other instruments. The EU’s narrow focus runs the risk of neglecting or
not connecting the respective sector to other important areas. For instance, the EUPM, despite
the advice of the UN, did not initially link police reform to the reform of the justice system,
and added the justice sector perspective only at a later stage. While viewing EU missions as a
key contribution  to  its  own peace  efforts,  the  UN has  called  upon the  EU to  deploy its
missions in a direct support of the UN missions and to become more active in other tasks of
conflict management, including through Battlegroups to manage open conflicts or to stabilise
post-conflict situations. 
Indeed, the EU’s normative commitment appears weak in conflicts in which the EU
did not intervene with a CSDP action. However, the absence of a CSDP action in such cases
does not reflect the EU’s lack of commitment to peacebuilding but the lack of commitment to
peace-enforcement, political tools and other instruments required in such scenarios. What the
EU needs is the political will and readiness to deploy the whole range of instruments from
peacemaking, peace-enforcement, peacekeeping to peacebuilding, or robust, multidimensional
missions with all the required instruments. In such constellations, the EU could realise its
commitment to peacebuilding alongside other tasks. A rapid or multidimensional commitment
was deemed necessary for instance in Libya and Mali at the beginning of the crises where the
EU was hesitant to act, and entered with peacebuilding instruments only once the countries
were pacified by other actors to some extent.
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It is difficult to expect the EU to conduct military interventions when some member
states oppose such interventions for idealogical and political reasons. The EU also continues
to be committed to such countries through other forums, such as the UN, where it campaigns
for international support for relevant actions. Many conflicts, such as those in Syria or in the
ISIS-occupied  territories,  require  not  only  a  national  but  also  regional  and  international
political solution (mediation and other peaceful solutions) or the use of force in their current
stage. To reach a political solution for Syria, an agreement among the USA, Russia and other
players in the region, and their sustained commitment are necessary. The case studies of BiH
and Mali have demonstrated that, although peacekeeping and combat actions have continued
during the peacebuilding phase, peacebuilding was possible only after prospects for a political
solution  and  a  certain  degree  of  stability  were  guaranteed.  To  conduct  its  peacebuilding
activities, the EU also needed a liable partner at the governmental level in the host country.
The  EU’s  commitment  to  international  peacebuilding  therefore  depends  on  the
preconditions of a political solution and a certain level of stability in the given post-conflict
country. This means that the EU deploys peacebuilding actions not only where it is deemed
necessary but where the political and security situation allows it. This approach is compatible
with the peacebuilding frameworks that emphasise either the necessity of a political solution
and basic stability or a simultaneous deployment of all necessary instruments. The UN, the
bearer  of  international  norms,  has  embraced  the  latter,  whereas  the  EU continues  in  the
practice of the former. These two modes represent different methods, but the objectives and
contents of peacebuilding remain identical. The fact that the EU is less willing to engage in
conflicts with peacekeeping and combat actions does not undermine the EU’s commitment to
peacebuilding. Instead, it reflects the EU’s political and pragmatic restraints resulting from the
autonomous nature of the CSDP which highlights the limits of the level of the EU’s ambition
as an international actor in the entire spectrum of conflict management.  
The autonomous character of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding within the CSDP
The EU’s approach to peacebuilding within the CSDP also reflects  the EU’s autonomous
capacity in international relations. EU member states perceive peacebuilding activities within
the CSDP as actions of EU foreign policy - outcomes of EU common decision- and policy-
making. EU missions are actions that reflect member states’ strategic interests, preferences,
concerns and constraints. They are an integral part of the EU politico-military foreign affairs.
They are decided, planned, designed and delivered as foreign policy actions of member states.
While the EU adopted peacebuilding as a normative framework, through its own practice and
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political processes, it pursues peacebuilding activities in a pragmatic and political way. From
the perspective of foreign policy analysis, the EU’s approach to peacebuilding in the CSDP
therefore corresponds with Hill’s framework of the  ability to agree, the  resources and the
instruments which are necessary for the EU if it wants to be a credible foreign policy actor.
While in 1993, Hill argued that the EU lacked these capabilities, the deployment of more than
30 CSDP missions and operations has shown that the EU is capable of agreeing on external
actions, has instruments for these purposes, and is willing to provide resources.
Nevertheless, this autonomous character of the CSDP is indeed one of the causes of
the narrow focus of the EU missions. It is characterised by the EU’s capability-expectations
gap, i.e. the inability of the EU to deploy more robust missions with an extended or fully
comprehensive approach due to  the lack of  political  will,  instruments  and resources.  The
majority of missions that have carried out peacebuilding tasks suggests that peacebuilding
within  the  CSDP remains  subject  to  the  gap  between  expectations  that  arise  from these
capabilities. Peacebuilding, in particular the building of state institutions, is what the EU is
mostly capable of and where its strength rests – on which member states are able to agree and
for which they are able to provide required resources. 
Indeed, this does not undermine the importance of peacebuilding or the role of the EU
in  contributing  to  international  peacebuilding  as  compared  to  combat  operations  and
peacekeeping. On the contrary, as demonstrated by past failures, peacebuilding is essential for
achieving peace and stability in post-conflict  societies. CSDP missions and operations are
deployed in countries and regions which are in the sphere of the EU’s geopolitical priorities.
The EUGS locates the areas of the EU’s geopolitical priorities for crisis management clearly
in the EU’s immediate and broader neighbourhood. Despite a few exceptions of missions in
remote  regions,  such  as  Aceh,  almost  all  missions  have  been  deployed  in  Europe,  the
Caucasus, the Near East and Africa. Deployments in remote regions may depend on whether
the crisis poses a direct harm to the EU vital interests.
Peacebuilding  activities  that  are  delivered  through  the  CSDP  are  designed  and
governed  through  complex  decision-  and  policy-making  processes  that involve  the  EU
member states and the EU institutions -  the Council preparatory bodies and the EEAS. The
former  represents  member  states  (actors)  and  the  latter  refers  to  institutions  (agents  and
structures). Yet, processes of decision- and policy-making in the CSDP have blurred the lines
between the actor-structure distinction. The design and governance of peacebuilding activities
within  respective  missions  is  shaped by the  involvement  of  both  member  states  and EU
institutions at multiple levels. 
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Common institutions  through which  member states  negotiate  their  preferences  and
concerns  provide a  platform where differences  are  being  increasingly converged.  Council
preparatory bodies and the EEAS encourage a coordinated approach to decision- and policy-
making on CSDP matters. CSDP actions therefore contribute to the development of an EU
identity in international relations; they present the EU abroad as a coherent actor. They are
adopted and undertaken by the EU as a distinct legal entity (Art. 28 and 47 TEU). As a result,
these  actions  serve  a  broader  purpose  of  enhancing the  integration  of  the  EU since  they
require a high degree of cooperation and solidarity between the member states. Peacebuilding
is a result  of consensus-searching processes aimed at  reconciling member states’ different
preferences. Although member states seek to pursue their own interests, they wish to reach an
agreement on common objectives and actions for the sake of their common policy. 
While member states control and govern every stage of the peacebuilding action from
its planning to delivery, the EEAS has increasingly become involved in CSDP policy-making.
The EEAS seeks the coherence of the foreign policies of the EU member states. The EEAS
has  indeed developed  its  own priorities.  Nevertheless,  the  member  states  remain  directly
involved in every aspect of the policy-making process - not only in the decision-making but
also in the planning, management,  command and implementation phases.  As Edwards has
framed  it:  “the  assumption  that  a  High  Representative  even  with  an  EEAS will  make  a
qualitative  difference  is  an  optimistic  one;  there  remain  too  many  hands  on  the  wheel”
(Edwards 2013, 75). This intense involvement of the member states makes the EU’s approach
different from that of the UN, where the gap between the UN institutions and the UN member
states is considerably deeper. At the UN, decision-making on matters of international peace
and security is concentrated in the hands of the UNSC. However,  planning, coordination,
oversight and conduct of particular missions is carried out by institutions. 
The operational side of the EU’s two-fold approach to peacebuilding within the CSDP
The implementation phase of peacebuilding in CSDP actions is case-specific. Although the
forms, contents and objectives of missions and operations are similar, CSDP actions differ
from country to country depending on the nature of the EU’s relations with the host country
and the EU’s strategic priorities. The peacebuilding activities in CSDP actions in BiH have
been influenced by a membership dimension. The EU did not only aim to build capacities,
institutions and sectors of a functioning state; the aim of the CSDP mission and operation has
been to build institutions according to the EU model as to ensure the country’s compliance
with the EU’s  acquis communitare. The ultimate aim of these activities has been to prepare
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the country for EU membership. The civilian mission and the military operation have been
fundamental  elements  of  this  accession-driven  process.  This  comprehensive  approach,
through  the  SAP and  later  the  SAA,  accelerated  peacebuilding  efforts.  It  has  formed  a
cornerstone of the EU’s peacebuilding approach based on a belief that regional integration and
interdependence  can  establish  sustainable  peace.  The  case  of  BiH  demonstrates  that
peacebuilding through membership-building has credible chances of achieving durable peace. 
In BiH, the EU has significantly impacted upon the implementation of peacebuilding
policies. As chapter five has shown, this approach runs the risk of undermining the national
and local ownership. In the case of BiH, the EU has used conditionality in a coercive manner
through the OHR. Nevertheless, the case of BiH also demonstrates that the prospects of EU
membership can generate not only push but also pull factors on the side of the host country.
While such an interventionism into the domestic affairs of third countries may be perceived as
a form of ‘Western hegemony’, it  proved essential for not only ensuring security but also
making the return to  violence in BiH unthinkable.  As this  case study shows, to  avoid an
opposition  of  the  EU  peacebuilding  policies  by  local  actors  in  the  host  country,  the
cooperation with local stakeholders and acknowledgement of their interests are essential.
In contrast, Mali, as a non-European country, has no prospect of EU membership. The
peacebuilding activities in the two CSDP missions have focused on the capacity-building and
reform of the police and military sectors. These activities have aimed at the establishment of
security arrangements that would ultimately enhance the security of the EU. Peacebuilding in
Mali, and in the Sahel, can be framed as ‘security-building’ or ‘protection of EU borders’.
Both  missions  aim  at  the  establishment  of  a  stable  Malian  society,  which  ultimately
contributes to the security of Europe. It is too early to assess the successfulness of CSDP
activities in Mali. Soldiers who received CSDP training have been deployed to the north of
Mali to fight terrorists. The military and police sectors have undergone a number of reforms.
The CSDP activities have also contributed to the creation of effective arrangements to tackle
illegal  migration and trafficking.  Nevertheless,  the security situation in  the north remains
apprehensive  with  potential  asymmetric  threats  of  terrorism.  Most  importantly,  further
economic, social and political reforms are necessary to ensure sustainable and all-inclusive
peace. Regional cooperation between the Sahel countries is a crucial step towards this goal.
The foreign policy dimension of CSDP actions with peacebuilding mandates is also
evident through the extension of the scope of some missions to cover issues which concern
the EU’s own security. As the Mali chapter has shown, the missions and operations in the
Sahel which were initiated as peacebuilding actions with capacity- and institution-building
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tasks have become security missions mandated to protect the EU, its borders and its citizens.
The mandates of these missions have been extended to tackle illegal migration, refugee issues,
trafficking and terrorism, which are seen as threats to the EU security.  The missions tackle
these threats through capability- and institution-building activities aimed at ensuring that these
countries are capable of controlling their borders. The EU maintains that this will ultimately
help to protect its borders against terrorism and irregular migration. 
Certainly,  post-conflict  peacebuilding  and  stabilisation  contribute  inevitably  to  the
enhancement of the EU’s own security. Yet, this recent shift raises the questions of the EU’s
underlying  interests  that  determine  the  nature  of  these  engagements.  These  developments
demonstrate  that  EU  peace  missions  are  an  outcome  of  EU  foreign  policy-making.  The
profound  involvement  of  the  member  states  in  all  the  phases  of  CSDP  missions  has
contributed to this shift away from the altruistic purposes of peacebuilding to the self-centred
focus on the EU’s own security. The EU uses its peacebuilding missions as instruments to
enhance the security of its borders and citizens. As a result, EU peacebuilding through the
CSDP embodies the interconnectedness between external and internal security.
The Mali and BiH case studies prove that the two sides of EU peacebuilding are not
contradictory. EU peacebuilding actions are normative, as they promote norms and standards
of a well-functioning state. At the same time, as outcomes of EU foreign policy, they also
serve Europe’s strategic interests. While peacebuilding scholars tend to criticise this side of
the EU’s peacebuilding activities, claiming that the EU merely pursues its own interests, the
altruistic effects of this approach are equally evident. Peacebuilding projects through CSDP
actions have been deployed to serve the interests of both the EU and the host countries. As
Biscop argues, “[f]oreign policy is about interests […it] is neither good nor bad […]. It is the
way in which these interests are then pursued which can be “good” or “bad” (Biscop 2015a,
4). In this sense, stability and peace in Mali and the Western Balkans, and the stability and
peace in Europe are not exclusive but mutually reinforcing. The nexus of external and internal
security in the EU’s peacebuilding policy through the CSDP, as well as other instruments,
requires acknowledging that EU foreign policy is pursued with interests. 
Theoretical and policy implications
Implications for theoretical approaches
This  thesis  has  shown  that  international  peacebuilding  theories  have  two  major  inherent
weaknesses. The first weakness is that they continue to be discussed as idealistic concepts
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without  a  proper  consideration  of  political  and  international  links.  The  theories  provide
descriptive accounts of respective conceptual understandings and objectives of peacebuilding
activities and set idealistic blueprints for the establishment of sustainable peace. They lack
more realistic considerations as they tend to neglect the role of state actors and institutions.
State actors are often not taken into account by scholars who study peacebuilding theories.
However, peacebuilding does not occur in a vacuum; it is affected by and has an effect on
political processes in a country of deployment as well as on international affairs. This thesis
has shown that state-centred peacebuilding is a set of activities and policies which are shaped
by political decisions of state actors. In terms of actors, peacebuilding theories tend to focus
on the UN, international NGOs or local/ national actors. The EU as an actor in peacebuilding
is  absent  in  scholarly  literature  on  the  subject  of  peacebuilding.  As  this  work  has
demonstrated, political decision-making and policy-making, and preferences and interests of
state actors directly influence the shape of peacebuilding, and thus its effects. Peacebuilding
activities  are  designed,  shaped and implemented  as  subjects  of  foreign  policies  of  states.
Peacebuilding  theories  should  consider  wider  political  and international  links  to  be  more
feasible and realistic. 
The second weakness is that peacebuilding theories are highly critical when it comes
to  assessing  peacebuilding  actions  delivered  by  international  governmental  actors.  The
successfulness  of  peacebuilding  missions,  such  as  CSDP  missions  and  operations,  in
contributing to durable peace in a receiving country is difficult to measure. The success of  a
particular  mission  is  measured  in  terms  of  achieving  its  objectives.  But  often,  even  if  a
particular task or a set of tasks are delivered and achieved according to the peacebuilding
blueprint,  sustainability cannot be guaranteed.  In this respect,  peacebuilding theories often
neglect the role of host countries which also play their own important role in the post-conflict
stabilisation and peacebuilding. Their willingness to build a peaceful society and commitment
to  peace  are  fundamental  conditions  for  any successful  peacebuilding.  Most  importantly,
external factors, such as economic dependence, threat of international terrorism or climate
issues also influence conflict dynamics. The case studies of Mali and BiH demonstrate that
the  extent  to  which  the  host  country is  ready and  willing  to  cooperate  on  peacebuilding
projects influences the successfulness of missions and operations. 
The decision- and policy-making process on peacebuilding within the CSDP confirms
the relevance of Howorth’s framework of supranational intergovernmentalism to the attempt
to explain peacebuilding under the CSDP as an outcome of a combined intergovernmental and
supranational policy-making. On the one hand, decision- and policy-making processes that
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produce  peacebuilding  in  the  CSDP are  highly  intergovernmental.  In  this  sense,  CSDP
peacebuilding  projects  the  preferences  of  member  states  which  seek  to  shape  the  CSDP
according  to  their  interests.  On the  other  hand,  EU peacebuilding  within  the  CSDP is  a
product  of  complex  yet  structured  institutionalised  processes.  Supranational
intergovernmentalism is a framework that fuses realism and liberalism into one theoretical
system. It could be therefore argued that the EU is a rare political entity in the international
relations which balances the tension between realism and liberalism. 
CSDP peacebuilding  missions  reflect  the  attempt  by  member  states  to  reach  an
agreement on common actions despite the fact that they often pursue different preferences.
The  insights  into  the  structures  of  the  CSDP confirm  previous  research  on  the  role  of
socialisation in decision- and policy-making within the Council preparatory committees and
the  EEAS  (Cross  2010;  Howorth  2010;  2014;  Juncos  and  Pomorska  2006;  Juncos  and
Reynolds 2007). Peacebuilding represents a policy on which the member states can agree. As
a result, this cooperation contributes to the convergence of member states’ foreign policies
and therefore to a formulation of an EU strategic culture. While arguing that peacebuilding
within the CSDP is part of the continuation of the evolving EU strategic culture, the thesis
confirms previous research by Meyer (2006) and Cornish and Edwards (2001; 2005). 
The analysis of CSDP decision- and policy-making processes, and particular missions
and operations in BiH and Mali confirms Eilstrup-Sangiovanni’s (2003) argument that the
CSDP is better suited to address non‐military tasks of conflict management and post‐conflict
rebuilding rather than military combat operations. At the same time, this research establishes,
in accordance with Biscop’s argument (Biscop 2013a), that the EU needs to be capable of the
full spectrum of conflict management operations, including rapid military combat operations,
to  step  into  situations  of  open  conflicts.  It  is  in  Europe’s  responsibility  to  assume  the
leadership “in maintaining peace and security” in its close and broader neighbourhood (Ibid.,
4). In many conflict  situations outside the EU, such as that in Mali,  neither the USA nor
NATO will take the lead. At the same time, the UN or African actors such as ECOWAS and
the AU are often too weak to tackle terrorist threats like those in Mali or CAR. For now, the
CSDP is  less  likely  to  be  used  in  such  situations.  Nevertheless,  the  EU could  be  more
ambitious and explore other options such as that provided in the provision of PESCO. The
readiness of the EU member states to agree on military operations Atalanta and Sophia and to
contribute to these actions with personnel and resources suggests that the EU is capable of
such  actions.  Indeed  the  agreement  for  these  actions  has  been  driven  by  a  common
understanding that they tackle crises which represent imminent threats to the EU’s security
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and harm the EU’s economic interests. Nevertheless, the threat of transnational terrorism and
the recent refugee crisis have highlighted that even ‘remote’ conflicts such as those in Mali,
Somalia, or Sudan have implications for the security of the EU and its citizens. 
Implications for the CSDP
The implications for CSDP policy-making and practice from the analysis provided in this
thesis are that the CSDP is less suitable for use in open conflicts or immediate post-conflict
stabilisation for dogmatic and pragmatic reasons which follow the logic of Hill’s capability-
expectations gap. As far as dogmatic reasons are concerned, member states do not have a
common view on liberal  interventionism and combat  operations  in  third countries.  While
France  and  the  UK,  and  to  some extent  Southern  and  Eastern  European  countries,  have
favoured combat operations in third countries for humanitarian purposes, Germany, Austria
and other countries have opposed such interventions for normative reasons. Some countries
do not feel compelled to intervene in countries which are not of strategic interest to them; they
expect other EU members or non-EU countries and international organisations to act.  For
these member states, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement deployments under an EU flag in a
third country are possible if  a member states takes the leading role in command, and the
supply of military assets and personnel, given that the deployment is requested by the host
country and complies with international law. This was the case of CAR (2014-2015) where
France took the leading role in command and the mission has been almost exclusively staffed
by French military forces. The deployment was indeed limited to Bangui and direct military
combat engagements were almost absent. However, as the Atalanta and Sophia operations
demonstrate,  the  EU  member  states  are  capable  of  peace-enforcement  and  peacekeeping
deployments with the objective to contain situations which member states perceive as direct
threats to their national or collective security and where it is clearly apparent that no other
international actor assumes this role. 
In terms of practical reservations, member states are not always willing to provide
military and civilian assets that are required and do not possess sufficient expertise for combat
and  peacekeeping  operations.  As  a  result,  member  states  tend  to  agree  on  peacebuilding
activities which are less demanding in terms of instruments and personnel. Yet, discrepancies
arise also here. While civilian and military training missions could be seen as less demanding,
they are more difficult to launch due to a lack of qualified and sufficient personnel. The lack
of  resources  and instruments  therefore does not only concern military combat  operations;
training and capacity-building missions also require the provision of instruments, equipments,
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knowledge and skills. Missions and operations with a peacebuilding mandate require new or
additional skills and competencies. Capacity- and institution-building activities are different
from  ‘classical’ peacekeeping  tasks  in  which  military  staff  involves  in  fighting,  civilian
protection,  observation  or  monitoring.  Civilian  staff  also  requires  new  skills  and
competencies. Abroad, military, police and civilian personnel engage in tasks that are different
from those they would usually engage in at home. 
Further,  policy-making  and  technical  constraints  impede  rapid  deployments  in
situations  of  open conflicts.  Protracted planning that  characterises  CSDP actions  is  better
suited to post-conflict  peacebuilding tasks.  Since the launch of the first  mission,  the time
between the political decision and the deployment has not been reduced. In 2017, a group of
member states and the EEAS have prepared concept papers for the realisation of reactive,
fast-track and more flexible civilian missions. This proposal includes ‘modular missions’ for
fact finding composed of a standing capacity (15 to 20 stand-by officials) or specialised teams
(20 to 30 experts), and reinforced by the CPCC or the Mission Support Platform (informal
interview M).  However,  the  limited  scope  and  capacities  of  these  proposals  are  relevant
essentially  for  scenarios  where  a  sufficient  level  of  security  has  been achieved or  where
required security arrangements are in place. 
The EU’s capability-expectations gap generates important questions of who should be
tasked with combat operations and peacekeeping (with the mandate of civilian protection).
Despite the fact that NATO is seen as an organisation that is capable of rapid deployments for
combat operations and the UN for peacekeeping in the immediate aftermath of a conflict, the
EU will  continue  to  be  requested  to  launch  rapid  response  operations,  including  combat
operations. Biscop has noted that EU states will have to assume more responsibility as they
can no longer count on the US in taking the proactive leading role on Europe’s doorsteps. As
the US has re-shifted its focus to Asia and the Pacific, the EU is left to cope with crises such
as those in North Africa (Biscop 2015a). Similar implications have been drawn from the EU
taking over NATO in Bosnia. The EU assumed the leadership in post-conflict peacebuilding
in BiH very late. An early involvement, with peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities could
have speeded the process of the post-conflict recovery in the country and the region.
As the case of Mali has demonstrated, rapid response actions are especially needed to
tackle the threat of terrorism. There are strong arguments against deploying large missions to
highly  insecure  and  unstable  theatres,  especially  those  with  asymmetric  threats.  What  is
needed in scenarios such as Mali is a readiness to deploy rapid counter-terrorism force. It is
indeed questionable whether the EU is able to agree on counter-terrorism operations through
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the  CSDP and  whether  it  is  capable  of  rapid  deployments.  Moreover,  counter-terrorism
actions as part of peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions may run the risk of undermining
the legitimacy and impartiality of the EU. This is the case of the UN missions in Mali, the
extension of which into counter-terrorism tasks, according to some scholars, could undermine
the legitimacy of not only the mission itself but also peacekeeping in general and the UN as
an impartial actor (Avezov 2015; Karlsrud 2017). 
Despite  these  reservations,  the  EU  would  need  to  adapt  to  these  challenges  and
develop ways for deploying counter-terrorism actions – most probably as short-term rapid
response  operations  through  a  coalition  of  willing  and  with  the  full  support  of  the  host
country. Since it is unlikely that member states agree on such deployments through the CSDP,
alternatives  must  be  found  to  match  the  expectations.  The  possibility  of  differentiated
integration through PESCO, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty offers an opportunity for those
member states who are capable of combat operations.  However,  as Biscop has argued, in
order the match the level of ambition, the EU member states need to further develop this idea.
This requires the willingness of those member states which want to pursue these project to
move from cooperation to effective integration in defence, which ultimately necessitates the
creation of permanent multinational frameworks (Biscop 2017a; 2017b). 
Moreover,  rapid  deployment  is  sometimes  required  for  civilian  missions  too,
especially in  cases  of  humanitarian crises,  civil  administration  and monitoring.  These are
reflected in the respective Petersberg Tasks, such as humanitarian and rescue tasks, and in the
priorities of civilian crisis management, such as civil administration and monitoring missions.
Yet, EU civilian actions aimed at conflict prevention or peacebuilding in third countries do
not necessarily have to be carried out under the CSDP. The EUMM in former Yugoslavia has
never become part of the CSDP. The EU mission in Moldova-Ukraine has been governed by
the  European Commission.  Before  the  CSDP, the  EU launched its  EU Administration  of
Mostar  -  a  civil  administration  mission  from  1994  to  1997  which  supervised  the
reconstruction  of  the  heavily  destroyed  city,  the  reintegration  of  communities,  and  the
establishment of a shared framework of government (Bose 2002). Article 28 of the Lisbon
Treaty,  on the basis  of which Council  decisions  on all  crisis  management  operations  and
missions are adopted, does not specify which instrument the EU must use when deciding on
an operational action.120 The use of this article indeed remains a subject of legal interpretation
120Article 28.1 states that: “[w]here the international situation requires operational action by the Union, the
Council shall adopt the necessary decisions. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be
made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation” (TEU
Art. 28(1)). EU operational action, which replaced “joint action” is a legal instrument of the EU CFSP and
means an operational  action required by the international  situation by the EU for which the EU can use
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and obscurity. Yet, this article could provide the EU with a faster decision-making procedure
under which the EU could launch a civilian action. By using this article, the Council could
delegate the EEAS with planning, command and oversight of the mission. Again, any such
action would require resources from the member states. At the time of writing of this thesis,
the EEAS was drafting a concept paper on the possibility of launching ‘civil administration’
missions under this article under the responsibility of the EEAS (see p. 185 of this thesis).  
Institutions-oriented  peacebuilding  requires  economic  and  social  development  to
ensure  its  perpetuation.  Sustainability  of  reforms  after  the  end  of  the  mission  is  another
challenge that the EU needs to address. The realisation of the CBSD concept will provide an
important step forward in increasing the effectiveness and successfulness of CSDP actions.
This equally applies to  counter-terrorism. Tackling the problem of terrorism requires more
than combat operations. What it  more needed are prevention activities on the ground that
would address underlying factors of religious radicalisation and recruitment, such as identity
issues, economic deprivation, and ethnic and social marginalisation, especially among young
people. The EU lacks prevention strategies to tackle religious radicalism and fundamentalism
among young people and young adults in countries emerging from conflicts. These challenges
highlight the importance of security and development nexus – the need for continued and
committed attention of the EU to economic and social development. This requires investing in
programmes oriented towards education, awareness raising and employment. 
EU peacebuilding missions have faced the challenge of preventing the perception of
interventionism and ensuring local and national ownership. The extent of the involvement of
the host country depends on case-specific circumstances and on the nature of the relationship
that  the EU has with the country.  In  countries in  which CSDP actions are  part  the EU’s
contractual agreements, such as the SAA in the case of BiH, the EU has a significant room for
exercising  its  influence  and  power  over  the  host  country.  At  the  same  time,  contractual
agreements require the host country to cooperate with the EU. But, the EU can also support
local  and  national  ownership  by  introducing  participatory  methods  and  activities.  For
instance, local police officers in BiH have been involved in the formulation of programmes
and projects run by the EUPM through the co-location and other participatory arrangements
that the mission established. At the same time, the mission used the OHR and the EUSR to
influence  and  impose  certain  reforms.  The  initial  phase  of  the  operation  Althea,  with
executive mandate, provided less room for local and national ownership. The situation in Mali
is different. Mali is not a prospective EU member and the EU does not have a contractual
national and EU resources, such as personnel, financing and equipment (EUR-Lex “EU action (CFSP)”). 
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agreement  with  the  country.  As  result,  the  power  and  leverage  of  the  EU  over  the
peacebuilding process is limited. This may affect the effectiveness of the EU actions as the
host country may not feel compelled to reforms according to the blueprint provided by the
EU. Yet, even in this case, France has significant leverage over its former colony, which the
EU has used to pursue its perspectives and visions. 
Also, the member states’ day-to-day involvement in and control of the every stage and
aspect of each CSDP mission and operation hampers the efficiency and speed of the CSDP
activities, thus impacting on the overall effectiveness of missions and operations. Compared
to UN missions, this procedure is excessive. Despite the fact that the UN deploys more robust
missions,  member  states  which  decide  on  and  contribute  to  the  operations  have  limited
involvement in their planning, coordination and oversight. Giving more rights to the EEAS –
CSDP structures, especially in planning, would make the process more effective and efficient
in terms of timing, and financial and human costs. 
Future research
The discussion on the EU’s approach to peacebuilding in the CSDP raises broader questions
about the roles and functions of the EU in building peace in third countries. While the thesis
examined CSDP missions and operations as a normative and practical commitment of the EU
to international peacebuilding, it was beyond the scope of this research to assess the wider
impact, performance and effectiveness of the CSDP as a peacebuilding tool. An assessment of
these  factors  is  needed  to  understand  why some countries,  such  as  FYROM,  have  been
successful in achieving peace, while others, such as BiH, need a longer period, and some
countries,  such as CAR, where previous  missions seemed to achieve peace,  relapsed into
violence again. The assessment of the performance of the CSDP would reveal what the EU
did differently in achieving sustainable peace in some countries and what went wrong in other
scenarios. Such an assessment could aid our understanding of the role of CSDP missions and
operations  in  contributing  to  the  establishment  of  durable  peace.  It  could  offer
recommendations for improvements in CSDP policies and for the development of conceptual
and operational frameworks that reflect the reality.
During my fieldwork, I collected a large amount of data which I have not used in this
dissertation due to the thematic and word count limits. Interviewees raised the questions of
new developments in security, such as cyber security, which the EU will have to tackle in the
future. Research suggested that environmental issues, climate change and energy security may
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become increasingly incorporated in CSDP actions in the future. These aspects are becoming
key challenges to the maintenance of security and rule of law in the countries of deployment.
EU officials  have started to  think about  possible  policies  that  would address these issues
within the CSDP. Energy security and climate change issues have also a direct impact on the
EU. Already the 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas dispute, during which  Russia interrupted all gas
supplies passing through Ukrainian territory with the subsequent disruption of gas supplies to
a half of the EU, showed how conflicts abroad directly affect the energy security of the EU.
The  rising  flows  of  refugees  from  Sub-Saharan  regions  are  also  caused  due  to  climate
changes.  These  developments  encourage  research  on  the  impact  of  energy  security  and
climate change on EU foreign policy, in particular the CSDP. 
The CSDP is facing ineluctable challenges with regard to its ability to adapt to rapidly
changing circumstances and security conditions in conflict-driven and post-conflict societies.
Countries emerging from conflicts experience different levels of security and stability. As the
case of Mali demonstrates, violence may continue in some parts of the country, while other
areas may be stable. Due to these increasingly complex crises, many conflict situations often
require deployment of different crisis management tools simultaneously. But, deployments in
such  volatile  situations  raise  new security  concerns.  Will  the  EU be  able  to  continue  in
deploying its peacebuilding missions and operations in such complex environments? How can
the CSDP adapt to these circumstances? The threat of terrorism and asymmetric attacks on
peacekeepers and peacebuilders are becoming serious issues and put even stable and secure
areas at risk. Could CSDP missions operate in environments that pose the risks of asymmetric
threats? Will the EU involve (and be capable of involving) in counter-terrorism combat tasks,
through CSDP or other instruments, or will it rely on other actors in this area? What would be
the consequences for the CSDP if the EU involved in counter-terrorism operations? 
Furthermore, CSDP missions and operation with peacebuilding mandates focus on the
stabilisation and reconstruction of state institutions while often omitting other aspects which
may be  key to  the  achievement  of  sustainable  stability  and security.  For  example,  many
missions  are  deployed  in  conflicts  that  are  ethnically  and religiously driven,  such as  the
conflicts in BiH or Mali. However, the missions and operations do not sufficiently address the
issues  of  ethnic  and/or  religious  division.  Engaging  in  institution-  and  capacity-building
without a wider political and societal resolution may therefore not be fully effective. BiH and
Mali provide promising cases where the EU has attempted to pursue inclusive inter-ethnic and
comprehensive approaches. What could the EU do to further advance political settlement in
post-conflict  societies  which  lack  direct  violence  but  have  not  yet  been  able  to  achieve
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positive peace?  How could missions  and operations  in  ethnically diverse societies  further
develop inclusive- and conciliatory approaches in training and capability-building? 
The ongoing transformation of CSDP missions and operations from missions centred
on capacity-  and institution-building to ones that  focus on the security of the EU and its
citizens marks a new era of international conflict management. Refugee and migration issues
will most likely continue to dominate the political and scholarly debates as flows of refugees
and migrants are not going to settle soon. The CSDP may be utilised to tackle these issues
more  frequently  and  directly.  The  interlinkage  between  internal  and external  security,  as
demonstrated  through the increasing cooperation between Frontex and CSDP activities,  is
becoming a reality. We need to understand what this means for the CSDP and how the CSDP
will and shall adapt to these new tasks. At the same time, this will require new considerations
of the implications of such actions for the host societies. 
Nevertheless, crises in Georgia and Ukraine remind us that traditional international
conflicts between states, such as that between Ukraine and Russia, have not disappeared. The
CSDP is not prepared to be able to tackle conflicts such as this. The EU missions in Ukraine
and Georgia have limited effect  when it  comes to actual  resolution of the conflicts.  Both
missions  contain peacebuilding (capacity-  and institution-building)  and conflict  prevention
aspects. Nevertheless, is it sufficient and effective to deploy such tasks when the conflict has
not been resolved yet and violence continues? The EU training mission in Ukraine is viewed
with scepticism by Russia.  The EU has indeed used this  mission not  only as a  capacity-
building  instrument  but  also  as  a  tactic  of  its  political  engagement  with Russia  and as  a
symbolic gesture of support to Ukraine. The re-emergence of such conflicts and wars will
have an impact on the future development of the CSDP and its purposes. 
In recent years, the growing diversity of Western societies, driven by migration, has
blurred lines between foreign policy and domestic society. Only a few scholars have explored
the impact of multiculturalism on foreign policy of EU countries. As European societies are
becoming more ethnically diverse, with significant share of people with non-EU migration
background, governments can no longer assume a national consensus in their relations with
the outside world, let alone the firm homogenisation of the world. This interlinkage impacts
on foreign policies of European states (Aggestam and Hill 2008; Hill 2013; Hill 2007). While
scholars have analysed the relationship between foreign policies and multiculturalism of EU
states, we need to further study how the increasingly multicultural societies of Europe impact
on the nature of common policies such as the CSDP. Many EU countries have become homes
to different ethnic groups which are transnationally attached to the countries of their origin
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and of their ancestors. These are often countries in which the EU deploys its missions and
operations. We need to understand the extent to which the presence of groups with migration
background impacts on decisions about and character of CSDP actions. 
Further  research  on  multilateral  cooperation  in  conflict  management  is  needed  to
explore how the continuing focus of the CSDP on post-conflict actions and peacebuilding
affects both the cooperation and distribution of labour among the EU, the UN and NATO.
Koops and Tercovich argued that, as a result of their negative experiences in Rwanda and the
Balkans, European countries shifted their political and military attention to alternative fora,
such as NATO and, subsequently from 2003, the CSDP. However, the intention of NATO
withdrawal from Afghanistan and the slowing down of CSDP activities in 2010 has offered a
potential  ‘window of opportunity’ for a  ‘European return’ to UN peacekeeping (Koops and
Tercovich 2015). The crisis in Ukraine and the rise of ISIS have also re-emphasised the role
of NATO. We have to continue monitoring how the contributions of EU member states to UN
and NATO operations impact on the capacities of CSDP actions.
While the UN and NATO will remain natural EU partners in conflict management, we
need to explore the role of emerging powers and new regional actors, such as China, India,
Brazil or the AU, and potential spheres of cooperation between the EU and them. Can these
actors become new partners in the CSDP? Will rising powers assume more responsibility in
international conflict management, thus complementing or competing the CSDP? The CSDP
has already become a platform for multilateral cooperation. Numerous  non-EU states have
participated  in  CSDP  operations,  especially  in  missions  with  peacebuilding  tasks.  The
participation of non-EU states in CSDP actions has strengthened the overall legitimacy of the
EU role as an international security actor (Tardy 2014). Further analysis of the reasons and
incentives of non-EU states in participating in EU missions would aid our understanding of
the EU’s role as an international actor in peacebuilding. 
Brexit  poses  a  further  challenge  for  the  future  of  the  CSDP,  and  thus  the  EU’s
approach to peacebuilding. While scholars differ on the question of how the EU will address
this challenge, they generally agree that Brexit will provide the 27 with a strong motivation to
reach closer integration in defence (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2017). The cooperation will most
likely also continue with the UK after it leaves the Union. While the thesis has not considered
potential implications of Brexit for the CSDP in full detail, many officials, including British
ones, touched upon this aspect. We need to further monitor the political developments as to
better understand the impacts of Brexit on the future development of the CSDP. 
The impact of Brexit  on the CSDP can be analysed in quantitative and qualitative
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terms.  Quantitatively,  it  is  important  to  ask how the  departure  of  the  UK will  affect  the
contributions towards the CSDP in terms of personnel, financial resources and other military
and civilian assets. As far as personnel is concerned, Brexit should not pose any significant
challenge to the CSDP as the UK has generally contributed only around five per  cent  of
personnel to CSDP actions. Moreover, as Biscop has argued, there is no explicit need for the
remaining EU member states to replace British troops, for the CSDP is not an expansionist
policy; the EU states are not keen on deploying troops for the CSDP either (Biscop 2017c). A
gap in financial  contributions will  not obstruct  CSDP actions  given the relatively modest
budget for the CSDP, compensated by other significantly boosted instruments. In addition,
Germany, the largest EU economy, started to assume a more active role in matters of security
and defence (Rynning 2017). However, military assets and intelligence services are crucial
areas where the CSDP is still dependent on countries such as the UK. 
From  a  qualitative  perspective,  a  member  states’ contribution  involves  not  only
personnel and assets but also political  decision-making capabilities, strategic planning and
policy development. It is important to ask whether the departure of the UK would mean a
weakened political profile, less skilled officials capable of planning and strategic design, lack
of information and know-how, and lack of individuals who can bring a mission and the CSDP
forward. Informal conversions with representatives and officials in Brussels in late 2016 and
early 2017 revealed that, since the referendum, UK officials have radically shifted their focus
from the CSDP to NATO. The UK has sought to emphasise the importance of NATO and
marginalise  the  role  of  the  CSDP.  This  shift  has  been  driven  by political  pressure  from
London, despite the fact that many officials profoundly disagree with their  government at
home. Yet, UK officials acknowledged that Britain will most likely continue in participating
in  the  CSDP  given  the  affirmative  acceptance,  international  recognition  and  relative
successfulness  of  the  CSDP compared  to  NATO actions  (informal  interviews).  Similarly,
Biscop assumes that the UK will most likely be part of actions in the case of a military threat
to European interests, as well as in Europe’s periphery or beyond (Biscop 2017c).
It would, indeed, be the UK which would suffer more if it left the CSDP and other
instruments that the EU uses to tackle conflicts abroad. Algar-Faria and Juncos have argued
that the UK will lack much of a peacebuilding and conflict prevention capability if it stands
alone. Brexit will make the UK less influential globally in the area of peacebuilding. The
budget that the EU spends on conflict prevention and crisis management activities abroad is
significantly larger than that of the UK. The UK used the EU to project its power in the world
through conflict  prevention  and peacebuilding  efforts.  It  benefited  from the  CSDP which
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allowed the UK to intervene in places with a colonial past and countries on its priority list
much more easily, and also allowed it to benefit from the EU development policy (Algar-Faria
and Juncos 2016). The UK was the initiator of several CSDP actions,  including in Aceh,
Darfur and Palestine (Gourlay 2013). This corresponds with Biscop’s argument that “it would
be logical for the UK to keep the CSDP option open, for there will be contingencies in which
this will be the best suitable framework” (Biscop 2017c, para. 3). The CSDP has become an
avenue for many non-EU countries keen to join and contribute to EU missions (Tardy 2014).
The Brexit debate has reminded me of my time in New York when, during my work at
the UN, I  became intrigued by the  role  of  the  EU in peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  I
admired how diplomats from EU member states, including the UK, not only voted, but also
acted in a united and coordinated way, even when dealing with UN officials. I observed how
EU states played the key role in initiating and supporting policies in matters of international
security and peace with a normative commitment of making the world a better place. At that
time, I would not have thought that the UK may change its mind towards this approach. The
last years of my research took place in the wake and aftermath of the Brexit referendum. This
vote shaped my perception about the sustainability of European collectivity, including in the
CSDP. I hope that the discussion on the EU’s approach to peacebuilding through the CSDP
presented in this thesis may contribute to the ongoing debates about the EU’s commitment to
international peacebuilding and its role in contributing to a more stable and peaceful world. 
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Interview 27 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 29 April 2016
Interview 28 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 20 February 2016
Interview 29 with a representative of a Council preparatory body, Brussels, 25 February 2016
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Interview 49 with an officer of EUTM, Bamako, 17 January 2014
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